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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As Russian soldiers in unmarked uniforms took control over strategic locations of the 
Crimea in March 2014 the world stared in disbelief. It had somehow seemed that since 1990ties 
with the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism Francis Fukuyama’s prophesy of the “end of 
history” had come to be and all of the major world powers had embraced the same outlook.1 The 
power game was to be played by having a superior economy and channelling interests through 
international institutions. Interconnectedness of economies was supposed to guarantee that annexing 
foreign territory was the stuff of the unsophisticated past. The so called international community 
was supposed to guard observance of its most fundamental tenets. As it turned out, all of these 
assumptions were mistaken, at least as far as Russia is concerned. However, recent events in Crimea 
and ongoing violence in Eastern Ukraine highlight more than a set of faulty perceptions which had 
become widely accepted since the end of the Cold War. More importantly, these events demonstrate 
one of the striking shortcomings of the international law as a legal system.  
That shortcoming is in the fact that international law provides for a multitude of legal 
interests, which could be regarded as “community interests” or interests that are common to all 
states and are shared by all states (such as international peace and security, protection of global 
environmental commons or universally accepted human rights2), but there are remarkably few legal 
mechanisms in international law that are designed to protect these interests.3 In other words, there 
seems to be a sharp contrast between abundant substantive content of international rules providing 
for shared interests and very modest legal means to enforce those interests. As a result, these vital 
interests that protect common values and seek to secure common aims of the international 
community largely remain unattained.  
At the heart of the above noted absence of mechanisms for protection of shared 
communitarian interests is the very structure of the public international law. As will be discussed 
                                                 
1 In 1989 Francis Fukuyama famously argued that humanity had reached „the end point of mankind's ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” See 
Fukuyama F., Bloom A. The End of History? The National Interest, Vol. 16, 1989, p. 3. 
2 Cassese has noted that: „in the current framework of the international community, three sets of values underpin the 
overarching system of inter-State relations: peace, human rights and self-determination”, see Cassese A. Exinjura ius 
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimacy of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World 
Community? European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1998, p. 23. 
3 It must be noted that preservation of international peace and security may be regarded as an exceptional category 
among other interests of the international community, as protection of these interests is safeguarded by a wide 
competence of the UN Security Council under the UN Charter. However, as absence of any meaningful institutionalized 
responses to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent aggression in Eastern Ukraine demonstrates, the above 
proposition on insufficiency of legal means to protect community interests remains valid, even with regard to this 
particularly protected category of communitarian interests. 
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latter on in this study, there is remarkably little “publicness” in public international law.4 The 
structure of international obligations and the accompanying enforcement mechanisms are primarily 
based on private law notions. The very system of public international law, even after the UN 
Charter, hinges on state consent. There is very little subordination in the international legal order, 
and states generally act quite like private contractors in domestic legal systems, picking and 
choosing which obligations they want to take up – a horizontal system among equals. Moreover, 
breaches of international law, even when they harm not only the injured state, but also interests of 
the whole international community, result primarily in legal relationship between the injured state 
and the state that performed the breach. Despite the doctrinal prominence of obligations erga 
omnes5, actual examples of a meaningful application of the concept in context of state responsibility 
remain limited.6 As Simma famously noted: “[v]iewed realistically, the world of obligations erga 
omnes is still the world of “ought” rather than of the “is””.7 Likewise, although the UN Charter 
provides for the competence of the Security Council to adopt both forcible and non-forcible 
measures8, in practice, due to Council’s frequent inability to act, self-help of the injured state 
remains the primary response to the wrongful act. The validity of the so called sanctions (also 
known as countermeasures of general interest or solidarity measures9) in particular when adopted 
outside the UN Security Council, (again as the conflict in Ukraine demonstrates10) remain highly 
controversial.11  Thus the wrongdoing state will rarely find itself answering for a breach to the 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 2, p. 38. 
5 For notable studies of the concept see: Tams C. Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; Ragazzi M. The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997; Crawford J.  Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law. In: Recueil des Cours, 
319, 2006, p. 325. 
6 Among judgments that not only acknowledge existence of obligations erga omnes, but also conceive a legal 
relationship between the wrongdoer and the community of states, which allows invocation of responsibility by a 
concerned member of that community see: ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 422; Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand 
intervening) Judgment of March 31, 2014 available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&case=148&code=aj&p3=4 [viewed September 8, 2014]. 
7 Simma B. Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or Collective Responses to Violations 
of Obligations Erga Omnes? In: The Future of International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios – New Law? (Delbruck 
ed.,), Kiel: Duncker&Humblot, 1993, p. 125. 
8 See Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. For an example of a regional attempt at collective arrangements see Articles 
8, 17 and 20 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), September 2, 1947, 21 UNTS, 77. 
9 Koskenniemi M. Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order? British Yearbook of 
International Law, 2002, Vol. 2, 1, p. 337. 
10 By September 2014 the US and the EU (and a number of other states such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Australia 
and Japan) have implemented economic sanctions against Russia. 
11 See Alland D. Countermeasures of General Interest. European Journal of International Law, Vol.13, 2002, p. 1239; 
Dawidowicz M. Public Law Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party 
Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council. In: British Yearbook of International Law, 2006. p. 
333. Specifically on trade restrictions see Damrosch L. Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 
Recueil des Cours, 269 (1997), p. 9. 
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whole public i.e., the community of states. It is much more likely that the only state entitled and 
willing to invoke responsibility will be the injured state.  
However, it must also be noted that international law is not entirely void of elements of 
publicness. Although public international law is essentially based on the private law paradigm (i.e., 
obligations are owed in strict correlation to subjective rights), as will be discussed latter on in this 
study, it increasingly displays an element, which is at the core of public law – a relationship 
between an individual state and the community of states as a whole. This relationship between an 
individual state and the community is evidenced by recognition of erga omnes obligations, 
peremptory norms and the supremacy of the UN Charter obligations over other bilateral and 
multilateral treaties. These and other developments present a shift away from the “classical” – 
bilateralism and subjective rights based international law. Such evolution of international law 
towards the public law paradigm (i.e., conceiving obligations towards the community of states as a 
whole) inevitably creates friction with legal concepts founded on bilateralism and the private law 
model. Thus one of the main challenges for contemporary international law is to reconcile legal 
concepts designed to protect community interests and those intended to protect individualistic 
interests of states; to find balance between public interest norms and concepts such as state consent 
and sovereignty - in other words - a balance between private and public law paradigms. 
This study focuses on legal mechanisms for protection of community interests where one 
would expect to find them – in the rules on international responsibility of states. A seminal point in 
the story of development of the law of state responsibility was 2001 when the International Law 
Commission (the ILC) formally concluded its work on the epic project of codifying (and 
progressively developing) the law of state responsibility.12 The ILC has been engaged with the topic 
of international responsibility for most of its working life13  – responsibility of states was one of the 
25 fundamental topics initially suggested by Hersch Lauterpacht  in 1949 to be taken on by the 
Commission.14 Since those early post-war years international law has undergone significant 
transformation.15 Arguably the most important among the many developments, has been the above 
noted paradigm shift from bilateralism to multilateralism and accordingly to community interests.16 
The law of state responsibility, although in a very limited way, has likewise been transformed in the 
                                                 
12 For the most recent and comprehensive overview of the law of state responsibility see Crawford J. State 
Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
13 The ILC was created by the UN General Assembly in 1947 with the objective of “promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification”, see UN General Assembly Resolution 174(II) adopted on 
November 21, 1947, U.N. Doc. A/519. 
14 Lauterpacht H. Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law 
Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (1949). 
15 See Friedmann W. The Changing Structure of International Law. London: Stevens, 1964, p. 10. 
16 See Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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second part of the 20th century reflecting trends in theory of general international law. However, the 
progressive development in the theory of international responsibility, particularly in terms of 
conceiving a relationship between the wrongdoing state and the whole community of states, as we 
shall see latter on in this study, reached its highest point around 1960ties to 1970ties and from then 
onwards became somewhat stagnant. The ILC’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Articles on State Responsibility”)17 came to reflect something of a 
middle point between lofty aspirations of post-WWII years and a general absence of enthusiasm for 
significant innovations in 1990ties when the notion of “international crimes” was dropped from the 
Articles on State Responsibility.  
Thus the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility encapsulated the law in a form that was 
essentially still based on the private law paradigm. While the Articles on State Responsibility in 
principle recognize invocation of responsibility to protect community interests (whenever an erga 
omnes obligation is breached), in fact, when it comes down to bringing a claim, erga omnes 
obligations are conceived as series of individual relationships between the wrongdoer and another 
individual state. Most importantly there are no institutional arrangements18 and no invocation on 
behalf of the international community. Likewise, the ILC opted to give up the idea that braches 
ought to be divided into ordinary breaches and “international crimes” – in case of which any state 
would be regarded as injured and therefore entitled to invoke responsibility. Finally, the ILC also 
decided not to tackle the crucial question of multilateral countermeasures and punitive measures, 
again leaving out important issues that would have facilitated multilateralism. Consequently, the 
result of the ILC’s work, in terms of protecting community interests, seems less than satisfactory.  
The ILC’s work did not, however, result in a landmark treaty akin to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties19, as could have been expected, but rather in a resolution adopted by the 
                                                 
17 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 
(A/56/10) (Articles on State Responsibility or ASR), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part 
Two, p. 26. A closely related topic covered by the ILC is its work on the Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, see Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011 (A/66/10), Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two (ARIO). Since there is limited practice on the responsibility of 
international organizations, many of the articles in the ARIO are indeed instances of the ILC developing new norms. 
However, as the ARIO are predominantly modelled on the basis of Articles on State Responsibility most of the 
conceptual choices as to the content of the rules were made before the ILC began to work on the ARIO. For discussion 
of some substantive innovations in the ARIO see Nollkaemper A., Nadeski N. Responsibility of international 
organizations ‘in connection with acts of states’, SHARES Research Paper 08 (2012), finalized April 2012, available: 
sharesproject.nl [viewed August 26, 2014]. 
18 Proposals for institutional arrangements, such as mandatory adjudication, made by Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz 
were widely criticized and generally dismissed as unrealistic. See Arangio-Ruiz G., Fifth report on state responsibility, 
A/CN.4/453 and Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1. 
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331. 
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General Assembly, which merely “noted” the adoption of the Articles by the ILC.20 Since then, 
another 20 years have passed and certain notable developments in international law have occurred. 
International courts and tribunals are as many (and as busy) as ever.21 There is much talk of 
constitutionalization, fragmentation and deformalization of international law.22 Also there are 
positive signs of obligations towards the international community as a whole having a very real 
impact on litigation outcomes. Such recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases as Questions 
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal)23 and Whaling in the 
Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening)24 demonstrate that a right to invoke 
responsibility to protect community interests (rather than individual interests of the claimant) is 
becoming an accepted norm. Considering that the Articles on State Responsibility fixed the 
responsibility rules more that two decades ago, one may wonder whether and how these 
developments in international law cohabitate with state responsibility rules. These trends reflect the 
already noted dichotomy between the public law and the private law paradigms. However, within 
this study, they are considered specifically in relation to state responsibility rules as codified by the 
ILC and concern purposely developments of the past two decades, therefore, hopefully providing 
novel insights. 
 
Aim and structure of the thesis 
Considering the above described issues, the aim of this study is to establish whether the 
normative shift towards multilateralism and community interests in substantive international law 
has been accompanied by a similar shift towards communitarianism in the law of state 
responsibility. The central claim of this dissertation is that in the second half of the 20th century, 
when substantive international law partially reoriented towards community interests, the trend was 
not accompanied by a similar reorientation in responsibility rules, which have remained based on 
                                                 
20 UN General Assembly, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts: Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly, 28 January 2002, A/RES/56/83, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3da44ad10.html [viewed 
August 15, 2014]. Interestingly in the resolution the General Assembly only stated that it “takes note of the articles”, 
thus avoiding any express approval or disapproval of the particular contents of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
21 It may be noted that generally (but not universally) international courts and tribunals seem to adhere to the wisdom of 
the ILC’s Articles. For rare instances of alternative approaches to attribution of conduct see ECtHR judgment El-Masri 
v Macedonia, 39630/09, 13 December 2012, para.206. Available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 [viewed September 28, 2014]; International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94A-A, Appeals 
Chamber, 15 July 1999, 38 ILM 1581 (1999). 
22 Koskenniemi M. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. Modern Law Review, Vol. 
70, 2007, p. 1. 
23 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), judgment of July 20, 2012, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012 p. 422. 
24 ICJ: Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) Judgment of March 31, 2014, available 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&case=148&code=aj&p3=4 [viewed August 8, 2014]. 
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bilateralism and subjective rights paradigm. The ILC, despite an obvious intention to provide 
responsibility mechanisms to protect community interests, was unable to depart from the private 
law paradigm. This disparity between substantive law and responsibility mechanisms contributes to 
non-enforcement of international rules with communitarian objectives.  
To substantiate the above proposition, the study will enquire into a number of research 
questions, structuring the following chapters around those questions. The first two chapters form a 
background necessary for the subsequent analysis of communitarian elements in responsibility 
rules. Thus the study begins by exploring the meaning of the concept of international community 
and whether there is any social or legal reality behind it (Chapter 1). The Chapter proceeds with a 
general appraisal of the state of international law on the basis of approach provided by Friedman, 
namely, by enquiring whether international law may be regarded as a law of cooperation and thus 
indicating existence of shared values and interests and thereby pointing to a community. Or rather, 
is international law still predominantly a law of coexistence, thereby indicating absence of a 
community. In Chapter 2 the study considers signs of the so called “public law paradigm” (elements 
characteristic to public law, primarily a legal relationships not only between individual states, but 
between individual states and the whole community) in international law generally. The analysis 
suggests that developments in general international law are mainly normative in nature i.e., the 
introduction of public interest norms and recognition of community interests in multilateral treaties 
are not accompanied by novel enforcement mechanisms, thus revealing a stark contrast between a 
wealth of obligations which pursue communitarian objectives and virtual absence of communitarian 
mechanisms for their enforcement. 
In Chapter 3 the study turns specifically to historical development of state responsibility 
rules. In particular it enquires how communitarian elements have evolved – whether responsibility 
rules conceive a legal relationship not only between the injured state and the state that has 
performed the breach, but also between the wrongdoing state and the community of states as a 
whole. After a brief overview of doctrinal origins and 19th to early 20th century developments, it 
will focus particularly on the work of the ILC and how it attempted to introduce multilateralism into 
state responsibility rules in the second half of the 20th century. Chapter 4 continues the historical 
narrative of the previous chapter, but is dedicated particularly to discussion of the concept of 
international crimes of states. As the concept of state crimes plays a pivotal role in the evolution of 
protection of community interests (and is also somewhat lengthy), it has been singled out from the 
rest of the discussion of history and elaborated in a separate chapter. 
Having traced the historical evolution of the protection of community interests in the law of 
state responsibility, in Chapter 5 the study finally turns to the present state of this branch of 
international law. It proceeds with assessment of four distinct elements in the Articles on State 
 12 
Responsibility which were designed to protect interests of the international community. These 
elements are: 1) the so called objective nature of state responsibility, i.e., an idea that state incurs 
international responsibility regardless whether the breach has caused injury to any state; 2) 
invocation of responsibility by a state other than the injured; 3) serious breaches of peremptory 
norms; and 4) countermeasures of general interest also referred to as solidarity measures. The final 
Chapter examines some of the trends in international law that have manifested in the decade 
following the adoption of the Articles on State Responsibility, such as constitutionalization and 
fragmentation. In particular the study will enquire whether responsibility rules, which were codified 
and sometimes progressively developed by the ILC considerably earlier then the discussed trends, 
adequately reflect these developments. 
 
Existing research 
Despite the fact that there is a vast amount of excellent scholarship on the law of state 
responsibility25, on the concept of international community26 and on multilateralism27 as separate 
topics in their own right, there is very little research that brings these areas together and is 
specifically dedicated to protection of community interests in state responsibility law.28 Likewise 
notable recent studies on jus cogens and on obligations erga omnes, such as Peremptory Norms in 
International Law by Orakhelashvili29 and Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law 
by Tams30, although providing extensive theoretical analysis of content and effects of these 
concepts, do not place these concepts specifically in the context of state responsibility rules as 
codified by the ILC. Proukaki’s The Problem of Enforcement of International Law31, similarly to 
this work, is concerned with the inadequacy of multilateralism in the contemporary law of state 
                                                 
25 For recent comprehensive studies of the topic see: Crawford J. State Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013; and Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), The Law of International 
Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
26 Keith K., Bilateralism and Community in Treaty Law and Practice – of Warriors, Workers, and (Hook-)Worms. In: 
Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 753. Abi-Saab G. Whither the International Community? European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 9 (1998). p. 252.  
27 Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; for an account on all trends signalling ‘verticalization’ of international law see 
Capaldo G.Z. The Pillars of Global Law. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008. 
28 See Crawford J. Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In: Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 224; Dupuy, 
P.M. A General Stocktaking of the Connections between the Multilateral Dimension of Obligations and Codification of 
the Law of Responsibility. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13. No.5, 2002, p. 1053.  
29 Orakhelashvili A. Peremptory Norms in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
30 Tams C. Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
31 Proukaki E. The Problem of Enforcement of International Law. Countermeasures, the non-injured state and the idea 
of International Community. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
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responsibility. However, Proukaki’s research is focused exclusively on countermeasures by non-
injured states, and it is primarily directed towards proving that countermeasures of general interest 
have become an accepted customary rule. Thus Proukaki’s work significantly differs in scope from 
the present study, which rather than investigating a single legal mechanism, is concerned with the 
broader phenomena of evolution of multilateralism in the law of state responsibility. The works that 
exist on the topic are rather limited in scope and therefore do not do full justice to the complexity of 
the topic.32 The peculiarity of this research is that it adopts an approach based on historical enquiry 
into development of multilateralism in the law of state responsibility. The historical approach to the 
narrative questions the commonly held perception that international law is ever steadily evolving 
from a primitive to a refined legal system. The historical analysis of state responsibility law 
demonstrates that when such a refinement is taking place, it is by no means a simplistic story of a 
constant linear evolution over the second half of the 20th century. It is rather an ongoing chronicle 
of relentless waves of doctrinal enthusiasm spurred by social realities of ever more interdependent 
world painstakingly and slowly eroding rock-solid bilateralism endorsing state practice. In a short 
term it may even appear that a step forward is just as well followed by two steps back (e.g., consider 
the discarding of the notion of state crimes and the accompanying regime of aggravated 
responsibility in mid 1990ties).  
 
Methodology and delimitations 
The methodology of this dissertation is determined by the fact that the topic of the study 
requires analysis of two interrelated aspects of international law: history (including history of 
theory) and theory in terms of enquiry into lex ferenda, i.e., what the theory ought to be. Therefore 
firstly, the study employs a historical approach to the research. With historical approach the enquiry 
traces the development of the public law paradigm in the law of state responsibility beginning with 
Roman law origins up to the present, in which the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility are the 
definitive feature of the state responsibility law of the early 21st century. Within this approach an 
analysis into the history of theory of the law of state responsibility is conducted with a focus on 
how and when trends towards multilateralism emerged, in particular in the work of the ILC. The 
evolution in the theory of the law of state responsibility is considered in the larger context of 
historic development of international law as a legal system. This enquiry into the evolution of 
multilateralism primarily is structured as a history of writings of international lawyers who 
conceptualize and criticize state practice of their time. Pronouncements of international courts and 
                                                 
32 Spinedi M. From One Codification to Another: Bilateralism and Multilateralism in the Genesis of the Law of Treaties 
and the Law of State Responsibility. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No.5, 2002, p. 1100; Dupuy, 
P.M. Back to the Future of a Multilateral Dimension of the Law of State Responsibility for Breaches of ‘Obligations 
Owed to International Community as a Whole’. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23 No.4, 2012, p. 1061. 
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tribunals add to the discussion, but only to a limited extent as precedents on invocation of 
responsibility or countermeasures to protect community interests remain very limited. To adopt 
Koskenniemi’s classification of historical narratives33 into narratives centred on: 1) a particular 
historic epoch; 2) development of a particular legal concept during various epochs i.e., conceptual 
history; 3) notable personalities within particular epochs and their contribution to international law, 
this research adopts the second modality. Although historical origins of the law of state 
responsibility are briefly considered, the discussion is centred predominantly on the second part of 
the 20th century when the ILC’s work on state responsibility dominated the landscape of the topic. 
However, within this research the presentation of historical development of the public law 
paradigm in the law of state responsibility is not an end in itself. The historical approach to the 
research is employed only as means to provide context for analysis of problems of the present law 
of state responsibility. Central to those problems is a marked disparity between responsibility rules 
(which generally are based on bilateralism and subjective rights) and substantive norms (or primary 
norms to use the ILC’s terminology) of modern international law, many of which seek to protect 
various community interests and therefore may not be adequately protected by mechanisms 
designed to protect individual interests. For this analysis a problem driven approach is applied. Thus 
the research employs a combination of historical and a problem driven approaches.   
Once the historical narrative is accomplished, culminating with assessment of mechanisms 
for protection of community interests in the ILC’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, the study 
turns to questions of theory of lex ferenda or what the law ought to be. Particular importance is 
given to widely recognized trends that are presently manifesting in international law, such as 
constitutionalization and fragmentation, and how these trends impact the law of state responsibility.  
In this section the study attempts to avoid teleological generalizations while at the same time 
providing an assessment of what secondary rules are required to mach primary rules which establish 
community objectives.  
Within the above described framework of the historical and problem driven approaches the 
research specifically employs methodology of comparative, historical, inductive and deductive 
analysis. The comparative method is used to consider invocation of state responsibility in general 
international law and in specific specialized fields such as the EU law. The historical analysis, as 
already mentioned, is the primary method of the first four chapters. Inductive and deductive 
analysis of legal concepts and legal phenomena in state practice, in judgments of international 
courts and in opinions of legal scholars are used throughout the research. 
                                                 
33 Koskenniemi M. A History of International Law Histories. In: Fassbender B., Peters A., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 943. 
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As for delimitations, it must first be noted that the particular issues raised in this research 
(e.g., invocation of responsibility by non-injured states, countermeasures of general interest etc.,) 
deal with enforcement of international law which as such may take many avenues.  All measures 
that are in the focus of this research, despite their progressive traits, belong to the horizontal or 
decentralized interstate level of enforcement. Therefore the analysis will not address enforcement of 
international law through national judiciaries – a topic that has come to prominence in the recent 
years.34 Inclusion of enforcement through national courts would considerably widen the scope of 
the research and would steer the topic away from the issue of development of state responsibility 
rules as measures for interstate enforcement of international law. Similarly the research will not 
address issues of state responsibility in the context of the UN Security Council measures. Although 
Security Council measures may be regarded as a model case of multilateral enforcement of state 
responsibility, they merit a separate discussion which inevitably gravitates towards abundantly 
argued issue of veto rights of permanent members and the Security Council reform.35 This 
discussion in contrast attempts to pursue a distinct approach and is limited to what could be labelled 
as decentralized interstate multilateralism. 
A further delimitation concerns the distinction between primary rules (those that provide 
substantive obligations) and secondary rules, i.e., “the general rules governing the international 
responsibility of states”36. Primary rules that provide for communitarian interests – be it Article 1 of 
the UN Charter (pronouncing the paramount aim of the UN “to maintain international peace and 
security”37), human rights38 and disarmament treaties39 or treaties on protection of global 
commons40 - are not in the focus of this research. These primary rules only serve as a background 
for analysis of secondary rules. Although closely related to the topic, substantive primary rules 
providing for communitarian interests for this study are important only as substantiation of 
necessity for responsibility mechanisms in the secondary rules. Therefore the subsequent analysis 
                                                 
34 See Nollkaemper A. National Courts and the International Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
35 For an overview of issues See Gowlland-Debbas V. Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State 
Responsibility. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 43.01 (1994), p. 55. 
36 Ago R., The First report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/217 and Add.l, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1969, Vol. II, p. 125. p. 139.  
37 Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
38 Most obvious examples of treaties providing for communitarian objectives in the field of human rights would be: 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS Vol. 78, p. 277; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
UNTS Vol. 1465, p. 85; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, UNTS Vol. 999, p. 
171. 
39 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction, 3 September 1992, UNTS Vol. 1974, p. 45. 
40 Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959, UNTS Vol. 402 p. 71; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
22 March 1985, UNTS Vol. 1513 p. 293; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UNTS 
Vol. 1833 p. 3. 
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will be concerned primarily with the secondary rules i.e., rules on international responsibility of 
states. 
In addition, the research is primarily concerned with state responsibility under general 
international law. Thus state responsibility rules under lex specialis of the EU law, the ECHR law, 
the WTO law and other specialized fields are addressed only occasionally for purposes of 
comparison with state responsibility rules of general international law. Elements of multilateralism 
in responsibility rules of specialized fields are as varied as the fields that employ them. Therefore 
comprehensive analysis of specialized fields would notably expand the scope of the research, 
diverting the focus away from responsibility rules under lex generalis which is the main object of 
this work.  
Furthermore, the reader is cautioned not to mix protection of community interests in terms 
of availability of legal concepts with the reality of frequent breaches that are not followed up by any 
legal responses. The issue of frequent non-invocation of responsibility is fundamentally a political 
issue and therefore outside the ambit of this research. There is however, undeniably also a close 
interplay between international law and politics, as law, being the “gentle civilizer”41, may motivate 
the political will to run in concord with the law. It is therefore the very mission of the law to offer 
legal concepts that would facilitate the political will. However, it is not the purpose of this research 
to enquire into non-legal considerations why states opt not to invoke responsibility. 
In addition, it must be noted that the topic of protection of community interests in the law of 
state responsibility has much to do with debate over what the law is and what it ought to be. 
International law obviously is developing, and it may be argued that it develops faster than the 
society that it regulates. Thus the topic touches into a fundamental policy question whether any 
developments in law should always be preceded by actual developments in society.42 On the one 
hand, an argument may be made that a good law ought to reflect genuine social reality, rather than 
build paper tigers. On the other hand, one may equally argue that law should be used as a tool to 
develop society. The evolution of the European Union with functioning single market and common 
policies across the spectrum of human activity is a marked example of a society that develops 
through law.43 Irrespective of many shortcomings of the EU, hardly such level of integration could 
                                                 
41 See Koskenniemi M. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
42 For reflections on this theme see: Lauterpacht H. The Development of International Law by the International Court. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Tams C., Sloan J. (eds.), The Development of International Law by the 
International Court of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
43 See Garrett G. The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union. International Organization, Vol. 49, 1995, p. 
171. 
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have taken place without law driven reforms.44 The flip side of law running ahead of the society is a 
risk that society may not accept the law (again the EU provides an example with popular discontent 
about overcomplicated policies and rule by unaccountable bureaucracy). If that happens, the 
lawmaker is discredited and law’s authority decreases. 
The analysis in this study attempts to avoid extremes of both above mentioned views on law 
as means of societal development. However, as arguments for and against progressive development 
of international law gradually unfold, the position taken by this thesis rather tilts towards supporting 
progressive development of international law. Law obviously must reflect social reality. But that 
requirement in no way implies that the law may not attempt to find solutions to society’s problems. 
Also a mandate to engage in progressive development may be implicit in objectives that the society 
has clearly and willingly agreed to. The present day international community has abundantly 
postulated its objectives with regard to international peace, human rights and other shared interests. 
Why then to deny development of legal constructs that would facilitate these agreed objectives? 
Likewise, one may wonder whether the present bilateralism-rooted international law does indeed 
reflect contemporary social reality? As noted by Allott, modern international law remains: 
“an international system which was, and is, post-feudal society set in amber. 
Undemocratized. Unsocialized. Capable only of generating so-called international 
relations, in which so-called states act in the name of so-called national interests, through 
the exercise of so-called power, carrying out so-called foreign policy conducted by means 
of diplomacy, punctuated by medieval entertainments called wars or, in the miserable 
modern euphemism, armed conflict. This is the essence of the social process of the 
international non-society.”45 
If there is a trace of truth in this assessment, it may well be the case that international law 
without a degree of progressive development may remain “doomed to be what it has been – 
marginal, residual and intermittent.”46 At the same time, it must be noted this research has not been 
carried out with a blunt intention to negate virtues and important achievements of modern 
international law. On the contrary, it is hoped that the following chapters will reveal an appraisal of 
international law – a law which despite its many shortcomings nonetheless represents valuable 
collective experience accumulated through generations of mankind and still holds vast untapped 
potential. 
                                                 
44 See Pierson P. The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies 
Vol. 29.2, 1996, p. 123. 
45 Allott P. International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World. Hull: Hull University Press, 1989. 
p. 10. 
46 Allott P. Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001, p. 104. 
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1. THE IDEA OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
To enquire into the topic of this research, namely, how interests of the international 
community are protected in the law of state responsibility, it is necessary to deal with some 
preliminary points. First of these is to establish the meaning of the concept of international 
community and whether there is any social or legal reality behind it. In order to investigate these 
questions the present chapter begins by a brief comparison of the most common uses of the term 
“international community” in contemporary legal discourse. It then proceeds to a comparative 
overview of opinions of scholars on classification of international systems (e.g., as international 
system, society, community, etc.,). In particular the Anarchical Society47 of Hadley Bull is taken as 
a point of reference for the discussion. Then the chapter outlines how major traditions of 
international scholarship (i.e., realists, internationalists and universalists) view the possibility of the 
international community. Finally, the chapter proceeds to a general appraisal of the state of 
international law on the basis of approach provided by Friedman i.e., by enquiring whether 
international law may be regarded as a law of cooperation - thus indicating existence of shared 
values and interests, and thereby pointing to a community. Or rather, is international law still a law 
of coexistence, thereby indicating absence of a community. 
 
1.1. What is a community? 
In western philosophical thought the concept of community was first theoreticised by 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in 1887. In his famous work “Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft” Tönnies proposed a distinction between community or Gemeinschaft - a small group 
that is characterised by a sense of togetherness and interdependence, such as a family or 
neighbourhood, and between society or Gesellschaft - a larger group with a lesser perception of 
interconnectedness, such as a state.48 For Tönnies members of a community are well aware of the 
common interest of the group and see themselves as means to secure those interests. On the other 
hand members of a society are rather preoccupied with their individual interests and see the social 
group only as means for achieving their individual goals.49 
                                                 
47 See Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977. 
48 See Tönnies F. Community and Society. Devon: David & Charles, 2011. 
49 Ibid., p. 69. 
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Of course, ideas on forms of human unity, such as those proposed by Tönnies, are not 
exclusively a product of Western philosophy and run considerably further back than late 19th 
century. Most creation myths suppose a profound oneness and interconnectedness of all human 
beings (or indeed all beings).50 The same principle of social and moral unity is apparent in major 
monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, perceiving all humans as children of the Creator and thus 
being part of one family. The idea of oneness of human society, which ought to manifest also in 
political and legal terms, appears prominently in works of Stoic philosophers.51 In medieval Europe 
the idea surfaces in perception of Respublica Christiania – a sense of a community of Christian 
states united by one faith, common values and a need to defend against common enemies. 
Interestingly enough, ideological unity of this early European “community” based on unity of 
values and purposes, although appearing within a setting of relatively undeveloped and 
unsophisticated interstate relations, arguably presents an example of an international system that 
resembles a community much more than the sovereignty dominated international system that came 
about after the Westphalian Peace Treaties of 1648.52 
The concept of international community (or rather society as societas gentium) first enters 
legal discourse in the period between fifteenth to seventeenth centuries in writings of such scholars 
as Vitoria, Svarez, Gentili and Grotius.53 However, by the beginning of the 21st century the use of 
the term has become all pervasive - statesmen make appeals to the international community or 
claim to speak on its behalf, international conferences seek to protect its interests, the ICC Statute 
proclaims Court’s jurisdiction over crimes which are “of concern to the international community as 
a whole”54, and even the UN Security Council occasionally calls on the “international 
community”55. The International Court of Justice has likewise taken on the vocabulary: in Legality 
of Nuclear Weapons56, Tehran Hostages57 and the Barcelona Traction58, in all of these the Court 
                                                 
50 See Leeming D. Creation Myths. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
51 See Aurelius M. Meditations, transl., by Hard R. Herfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997.  
52 The so called Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in the Holly Roman Empire and also a war 
between the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, consists of three treaties: two Treaties of Münster of 30 January 
and 24 October 1648, and the Treaty of Osnabrück 24 October 1648, available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=4540 [viewed 28 August 2014]. 
53 Although scholars like Grotius spoke of societas gentium already in the 17th century, hardly the term can be applied 
to the 17th century world at large. As Abi-Saab notes in this regard: “Yet this universal community, embracing all 
humanity, was only a theoretical construct or explanation, a mental image, perceived as a philosophical proposition or a 
distant horizon, rather than as an existent reality”, see Abi-Saab G. Whither the International Community? European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9 (1998). p. 250. 
54 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 37 ILM 1002 (1998), 
Article 5. 
55 UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) On the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17 March 2011, 
S/RES/1973(2011), available at: www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html [viewed 28 September 2014]. 
56 ICJ: Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996. p. 226. 
57 ICJ: United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3. 
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refers to the “international community”. The term also found its way into the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties59 as well as into the ILC’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility.60  
However, as has been observed elsewhere: “invoking the international community is a lot 
easier than defining it.”61 Indeed, the term has become so widely used that its meaning is 
presupposed to be self-evident. But what does “international community” really refer to? One of the 
most predominant uses of the term in political, scholarly and judicial discourse seems to refer to the 
sum of predominant actors on international stage – states, international organizations and to lesser 
extent also other actors, such as international NGOs. Thus “international community” is merely a 
convenient collective reference to all those who possess varied degrees legal “personality” on 
international stage. An important facet of this international community has much to do with 
articulation of international public opinion.62 The difficulty with such an understanding of the 
concept is that it hardly fits into the substantive meaning of the notion “community”. As will be 
explored later on, a community (in both its sociological meaning and as discussed in legal 
scholarship) is about an advanced degree of interconnectedness, recognition and actual protection of 
shared interests and values. One may argue that such a level of interconnectedness and shared 
interests is present among states of one region in certain specific cases (like the EU), or among 
NGOs in a specific field (like human rights), or even among all states, but only within a specific 
area of interests (like peace and security).  But an argument that the same applies to the whole 
multitude of international actors across the whole spectrum of human activity seems questionable.63  
Another frequent use of “international community” in contemporary discourse implies 
exclusively the community of states. This meaning of the concept appears specifically in both 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. Article 53 of both conventions, when defining a 
peremptory norm, explains that it is a norm that is recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole. This use of the term is present also in many of prominent accounts of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
58 ICJ: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, 
para.33. 
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331. 
60 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
2001 (A/56/10) (ASR), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 26. 
61 Govers A. The Two Powers. Foreign Policy Vol. 132, 2002, p. 32. 
62 The concept of international public opinion in itself is somewhat problematic. In absence of a genuine international 
public, the so called international public opinion is articulated by those that claim to be representatives of national 
publics – governments, groupings of those governments and also international NGOs. The problematic element is that 
these representatives may not necessarily voice the genuine opinion of national publics. The British military venture in 
Iraq of 2003 provides a fitting example of governmental policy in stark dissonance to public opinion. 
63 Among sceptics of the „international community” see de Visscher C. Theory and Reality in Public International Law. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 94. de Visscher notes: „It is therefore pure illusion to expect from the 
mere arrangement of inter-State relations the establishment of a community order; this can find a solid foundation only 
in the development of the true international spirit of men.” 
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international law of the late 20th century. For example, in the 9th edition of Oppenheim’s 
International Law, Jennings and Watts, when discussing universal nature of international law, note 
that irrespective of differences between states in their political systems or ideologies, international 
law does not make “any distinctions in the membership of the international community.”64 Such use 
of “international community”, implying a community of states, certainly has some validity in a 
sense that it refers to a relatively small group, thus fitting the sociological meaning of the concept. 
The designation “community of states” perhaps was even more fitting in 1945 when that 
community was made up of only about 51 members. However, as will be explored latter in this 
chapter, the size of a group by itself does not merit a label of a community, if essential 
characteristics of high degree of interdependence and shared interests are absent.65 
 
1.2. Degrees of communitarianism   
Definitions of international community are many and as most definitions present a fruitful 
ground for disagreement.66 Does international community mean community of states only (as 
VCLT and writings of Jennings and Watts suggest) or perhaps it refers to a community of all 
humanity as such? Does it also imply a certain degree of interconnectedness or some other criteria 
of communitarianism; if so, what are those criteria and where the threshold for qualifying as a 
community stands? Among the multitude of scholarly opinions, it is probably writings of Headley 
Bull that stand out as defining the modern debate on the above issues. In his Anarchical Society 
Bull suggests to distinguish four levels of international interconnectedness, those being: 
“international system”, “international society”, “international order” and “world order”.67 
Bull’s “international system” designates the least developed mode of communitarianism. It 
emerges “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact 
on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a 
                                                 
64 Jennings R., Watts A. Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace. Vol. 1, 9th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992, p. 87. 
65 It must be noted that other more specific uses of the term “international community” appear in scholarly discourse of 
the „universalist” or „Kantian” strand. Many of these authors argue that international community refers not only to 
generally recognized subjects of international law, such as states and international organizations, but encompass the 
whole humanity, with individual as the genuine subject of the international community. See Allott P. Reconstituting 
Humanity – New International Law, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, 1992, p. 219. Cassese A. The 
Human Dimension of International Law. Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
66 For instance Tomas Franck in his Fairness in International Law and Institutions defines community as a “social 
system of continuing interaction and transaction” and “an ongoing, structured relationship between a set of actors” 
which at the same time is a “conscious system of reciprocity” with “shared moral imperatives and values”. See Franck. 
T. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. p. 10. 
67 See Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977. 
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whole.”68 This mode of interrelation is to be distinguished from one in which states are fairly 
unaware of each others conduct and contacts are rudimentary and only occasional. Thus, for 
instance, Roman Republic of around 4th century B.C., probably formed something akin to an 
“international system” with Carthage and Greek city states.69 Whereas Rome during the same 
historic period could not be said to form an “international system” with Chinese or Mayan states.  
If relations in “international system” intensify (due to trade or other individualistic interests) 
then “international society” comes about. For Bull “international society” designates “a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values” which is “bound by common set 
of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common institutions.”70 
Greek city states of 4th century B.C., could somewhat qualify as a regional “international society” as 
those states had a network of lively relationships of trade, treaties, war alliances and even methods 
of dispute adjudication.71 On the other hand Greeks had very little of what could be labelled as 
common institutions, thus arguably they rather fited the category of an “international system”. The 
Westphalian system of international relations, as it existed from 17th century onwards, is probably a 
better example of Bull’s “international society” – European states of that epoch indeed had common 
interests and values, adhered to certain rules in their relations and established common institutions. 
It was a society in which the predominant norm was non-interference and international law mostly 
comprised of rules on what one state does not do to other states. Bull’s “international society” also 
roughly fits with the meaning of Gesellschaft proposed by Tönnies - members of international 
society are aware of their common interests, however, their individualistic agendas tend to prevail – 
common rules exist, but they may remain declaratory, common institutions are still undeveloped.  
If, however, awareness of common interests develops and states recognize their importance 
not only in words but in deeds, then an “international order” emerges. “International order” means 
“a patter or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that 
are elementary, primary or universal.”72 For Bull those goals would include preservation of peace, 
keeping promises and limiting violence. In “international order” the commitment of individual 
states to common interests becomes actual rather than declaratory and states actively engage in 
protection of those interests. Arguably the present condition of international relations comes close 
to Bull’s description of an “international order” as states (with occasional exceptions) seem to share 
such goals as preservation of international peace and performance of international obligations and 
                                                 
68 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977. p. 9. 
69 See Phillipson C. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome. London: MacMillan, 1911. 
70 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 13. 
71 See Bederman D. International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Rostovtsev M. 
International Relations in the Ancient World. In: The History and Nature of International Relations, Walsh E. ed. New 
York: MacMillan, 1922. 
72 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 15. 
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are ready to actually exert themselves to attain these goals through cooperation in international 
organizations, by establishing international courts to settle disputes or by applying countermeasures 
of general interest. On the other hand, it seems questionable whether states do indeed sustain their 
common goals, or rather they tend to pursue their individualistic interests. For instance, inaction of 
the UN Security Council in situations, which clearly constitute threats to international peace and 
security, casts some doubt whether such a system merits being labelled as “international order” as 
the primary goal of international peace will be left unattained due to Security Council’s permanent 
member’s preference towards individual interest.  Bull’s “international order” already resembles 
Tönnies Gemeinschaft, although it is more limited, as participants of Bull’s “international order” 
still have only some shared interests, whereas Gemeinschaft presupposes a deeper sense of 
togetherness and interdependence.  
The final and the most advanced modality of communitarianism for Bull is “world order”. It 
takes place when elementary or primary goals of social life are sustained not only on interstate 
level, but on level of mankind as a whole in “the great society of all mankind”73. The relationship 
here shifts from inter-state level to a system that is made up of individual human beings, who 
pursue the common good of the mankind directly without the medium of states (although states may 
continue to exist). Here Bull’s view flows into the larger current of Kantian universalism on which 
much of modern legal scholarship travels (especially that of constitutionalist strand). Have we 
already arrived at “the great society of all mankind”? Some authors argue that we are certainly on 
the way74; perhaps indeed we are, but so far most of us are simply failing to recognize it. 
To sum up Bull’s classification, international relationships make a gradual transformation – 
from no relationship to an “international system” which develops into “international society” which 
in turn may advance to “international order” and eventually culminate as “world order” made up of 
individual human beings rather than states. Classifying historical systems and the present day 
condition of international arena in accordance with categories provided by Bull is bound to be very 
subjective. Where one observer would see international system, another one would perceive 
international society. Moreover, there have been other influential authors proposing similar, but 
slightly varied views on classification of the international system.75 Also sociological terms 
“community” and “society” suggested by Tönnie’s, although lacking in technical detail when 
compared to Bull’s classification, perhaps intuitively offer more insights than a robust definition.  
                                                 
73 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 19. 
74 See Buzan B. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
75 See Heeren, A.H.L. A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies: from its formation at 
the close of the fifteenth century, to its re-establishment upon the fall of Napoleon. London: Henry G.Bohn, 1846. 
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Therefore it seems unnecessary to further dwell the above classification. The important 
point for this study that can be derived from writings of Bull and others is that recognition of 
common interests and common values are the defining elements in determining the degree of 
communitarianism. The differences in intensity of these common interests and values and how well 
they are actually protected will accordingly determine how the social reality is classified. The more 
shared interests are recognized and protected, the more a system deserves to be regarded as a 
community.  
So what is the present degree of communitarianism? It seems uncontroversial to suggest that 
states and other actors on international stage are aware of common interests - such as international 
peace, preservation and management of global commons and dealing with challenges that by their 
nature may not be adequately addressed by efforts of individual states, such as climate change. 
Likewise, there is also a near universal acceptance of a limited set of values, most notably 
evidenced by recognition of peremptory norms. These are signs that signal communitarianism. But 
are these enough to constitute a community? It seems equally uncontroversial to suggest that the 
collective security system often fails to function; that global commons are rapidly being degraded; 
and that efforts to deal with climate change are anything but successful. Putting these observations 
in the context of the above discussion, suggests that at best we have a dysfunctional international 
society rather than a community. If international relations theorists have got it right, then in actual 
state practice individualist interests are often likely to take precedence over common interests, just 
like individuals in Tönnie’s Gesellschaft care more about their own affairs than about the affairs of 
the state that they make up.  
However, there are also good reasons to refer to the sum of international actors as the 
international community. Firstly, it is probably better to consider that we have an international 
community that is failing to protect common interests, than to think that we have an international 
society in which precedence of individualist interests is an accepted norm. Language may have a 
powerful influence on perceptions and indeed may steer opinions towards a genuine international 
community. Secondly, there is a considerable amount of discourse, including judicial, as well as the 
already mentioned provisions of the VCLT and the Articles on State Responsibility that use the 
term “international community”. Therefore, for the purpose of consistency with the mainstream 
discourse, it is suggested that from this point onwards, we will settle on “international community” 
bearing in mind, however, that the present reality of international relations does not fully warrant 
the use of this term, but is rather an aspiration.  
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1.3. “International community” for realists, internationalists and universalists 
Opinions on whether states recognize their common interests (and accordingly that there is 
something akin to an international community) are inevitably influenced by philosophical outlooks 
that one holds about the reality of international relations. The whole multitude of scholarly opinions 
on this point has been categorized into three basic traditions or schools of philosophic thought.76 It 
is worth outlining these traditions as time and again they will come into play in the subsequent 
discussion on existence (or non-existence) of shared values and goals of the international 
community.  
The first tradition is that of “realists”. For this tradition international relations are all about 
pursuit of national interest above all else - a struggle for power - straight and simple. International 
system is a kind of jungle where powerful states do as they wish while “the weak suffer what they 
must”77. Hans Morgenthau presents an example of a “realist” outlook: “International politics, like 
all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is 
always the immediate aim.”78 This ceaseless struggle forces states to do whatever they can to 
maximize their power at the expense of other competing states.79 Thus international cooperation, 
according to realists, will take place only as far as it serves self-interest to maximize power. 
International rules in such a system are only a smoke screen that may be used to subject weaker 
states or to be violated when a violation would grant a competitive advantage. The true province of 
law, for realists, is to deal with inconsequential, uncontroversial mundane technicalities – the stuff 
about which one feels cool and dispassionate. All matters of genuine importance are the province of 
politics.  
On the level of state rhetoric realism has been out of fashion since the advent of the United 
Nations Charter and states generally tend to justify their actions on the basis of international law.80 
In scholarly discourse the realist tradition somewhat fell from grace right after the Second World 
War, just as its leading proponents of 1930ties, such as Morgenthau, had fallen from favour of their 
more liberally minded (and competing) colleagues.81 However, with the beginning of the Cold War 
                                                 
76 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 23.  
77 Thucydydes, The History of the Peloponnesian War (Smith W. transl.). London: Jones&Co, 1831. Book V, Chapter 
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legitimate, claiming existence of weapons of mass destruction to obtain authorising Security Council resolution. See 
Gray, C. From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq. European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 13.1, 2002, p. 1. 
81 Criticism of realist approach centres on rigidity of assumptions on which the realist theory is based. Namely, that 
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“realist” international scholars came back to prominence, emerging under the international relations 
rather than international law banner.82 On the level of state practice, however, occasionally there 
seems to be very good evidence of workings of a realist outlook. Whenever that happens, marked 
inconsistency in state rhetoric and conduct becomes apparent. Such inconsistency outlines a 
dilemma of an applied realism – on the one hand, states (since their paramount interest is to 
preserve themselves) will go to great length to emphasize importance of territorial integrity, non-
intervention and sacrosanctity of sovereignty. While on the other hand, realist policy in actual 
application does not respect these principles in the least (or any principles for that mater) and will 
disregard them the moment when that seems to grant an advantage.  
A poignant example of this dilemma might now be causing intellectual struggles for Russian 
legal scholars post Crimean annexation. All along they have strongly argued against a right of 
external self-determination (except for peoples of former colonies), claiming that sovereignty and 
territorial integrity prevail.83 2014 Russian annexation of the Crimea on the basis of an alleged 
exercise of self-determination by Crimeans, which Russia regards as lawful, requires the exact 
opposite – that self-determination prevails over sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, from 
a realist theory point of view, this inconsistency of arguments only confirms the realist thesis - that 
rules are nothing but means to be used in the struggle for power. The inconsistency of argument 
occurs only because on the level of rhetoric Russia claims not to have a realist outlook, whereas in 
fact it does. Thus for realists “taking rights seriously” is to miss the point of international relations. 
The only shared value cherished by all members of a realist system is the survival of the state 
system itself. Therefore for realists, talk of the international community, if anything, is nonsense 
that may only hide an imperial or some other project. 
The second tradition is “internationalist” or “Grotian”. As opposed to “realists”, “Grotians” 
believe that states, rather than being immersed in perpetual strife for power, also pursue common 
interests and goals. Bull further divides “Grotians” into two subgroups, which may be labelled as 
“Vattelians” and “neo-Grotians”.84 “Vattelians” hold a view that although international co-operation 
does occur, the system as a whole is still dominated by individualistic interests of states. Common 
interests exist only to an extent that they are necessary to maintain stability for states to pursue their 
individual interests. For “Vattelians” states do participate in international organizations, however, 
those organizations remain a vehicle for channelling and accommodating agendas based on national 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and that strife among states is perpetually at a level that states are continuously readying for war. Both of these 
propositions seem open to doubt.  
82 See Wolfers A. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1962. 
83 Лукашук И. Mеждународное право, Общая часть. Москва: Волтерс Клувер, 2001. 280 с.; Ковалев, A.A., 
Черниченко С.В., (ред.) Международное право, 3-е изд. Москва: Проспект, 2008. 58 c. 
84 Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 310. 
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interest. Bilateralism remains the rule, and order is the core value of the system. The Westphalian 
system is a clear embodiment of the “Vattelian” outlook. Thus the whole pre-Charter classical 
international law of sovereign equality of nation states fits this conception of an international 
system.  
The second sub-group of “Grotians” are the so-called “neo-Grotians”. This view of 
international relations places emphasis on communitarianism and recognition of common interests. 
The way to achieve these interests, according to “neo-Grotians”, is by cooperating in common 
institutions.85 The international system and international law are perceived as being on their way to 
becoming a genuine community regulated by international legal order. Bilateralism and unlimited 
sovereignty eventually are to give way to multilateralism and solidarity. Much of the post-Charter 
international law, in particular such projects as gradual construction of the international community, 
have been inspired by “neo-Grotianism”. Some of the most prominent international law scholars of 
the 20th century, such as Friedmann, Lauterpacht and many others are adherents to this conception 
of inter-state relations.  
The final tradition that may be identified is “universalist” or “Kantian”. For this strand of 
thought international system, although formally comprises of states, in fact is made up of 
community of mankind. States merely serve as means to organize international cooperation. 
Particular emphasis is placed on direct forms of representation (such as via NGOs) and on 
individuals as true subjects of the international system. It is not uncommon for Kantians to argue for 
fundamental reinvention of the idea of the international system, for conservative idealist revolution, 
and even to do away (at least philosophically) with states “those random by-products of the chaos of 
history, artificial amalgams of lands and tribes [...] [and with governments] some of them no better 
than criminal conspiracies.”86 Justice and human rights are paramount values of this outlook. Many 
of the modern international “constitutionalist” scholars are adherents of this school of thought. The 
possibility of the international community for these scholars is their project - to introduce a new 
idea of the international community, a community of the whole humanity, which sees rule of law as 
an inherent part of itself. It is noteworthy that affection for Kantian themes is not limited to scholars 
only. Dissenting opinions of such judges of the International Court of Justice as Álvarez (in South 
West Africa87), Weeramantry (in Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons88) and Cançado 
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86 Allott P. The Idealist’s Dilemma: Re-Imagining International Society. Published on June 9, 2014. Available at: 
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87 See dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez in International Status of South West Africa. In particular Álvarez notes: 
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Trindade (in Questions Relating to he Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite89) all seem to resonate 
with Kantian themes.90 
Why are these theoretical outlooks important? It has been argued that whether we are 
conscious of theory or not, perceptions we form and choices we make on their basis in fact 
constitute a theory. As noted by Allott: “people speak theory in everything they say and do, every 
day of their lives, even if they don’t know what the theory is, or where it came from.”91 Becoming 
aware of a theory shines a light on assumptions made about the phenomena we encounter. Knowing 
the theory identifies its elements with focused clarity and makes one realize connections and causes.  
Therefore theoreticizing may be a beneficial exercise. However, being aware of a theory also seems 
to work the other way around. A theory may easily become an intellectual identity of “I’m a 
realist”. Such taking up of an intellectual identity inadvertently conditions perceptions of legal 
phenomena, which in turn lead to automated judgments and loss of the quality of investigation and 
insight. Therefore is seems best to employ the above outlined theories, but only in a way that is 
open: if one feels strongly universalist, perhaps it would be useful to acknowledge some truth of 
what realists are saying. If one feels strongly “legal”, despising indeterminacy of political argument, 
it may be a good idea to read more on international relations. As Koskenniemi has observed on 
usefulness and at the same time limitations of theoretical approaches: “[r]esearch serves practice by 
producing critical reflection and self-awareness in acting lawyers. But it fails to provide answers to 
problems on which practising lawyers are requested to give advice.”92 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
88 ICJ: Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion [1996] I.C.J. Reports p. 226. Weeramantry 
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1.4. The law of coexistence and the law of cooperation 
 Another way to enquire into existence of international community is by investigating 
characteristics of the law that regulates it. If the law aims only to safeguard coexistence of states - 
that might be a good indication that states do not share common interests and values and hence do 
not form a community. If, however, rules provide for cooperation – that is probably a sign that some 
sense of common objectives and values does exist and thus something akin to a community is 
present. In other words, by assessing the law one can assess also the state of the community that the 
law governs. The more the law leans towards cooperation, the more likely it is that a community 
exists.  
1.4.1. The law of coexistence 
Two key concepts relevant for this approach - “law of coexistence” and “law of 
cooperation” - were first coined by Wolfgang Friedmann93 in mid 1960ties. According to 
Friedmann, the classical international law, as it materialized after the Peace of Westphalia94 of 
1648, was a law of coexistence. This law emerged as a result of lengthy wars of religion which in 
turn were earlier triggered by reformation and a resultant schism in Christianity. The political result 
of the wars of religion was that the power of the Pope and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire 
disintegrated, leaving every prince free to choose his or her religious allegiances. To secure this 
freedom of choice the law had to provide an appropriate legal principle. Thus the Westphalian 
system established independence or sovereignty from any higher authority, be it Pope, Emperor or 
anyone, as the core principle of this new system. However, to sustain this independence, it was 
necessary that each prince besides recognizing his own independence also recognizes the 
independence of others princes, regardless of their religion or power. In other words, princes of 
Westphalian system had to treat each other as formally equal. Thus the principle of equality had to 
be introduced as the second foundational principle. By recognizing complimentarity of these two 
principles the Westphalian system established what has been known as the cornerstone of the law of 
coexistence – the principle of sovereign equality.95 
The curious peculiarity of the Westphalian peace treaties was that they in fact cemented 
foundations for the law of coexistence, while in principle engaging in the “first attempt at 
international organization of peace”.96 The treaties provided for a commitment to abstain from 
engaging in wars for religious considerations. Importantly, the treaties obliged all parties to 
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collectively enforce the commitments. Thus the Treaty of Münster provided that: “all Partys in this 
Transaction shall be oblig'd to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against any 
one, without distinction of Religion”.97 The treaties also provided for an obligation to settle disputes 
amicably. If the parties failed to resolve the dispute within a period of three years then “all and 
every one of those concern'd in this Transaction shall be oblig'd to join the injur'd Party, and assist 
him with Counsel and Force to repel the Injury”.98 These were considerable innovations for the 
17the century international system, which in principle attempted to bring about cooperation. 
However, paradoxically, by introducing sovereign equality, the Westphalian system in effect 
terminated the foundations of the Respublica Christiania – a commonwealth of Christian states, 
which throughout middle ages shred a sense of unity in one faith and represented a community at 
least in terms of shared values and defence objectives. 
The essential aim of the law of coexistence is to provide a minimum of order in the system 
that is defined by ceaseless rivalry of states. It is a law the purpose of which is to keeps subjects 
apart, rather than bring them together. It aspires only to prevent states from crushing the very 
system in which they operate, and the only shared interest is to preserve the rules that allow the 
system to function. Consequently, obligations in such a system are all about delimiting sovereign 
jurisdictions and abstaining from intervention in jurisdictions of other states. As to enforcement, the 
classical law of coexistence relies exclusively on self-regulation and, if that fails, on self-help of the 
injured. Why such a peculiar and obviously deficient approach to enforcement? The reason may 
again be found in historical context of Westphalian system: the key purpose of states was to rid 
themselves of the authority of Pope. As Abi-Saab notes:  
“Above all they did not want to see a new superior authority established over them, 
whatever it may be. The new structure of international law was thus assigned a precise and 
limited task: to establish a new key to the allocation of power in the international context, 
to legitimate and sanction the sovereignty of states, without encroaching on it. That was 
the real function imparted to the new legal system by its creators-subjects. In relation to its 
subjects, the states, this legal system necessarily has a weak and barely constraining 
structure and hold, strictly proportioned to its limited task.”99 
As a result, the law coexistence is not ambitious with regard to aims that it pursues and the 
role that it plays in inter-state relations. The positive side is that due to not aiming too high the law 
of coexistence can be said to achieve its purpose – that of bringing a minimum of order and 
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legitimizing sovereignty. Also from a realist or “Hobbesian” point of view, it is the only “realistic” 
law that can govern a system where gaining of power at the expense of other players is the ultimate 
reward. On the negative side, one may wonder what is the point of having a law if it does not 
address the fundamental needs of the group that it governs? Some of the most primary aims of the 
present international system (such as maintenance of international peace and security) by their very 
nature can not be adequately addresses by the law of coexistence. To maintain international peace 
and security sovereign equality by itself is not enough; cooperation and indeed certain interference 
with sovereignty of states that do not respect sovereignty of others are obviously also needed. Thus 
the law of coexistence, although very much relevant for international system of 17th century, which 
sought to free itself from overarching power of the Pope, is very insufficient for international 
relations in which states have other shared aims besides cementing of their sovereignty. 
 
 
1.4.2. The law of cooperation 
The law of cooperation, on the other hand, is quite different in several regards. Firstly, the 
fundamental aim of the law of cooperation is considerably more ambitious than that of the law of 
coexistence. If the law of coexistence only seeks to safeguard sovereignty and a minimum of 
international order, the law of cooperation aims to proactively accomplish shared goals (e.g., to 
facilitate international transport or maintain international macroeconomic stability). These goals are 
again determined by the historical context. With the advent of industrial revolution in late 18th 
century states found that their economies were no longer limited to their own territories – new 
means of production required resources from other states, domestic economies became increasingly 
internationalized and that in turn required cooperation on areas such as communications and 
transport. With intensification of international relations the list of areas of cooperation steadily grew 
and also grew the number of international organizations founded to accomplish shared goals.100 
After the First World War a sense that cooperation is needed to prevent another war was starkly 
evident, so much so, that that the first universal international organization – the League of Nations 
was established with an objective of collectively keeping peace. This no longer was cooperation in 
specific technical fields, but rather an attempt to reorganize international relations around a shared  
central purpose of preventing war.  
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The scale of devastation of the Second World War gave an even more powerful impetus to 
come together to ensure that never again humanity is drawn into such savage insanity.101 The UN 
Charter brought the law of cooperation centre-stage. If we examine purposes of the United Nations 
enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, we find that they all are in essence calling for the law of 
cooperation approach. The paramount aim of the UN system “to maintain international peace and 
security” by means of taking effective collective measures, has all he hallmarks of this approach. It 
specifically calls for cooperation to reach a shared goal and for action (rather than abstention) to 
remove threats to peace and to suppress aggression. Other purposes listed in Article 1 “to develop 
friendly relations among nations”, “to achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems” and “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations” are all likewise expressions of 
community interests and values which the UN members pledge to pursue and which can not be 
attained by unilateral efforts of lone competing sovereigns. 
A further difference of the law of cooperation concerns understanding and application of the 
principle of equality. In the law of coexistence equality of states (along with sovereignty) are 
paramount and all pervasive - states big or small, rich or poor enjoy the same immunities, the same 
voting rights in institutions and generally are regarded as formally equal in all of their rights and 
obligations. In the law of cooperation equality plays a rather different role. Since the law of 
cooperation is concerned with achieving common goals, obligations will usually provide for certain 
proactive conduct. In other words, the law of cooperation provides for positive obligations, whereas 
the law of coexistence is dominated by negative obligations – obligations to abstain from certain 
conduct that interferes with sovereignty of other states. Being proactive i.e., imposing an obligation 
to actually do something, obligations of the law of cooperation thus have much to do with actual 
capabilities of states. Obviously military, economic and other capabilities of the United States and 
those of Latvia are very different. In the law of cooperation these differences are realistically 
acknowledged and reflected in obligations. Most notable examples of such differentiation may be 
found in environmental law in which the principle of common but differentiated responsibility has 
been widely acknowledged.102 The same principle in a legally binding form was one of the key 
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elements of the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention103 where only countries listed in 
Annex I (developed countries and countries with economy in transition) had quantified emissions 
reduction obligations, while developing countries had no such obligations.104 Thus in the law of 
cooperation equality between states in all matters is no longer the norm – states are still equal in a 
sense that they all may participate, however, their actual rights and obligations may differ. 
Another important peculiarity of the law of cooperation is that it heavily relies on 
institutions. Rules of coexistence, which for the most part call for abstention from actions that 
interfere in domains of other sovereigns, by their very nature, require no coordination. States need 
no institutional arrangements to be able to respect immunities of foreign diplomats or to abstain 
from fishing in territorial waters of their neighbours. The law of cooperation, on the contrary, since 
it aspires to accomplish complex tasks, necessitates division of responsibilities and therefore calls 
for supervision and coordination. As a result, all the law of cooperation mechanisms are to smaller 
or greater extent accompanied by institutions. If the task is relatively simple, such as overseeing 
implementation of a treaty that deals with a specific narrow issue, then a small secretariat filing 
country reports is sufficient. If the task is more ambitious, such as functioning of single market in 
goods, labour, services and capital, then a complex web of supranational institutions would be 
necessary (e.g., as the one facilitating the workings of the European Union). In short - the more 
complex the task, the more elaborate the institutions. 
 
1.4.3. A rhetoric community of sovereigns? 
Having outlined characteristics of both the law of coexistence and the law of cooperation, 
we come to the substantive question: which of these approaches presently dominates international 
law (and by inference – whether we have an international community or rather coexisting, 
competing sovereigns)? As we already saw in earlier analysis classical international law, as it 
emerged after the Peace of Westphalia, was in essence a law of coexistence. The corresponding 
philosophical outlook that supports the law of coexistence approach is “Vatellian”. Thus classical 
international law is far from a model in which states work for the good of common goals, but rather 
pursue individualist interests without much actual regard for benefits that may result from 
cooperation.  
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UNTS 167. 
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However, the law of cooperation has been gradually growing – starting from 19th century in 
specialized fields such as transport and communications and steadily creeping into ever new areas 
of human activity.105 This gradual expansion continued also in 20th century till the adoption of the 
UN Charter, which attempted to drastically reshape the landscape of international law.106 All the 
purposes of the UN listed in Article 1, as we saw earlier, call for multilateral cooperation for the 
good of shared goals. Also most of the principles enumerated in Article 2 (apart from the first one), 
such as peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 2(3)), provision of assistance to the UN (Article 
2(5)) and in particular Article 2 (6) obliging the UN to ensure that also non-members comply with 
these principles, all seem to belong to the law of cooperation approach. Even more importantly, the 
overall scheme of the Charter (considering the preamble which defines the essential aspiration of 
the organization – “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”; also rules aimed at 
pacific settlement of disputes via cooperation in chapter VI and extensive powers of the Security 
Council under chapter VII), all demonstrate that the UN Charter is constructed around the 
paramount common interest – safeguarding of international peace. A system that aims to reach a 
shared goal and provides for institutions endowed with powers to reach that goal, are a strong 
indication that the system, at least partly, is based on the law of cooperation.  
Whether the above findings are enough to claim that the Charter indeed fundamentally 
transformed international law from the law of coexistence to the law of cooperation is another 
question. As we turn from Purposes of Article 1 to Principles of Article 2, a somewhat different 
view emerges. The first among Article 2 principles is that “the Organization is based on the 
principle of sovereign equality”. Thus, although heralding a new era for international law, the 
Charter also proclaims both principles which are at the heart of the law of coexistence (sovereignty 
and equality) as the foundational principles of the Charter system. Likewise, the institutional 
mechanisms to achieve the lofty goals of cooperation are overwhelmingly absent from the Charter. 
Principal organs of the UN, apart from the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, 
are in their essence forums for inter-state deliberations. Also the Charter itself does not provide for 
substantive rules in any of the areas where it aspires to promote cooperation – be it in economics, 
human rights or culture. The principal organs, apart from the Secretariat, are not supranational. 
Thus, as well demonstrated by the selectiveness in the practice of the Security Council, UN organs 
most often will function as means by which states pursue individualistic interests, rather than the 
interest of the whole international community. Therefore, the law of cooperation seems strong 
                                                 
105 International treaties and corresponding international organizations emerged in areas such as public health (The 
International Office of Public Health, now World Health Organization, was established in 1903) and agriculture 
(International Institute for Agriculture, now The Food and Agriculture Organization, established in 1905). 
106 Fassbender B. The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 1998, Vol. 36, p. 529. 
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predominantly on the level of legal rhetoric, rather that on the level of actual institutions and 
policies.  
However, the above analysis has a few exceptions. The most notable among those is in the 
field of international peace and security. Here the Charter provides not only for a shared goal, but 
also an institution with actual powers. It also provides for substantive norms – although defined in 
very general terms, the prohibition of use of force, the exception of self-defence, and the powers of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII provide a minimalistic framework which nonetheless, if 
accompanied by political will, may be fully operational in safeguarding the shared interest of 
maintaining international peace and security. In limited ways also other UN organs occasionally act 
in accordance with the law of cooperation approach as organs of a genuine community. The UN 
General Assembly may perform (and occasionally it does) a very important function of collective 
legitimation.107 The General Assembly may adopt resolutions on any matter thus expressing the 
viewpoint of the whole community of states, as in the recent example of condemnation of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea.108 Although legally non-binding, political weight of collective legitimation 
(and thus also impact on state conduct) may be considerable.   
From the sketchy outline above, we may conclude that international law is a mix of the law 
of coexistence and the law of cooperation. Accordingly, following the earlier proposed thesis that 
the more the law leans towards cooperation the more likely it is that a community exists, we may 
conclude that international law displays signs of communitarianism while at the same time holding 
on to sovereign equality as a foundational block of the international legal order. Therefore, it is 
suggested that at present we are left with a “rhetoric community of sovereigns”, rather than an 
actual community. 
 
1.5. Conclusions 
The concept of the international community is vague and therefore open to various 
interpretations. Even more importantly, the concept has much to do with power and legitimacy and 
thus is inevitably susceptible to abuse. Its ambiguous content may thus be of more service to 
political rhetoric than to courts of law. Likewise, having an idea of an international community in 
itself may not necessarily be an outright positive development. Whenever a reference to the 
international community is made (if, for instance, force is used on its behalf) a question arises – 
whose community is it? Who may speak and act on its behalf? Who dictates the terms on which this 
                                                 
107 Claude I. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. International Organization, Vol. 
20. 1966, p. 367. 
108 UN General Assembly, Resolution on Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, March 27, 2014. UN Doc. A/68/L.39. 
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community operates? Is it truly an international community (on guard of supranational interests) or 
rather an imperial project clothing power in a mantel of legitimacy?  
The present day scholarly discourse on the international community (at least most of it) runs 
on an assumption that the present international system is indeed a community as it is defined in 
sociological terms and in classifications of international affairs such as those offered by Bull. 
Within this meaning the concept of the international community refers to a relationship in which 
members of a group recognize goals and values that are not merely in their own individualistic 
interests, but rather benefit the whole group and are therefore shared by the whole group. Also these 
shared interests are of such nature that they can be well accomplished only if most of the members 
of the group are genuinely concerned with protection of the shared interest. Thus “community” first 
and foremost denotes a sense of unity, togetherness and interdependence - a structure in which 
fundamental shared interests are recognized as standing above individualistic interests. 
However, even a brief overview of fundamental tenets of international law (e.g., the UN 
Charter) indicate that such labelling of the current international system has more to do with an 
aspiration to have a community, rather than actual existence of an interdependent group which is 
aware of common values and shared goals and actually engages in their realisation. That being said, 
it must also be acknowledged that forms of communitarianism are also very much present, although 
they may not be of universal membership or encompassing all fields of inter-state activity. Thus 
there seems to be some sense of a community at least with regard to maintenance of international 
peace and security. There also seem to be regional arrangements, such as the EU, that would 
genuinely merit a label of a community. It is therefore suggested that it is more appropriate to talk 
about multiple communities existing within the international system, e.g., a community of peace 
and security, a community of international trade or a regional community of human rights. It is a 
system of multiple parallel and occasionally overlapping communities on different subject matters. 
A statement that states presently form an international community which continuously encompasses 
all aspects of inter-state relations indeed would be an exaggeration, as many areas of international 
relations are dominated by individualistic rather than common interests. Whereas on other subject 
matters, such as climate change, preservation of peace or management of global commons, all 
actors will, at least to a certain extent, recognize their shared interest in protecting interests of the 
whole group (although they may not necessarily act in accordance with those interests).  
Therefore, it is suggested that the universal international community on all subject matters 
of international life is a rhetorical community only - an aspiration that may nonetheless facilitate 
evolution of a genuine all-encompassing international community. This designation, however, does 
not make shared interests and common objectives of states any less real. Although the present day 
international “community” in sociological terms provided by Tönnies is more of a society than a 
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community, the term may still be used to refer to the sum of states - partly for the value of 
perceptions that the term evokes and partly for the sake of consistency with the majority of 
international law scholarship. 
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2. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE PUBLIC LAW 
PARADIGM IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Before we engage the core question of this research - how interests of the international 
community are protected in the law of state responsibility, another preliminary point must be 
addressed. That point is to enquire whether and how protection of community interests is 
accommodated in general theory of international law. To do that we will look for signs of the so 
called “public law paradigm” in general international law, i.e., elements characteristic to public law 
signalling existence of legal relationships not only between individual states, but between individual 
states and the whole international community. As opposed to subsequent chapters, which are 
focused specifically on the law of state responsibility, this Chapter outlines such elements of 
publicness as peremptory norms, obligations erga omnes and the role of state consent in 
international law-making.  
This enquiry into the public law paradigm leads us to questions about the very nature of 
international law: is international law fundamentally a series of consent based bilateral relations? Or 
is international law a public order of some sort, reflective of the interests of the international 
community.109 The traditional view holds that public international law (despite the “public” in its 
title) is based on the private law model.110 The same conclusion was reached by Hersch Lauterpacht 
in his famous 1925 doctoral dissertation in which he concluded that international law “belongs to 
the genus of private law.”111 There is no subordination in the international law system and states 
generally act quite like private contractors in domestic legal systems, picking and choosing which 
obligations they want to take up112 – a horizontal system among equals without delegation of power 
to any higher authority.  
However, international law is not a static structure and has undergone (and arguably 
continues to undergo) considerable developments.113 The hey-day of bilateralism and unlimited 
                                                 
109 See Simma B. From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil des Cours de l’Academie 
de Droit International, (1994 VI), p. 217. Simma defines international community as a ‘more socially conscious legal 
order’ which reflects not only the specific interests of individual states, but increasingly also community interests.  
110 Holland T. Studies in International Law. Oxford: Henry Frowde, 1898, p. 152. 
111 Lauterpacht H. Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. London, Longman Publishing, 1927, p. 81. 
112 It must be noted that international law is not entirely void of elements of publicness. As will be discussed latter on 
this Chapter there are certain public interest norms as well as special competences of the UN Security Council under the 
UN Charter which although in limited ways, nonetheless, introduce elements characteristic to public law. 
113 For elaboration on the development trends see Chapter 6, p. 134. 
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sovereignty is slowly but consistently receding into the past.114 As Simma has pointed out: 
“international law has undoubtedly entered a stage at which it does not exhaust itself in correlative 
rights and obligations running between states, but also incorporates common interests of the 
international community as a whole, including not only states but all human beings. In so doing, it 
begins to display more and more features which do not fit into the “civilist”, bilateralist structure of 
the traditional law. In other words, it is on its way to being a true public international law.”115  
Before embarking on the analysis whether and to what extent international law generally 
and the law of state responsibility in particular displays elements of the public law paradigm, it is 
useful to define more specifically what exactly is meant by the public law paradigm and what are 
elements characteristic to it? The purpose of public law is to protect interests of the community as a 
whole i.e., the interests of the public, rather than individual interests of members of that public. To 
achieve that aim, public law creates institutions and confers on them powers to enforce rules that 
protect the common good on individual members. Thus the basic mechanism by which public law 
seeks to secure community interests is by establishing legal relationship between individual 
members and the community as a whole. Therefore the simplest definition of public law (within 
domestic legal orders) is that it is a law that regulates relations between individuals and the 
community as such.116 The most pertinent characteristic of public law is that it is vertical (rather 
than horizontal) in nature due to powers to enforce law that the state wields over individuals. 
Judging by these criteria, public international law is anything but public.117  
However, as observed by Simma and as will be explored latter on in this chapter, 
international law is not entirely void of elements characteristic to public law. There are modalities 
of relations between an individual state and the community of states as a whole, namely, the so 
called obligations erga omnes118; there are also the peremptory norms accepted by the entire 
community of states, which individual states are obliged to comply with119; and there is the Article 
103 of the UN Charter spelling out the supremacy of Charter obligations over any other treaty 
obligations of UN members and the UN Security Council with powers to adopt binding resolutions. 
                                                 
114 See Friedmann W. The Changing Structure of International Law. London: Stevens, 1964, p. 10. 
115 Simma B. Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practicioner. European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 20, no.2, 2009, p. 268. For elaboration of this ‘classic’ understanding of universality see 
Jennings R. Universal International Law in a Multicultural World. In: Bos M., Brownlie I., (eds.), Liber Amicorum for 
the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 40. 
116 Weblay L., Samuels H. Public Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 4. 
117 The reason for ‘public’ being in the title is that it is a law between publics i.e., states. 
118 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), judgment of July 20, 2012, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012 p. 422; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32. 
119 Cassese A. International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 13–21; Byers M. Conceptualising 
the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law (1997) p. 211. 
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These elements of publicness, as frail as they may be, nonetheless demonstrate that international 
law indeed may be perceived as possessing a degree of public relationships between individual 
states and the community of states (although a very uncentralized one). It is this core understanding 
of publicness that is meant under the concept of  the “public law paradigm” and will be employed in 
the assessment of international law generally and responsibility rules in particular.  
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that there are also other conceivable layers of 
publicness.  For instance public law may imply application of public law principles. As has been 
noted elsewhere: “the publicness approach proposes that international law be conceptualized as a 
law between “public entities” (primarily, but not limited to, States), these public entities being 
subject to public law and thus to basic public law principles, including legality, rationality, 
proportionality, rule of law, and fundamental rights, as well as to an additional quality of 
“publicness” inherent in law, one that is difficult to define but nevertheless crucial.”120 Waldron, 
trying to pin down this elusive sense of publicness, has concluded that it has to do with a change in 
perception of law. Thus he remarks that the public character of law is to be found in the fact that 
law presents itself not just as a set of commands by the powerful or a set of rules recognized among 
an elite, but as a set of norms made publicly and issued in the name of the public, that ordinary 
people can in some sense appropriate it as their own.121 Whereas Kingsbury and Donaldson point 
out that to be public law, international law need not abandon the concept of state and perceive 
international law as global public law with direct participation of individuals.122  
Likewise, the notion of the public law paradigm in the context of this research does not 
imply Kantian themes on perpetual peace123 – the focus is much more limited. As fascinating as 
these ideas may be, to investigate their validity with regard to the law of international responsibility 
                                                 
120 Kingsbury B., Donaldson M. From Bilateralism to Publicness in International Law. In: From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 p. 83. See also 
Kingsbury B., International Law as Inter-Public Law. In: Richardson H., Williams M. (eds.), Nomos XLIX: Moral 
Universalism and Pluralism. New York: New York University Press, 2009, p. 167. 
121 Waldron J. Can there Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? Emory Law Journal, Vol. 58, 2009. p. 675. Waldron also 
emphasizes that “laws must purport to stand in the name of the whole society, and address matters of concern to the 
society as such, rather than just matters of personal or specific concern to individuals or groups who formulate the 
laws”, ibid. 
122 The authors emphasize that „In global institutions, much of the process of law-making is far removed from any 
processes analogous to democracy, and  there do not exist clearly defined publics other than those of each State 
(assuming a universal community of all individuals is set aside as not being operationalizable or even a reality for most 
purposes). While it is impossible to identify a public for many public entities operating at the global level in the way 
that it may be possible to point to a body of citizens or constituents within a State, it is neither desirable nor possible to 
abandon the notion of a concrete polity. Broad public law principles, particularly rule of law and fundamental rights, 
depend for their meaningful operationalization on the specific contextual features of the way law is made, and on the 
existence of a particular, determinate group of individuals constituting the public in whose name the law stands.” See 
Kingsbury B., Donaldson M. From Bilateralism to Publicness in International Law. In: From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 p. 84. 
123 See Kant, I. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
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would bring the discussion well beyond the ambit of this thesis. Therefore for the purposes of this 
research the inquiry into elements of publicness of international law will be limited to the essential 
element of public law – whether responsibility rules display a sense of relationship between 
individual states and the international community as a whole i.e., whether there is something akin to 
public order.124 
  
2.1. Public interest norms 
Seminal importance in development of the international community is played by changes in 
the structure of international obligations. Besides the traditional private law type obligations 
between states, increasingly there seems to be acknowledgment of obligations owed to the whole 
international community.125 Thus recently in the 2012 Belgium v. Senegal judgment126 concerning 
Senegal’s obligations under the Convention Against Torture127 to prosecute or extradite the former 
Chadian President Hissène Habré, the International Court of Justice once again observed that there 
are the so called obligations erga omnes partes meaning that “each State party has an interest in 
compliance with them in any given case.”128 Also the ICJ slightly adjusted the wording compared to 
its famous pronouncement in Barcelona Traction129 and concluded that: 
“The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the 
Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the Convention 
to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another State party.  If a 
special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State would be in the 
position to make such a claim.  It follows that any State party to the Convention may 
                                                 
124 Likewise the discussion of whether international law is really law will be left out; as the ILC concluded in its report 
on fragmentation: “international law is a legal system”, see International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
international law: difficulties arising from the diversiﬁcation and expansion of international law, Report of the 
International Law Commission on its 56th session, GAOR, 59th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/59/10 (2004). 
125 See Ragazzi M. The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Tams C. Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Crawford J.  ‘Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law’, 319 Recueil des Cours, 2006, p. 325. 
126 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), judgment of July 20, 2012, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012 p. 422. 
127 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
UNTS, Vol. 1465, p. 85. 
128 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Merits, Judgment of 20 
July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 68.  
129 ICJ: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 
33. In Barcelona Traction the court referred to “legal interest” of states other than injured states in an attempt to 
distinguish “legal” interest of these states from “actual” or “individual” interests of injured states. The use of this term 
“legal interest”  has been criticised as an unhelpful since both the injured states (Article 42 of ASR) and states other 
than injured states (Article 48 of ASR) have a ‘legal interest, see ILC ASR Commentary p. 319.  Whereas in Belgium v 
Senegal the ICJ referred simply to “common interest”. 
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invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged 
failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, 
paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an 
end.”130 
Thus the ICJ clearly acknowledges existence of obligations that are owed to all other states 
parties and to the international community as a whole.131 Even more so, the distinction of this 
specific category of obligations is made meaningful by allowing invocation of responsibility by any 
state in cases where these erga omnes obligations are breached. The ILC confirms this right to bring 
claims for protection of public interests in Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
However, the right to invoke responsibility to protect community interests must not be 
confused with a right to institute proceedings in any given international court or tribunal. The 
acceptance of erga omnes obligations has led to a discussion whether international law as a result 
has also accepted (and to what extent) actio popularis - the concept referring to a right of any 
member of the international community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest.132 
Although states other than the injured state are entitled to invoke responsibility if erga omnes 
obligations are breached, the claimant must still satisfy the jurisdictional rules of the court or 
tribunal at which the proceedings are brought. Thus existence of obligations erga omnes does not 
imply existence of actio popularis regardless of the relevant jurisdictional rules.133 As the ICJ has 
held in the Eeast Timor case “[t]he erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to 
jurisdiction are two different things.”134 The ICJ reached a similar conclusion also more recently in 
the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo where it held that the fact that erga omnes 
                                                 
130 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Merits, Judgment of 20 
July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 69. For an alternative approach to consequences of erga omnes obligations  see 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 22.09.2006, para. 132: “The Court therefore deems it pertinent to 
declare that the States Parties to the Convention should collaborate with each other to eliminate the impunity of the 
violations committed in this case, by the prosecution and, if applicable, the punishment of those responsible.  
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against human rights by the undue application of legal mechanisms that jeopardize the pertinent international 
obligations.  Consequently, the mechanisms of collective guarantee established in the American Convention, together 
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131 There is no exhaustive list of obligations towards international community as a whole, however, according to the ICJ 
prohibition of aggression, genocide, racial discrimination as well as obligation to respect self-determination of peoples 
belong to this list, see: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1970, p. 32, para. 34; ICJ: Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, I.C.J. 
Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29. 
132 Browlie I. Principles of Public International Law, 7th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 470; 
Ragazzi M. The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. p. 210. 
133 Ragazzi ibid., p. 212. 
134 ICJ: Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, para. 29, p. 102. 
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obligations are at issue cannot in itself constitute an exception to the principle that Court’s 
jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the parties.135 Therefore it seems the better view that 
at the present stage of development international courts do not afford their jurisdiction solely on the 
basis of protection of public interest, if there is no other jurisdictional ground for the court to take 
up the claim.136  
However, a number of international treaties combine the right to invoke responsibility with 
jurisdictional clauses, thus in effect allowing actio popularis for protection of public interest among 
states parties. Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights137, Article 44 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights138, as well as Article 41 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights139 are among such treaties.140 Similarly, Article 22 of the Torture 
Convention141 and Article 9 of the Genocide Convention142 in effect provide for actio popularis. 
Another indication of a shift towards public law elements is evidenced by recognition of 
the so called peremptory norms or norms jus cogens.143 Just like with erga omnes obligations the 
purpose of jus cogens norms is to protect some of the most fundamental interests of the 
                                                 
135 ICJ: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
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Omnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 213. For arguments in favour of actio popularis in environmental 
law see Sands P. Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 
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141 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
UNTS Vol. 1465, p. 85. 
142 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS Vol. 78, p. 277. 
143 Among the multitude of publications on the topic see:  Orakhelashvili A. Peremptory Norms in International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; Hannikainen L.  Peremptory norms (jus cogens) in international law: 
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between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective, 41 Austrian 
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on the Eve of a New Century. General Course on Public International Law’, 281 Recueil des Cours (1999) p. 81. 
Verdross A. Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, American Journal of International law, 1966, 60 p. 
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international community.144 Although both share a common purpose - the concepts are not identical 
as they have different functions and consequences. The core (uncontested) function of jus cogens 
norms is to preclude validity of any treaty that would breach existing peremptory norms.145 Whether 
jus cogens norms introduce a general hierarchy of norms and override also any other customary 
rules, in particular rules on state immunity, remains a contested topic146 as demonstrated by the 
ECtHR in the Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom147). Whereas obligations erga omnes specifically 
affect invocation, allowing invocation of responsibility by states other that the injured state.148 
Together these concepts guard the fundamental values of the international community and could be 
regarded as public interest norms in international law.149 Indeed, over time the two concepts have 
come much closer together and some authors argue that they have actually merged into a “uniﬁed 
concept of an international “community interest” or international “public” law”.”150 Thus Paulus 
argues that:  
“At least on paper, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes have indeed merged into 
a uniﬁed concept of an international “community interest” or international “public” law – 
even if their scope may not be completely identical.” [...] “What began as a category with 
relatively clear effect – nulliﬁcation of treaties contrary to it – but unclear scope, ended in 
the reverse: unclear consequences, but a much clearer view of which rules had achieved 
jus cogens status (prohibitions of aggression, of slavery, genocide, racial discrimination, 
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apartheid, torture, as well as the basic rules of international humanitarian law and self-
determination, borrowing from both jus cogens and erga omnes-related case law and 
statements). Thus, there seems to be no recognizable difference any more between 
obligations erga omnes and jus cogens– so much so that the Commission could simply 
exchange the concepts with hardly any – and if so, only theoretical – opposition.”151 
 
A further indication of public law elements in international law is Article 103 of the UN 
Charter.152 The Article provides that Charter obligations prevail over any other treaty obligations, 
thus in effect establishing a hierarchy amongst international treaties.153 A quality of Article 103 that 
is characteristic of public law paradigm is that states are no longer free to apply whatever treaties 
they have agreed upon, if these treaties conflict with the UN Charter. Thus Article 103 seems to 
acknowledge that obligations of the Charter serve community interests which prevail over other 
treaties between states. Furthermore, it may be argued that even the Charter remains subject to the 
superior values of the international community protected by jus cogens.154 
These trends towards publicness and multilateralism have been accompanied by what 
could be labelled as moralization of international law.155 As Kingsbury and Donaldson have 
recently pointed out “structural changes occurred in tandem with expansion in the reach of 
international law into more and more areas of State policy and human life and activities; and were 
accompanied by a transformation of the moral stance of international law, from an order that 
permitted governments to cause or tolerate human suffering that would not be accepted within their 
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own societies to one centrally concerned with human wellbeing.”156 It follows from this argument 
that it is the protection of shared interests of all mankind that is the core reason for states to 
organize into an international community. These interests (such as maintenance of international 
peace and security, protection of global environment and human rights) go beyond individual 
interests of states and “correspond to the needs, hopes and fears of all human beings, and attempt to 
cope with problems the solution of which may be decisive for the survival of entire humankind.”157 
The important question is whether and how these moral aspirations to protect the common 
interests of all (regardless whether we call it moralization or constitutionalization or by any other 
name) may be achieved through a legal system that has been designed to suit the individual interests 
of states. Indeed the modern international law is essentially based on foundations of concepts such 
as sovereignty and state consent which came into being in the “classical” international law of the 
17th century, leaving present generations with legal architecture that may be inadequate for modern 
globalized problems. As noted elsewhere: “the objective of achieving the common good has been 
pursued through legal tools that were not, at their origins, elaborated for that purpose and are better 
suited to the protection of individual interests.”158 One only ought to notice the ongoing difficulty 
for states even to adopt (and even more so to enforce) urgently needed rules to combat climate 
change or introduce at least a minimal sustainability to high seas fisheries to understand this point.  
Another indication of evolution of international law towards publicness is evidenced by the 
emergence of international criminal law. Although drafted in terms of a relationship between the 
international community and individuals (rather than between the international community and 
states) this branch of international law clearly testifies to existence of international public order. As 
famously noted in the Nürnberg principles “Any person who commits an act which constitutes a 
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. The fact that 
internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law 
does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.”159 
To sum up, although public international law is essentially based on the private law 
paradigm, it increasingly displays an element which is at the heart of public law – a relationship 
between individual state and the community of states as a whole. This relationship between an 
individual state and community is evidenced by recognition of erga omnes obligations, peremptory 
norms, supremacy of the UN Charter obligations over other bilateral or multilateral treaties, and 
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finally by recognition of international criminal responsibility of individuals. These developments 
present a shift away from the “classical” international law which, as we saw earlier, is based on the 
private law paradigm. Such evolution of international law towards a public law paradigm inevitably 
creates friction with legal concepts founded on bilateralism and the private law model. Therefore 
the main challenge for a meaningful introduction of the public law paradigm into international law 
is to reconcile legal concepts designed to protect community interests and individualistic interests of 
states; to find balance between public interest norms and concepts such as state consent and 
sovereignty - in other words - a balance between private and public law paradigms. 
  
2.2. Balancing community interests and individual interests of states 
Although public interest norms are generally acknowledged their actual impact in disputes 
remains limited. This is mainly due to tensions between public interest norms and norms which are 
raw expressions of sovereignty and bilateralism based legal system, such as customary rules on 
immunities. These tensions may be observed in a number of ICJ cases. For instance in the Arrest 
Warrant160 the ICJ had to resolve a question whether community interest to prosecute a person 
accused of violating  jus cogens norms provides an exception to the rule on immunity of acting 
ministers of foreign affairs. The Court considered that there are no exceptions to the immunity.161 
Likewise, in the 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) confronted with a 
question whether sovereign immunity applies also to civil claims in foreign courts brought by 
victims of war crimes, the Court upheld the sovereign immunity.162 
Similar tensions may be observed also in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion.163 In this case the ICJ on the one hand concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be contrary to the principles and rules of humanitarian law most of which are fundamental to 
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the respect of the human person and elementary considerations of humanity.164 On the other hand, 
the Court felt that it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival 
of a state would be at stake.165 Thus, when faced with a collision between community interest (to 
protect “elementary considerations of humanity”) and individual interest of self-defence by all 
means available (if necessary by nuclear weapons), the Court stopped short of preferring the 
community interest. 
As already noted, most obviously these tensions have manifested with regard to 
community interest in prosecution of international crimes and individual interest of states to 
preserve immunities (both sovereign and of high ranking officials). Attempts to protect community 
interests have taken various forms such as exceptions to immunity if jus cogens rules are breached 
(as in Arrest Warrant); by granting jurisdiction to international criminal courts and tribunals 
(International Criminal Court is the prime example as the Court can prosecute even acting heads of 
state of states non-parties to the Rome Statute166 if the UN Security Council has referred the case to 
the ICC); and by recognizing the right of states to prosecute certain international crimes on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction.167  
In none of these cases, however, states have attempted to argue for an absolute preference 
to community interests over established, sovereignty based rules. All of these instances of 
interference with individualistic interests of states have been constructed as narrow exceptions to 
the general rule. Thus in Arrest Warrant Belgium did not argue that immunity of acting minister of 
foreign affairs from foreign criminal jurisdiction does not exist, but rather suggested that there is a 
specific exception to this immunity in cases where jus cogens norms have been breached. Similarly 
with regard to universal jurisdiction, states that apply it generally do so only if other states that 
could invoke more widely recognized jurisdictional principles (such as territorial or nationality 
principles) have failed to institute proceedings. Likewise, the jurisdiction of ICC is only 
complimentary and comes into operation only when the sovereignty based jurisdictional principles 
have not been invoked. 
In search of balance between community interests and individual interests of states some 
authors have suggested that: “whenever community interests are protected under international law 
and are considered to be fundamental to the system, the general trend shall be towards their 
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prevalence over competing individual interests in those cases in which the continued preservation of 
the latter may undermine the common good. [...] The norms and obligations aimed at protecting 
individual interests cannot therefore remain intact and a compromise should be found to ensure that 
the community interest is achieved, even at the sacrifice of the personal sphere of individual states 
whenever (and only when) this is needed.”168 Such proposals are likely to encounter opposition 
when applied in particular disputes. To resolve a collision between competing interests it is first 
necessary to determine whether a particular interest is a community interest or not. It is simple 
enough in cases where a state employs a legal mechanism which is by definition designed to protect 
community interests (such as invocation of responsibility by a state other than the injured state in 
accordance with Article 48 of Articles on State Responsibility). However, it is more problematic if 
sovereignty based legal concepts (such as immunity of ministers of foreign affairs) are perceived as 
a general interests of the whole international community, namely, to preclude interference with the 
work of high ranking officials and to ensure smooth functioning of interstate relations. As several 
ICJ judges remarked in a separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, both the immunity of a 
minster of foreign affairs and the need to secure functioning of interstate relations are highly valued 
community interests:   
“[o]n the one scale, we find the interest of the community of mankind to prevent and stop 
impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its members; on the other, there is the 
interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely on the inter-State level 
without unwarranted interference. A balance therefore must be struck between two sets of 
functions which are both valued by the international community.”169  
If smooth functioning of inter-state relations is a community interest (and prosecution of 
the minister of foreign affairs would hamper it), then what is needed, is to balance between several 
competing community interests. International law may not have ample precedents particularly on 
balancing of interests in unhampered inter-state relations and prosecution of international crimes. 
However, the task need not be perceived as some unmatched perplexity beyond the abilities of law. 
Indeed, balancing of competing interests is the very function of law. If the superiority of a particular 
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interest is not enshrined in the law itself, then it is up to lawyers to balance these interests, 
employing their time-tested toolbox of legal methodology. Such balancing takes place on everyday 
basis in both national and international courts. There is no reason why also the ICJ should not 
engage in such an exercise, as it might produce outcomes that are far more palatable than the ICJ’s 
abrupt preference for immunity.  
Similarly, such balancing of interests also ought to take place when interests of the 
international community meet individualistic interests of states. It is suggested here that in 
situations of such tensions between competing interests (and legal norms embodying them) a 
principle akin to the principle of proportionality may be employed. The purpose of the 
proportionality principle, as it is known in public law of most domestic legal systems as well as in 
specialized fields of international law (such as the EU law and human rights), is precisely to find 
balance between private and public interests or competing public interests. In its most commonly 
accepted version the proportionality principle requires that a particular limitation of an individual 
right is both suitable and necessary for the achievement of the public good.170 Thus essentially the 
proportionality principle requires three elements: the limitation of an individual right must pursue 
some legitimate public good; the limitation of the individual right must be suitable for the 
achievement of that public good; and finally, the limitation must be necessary, meaning that there 
are no other less infringing ways to secure the protection of the public good.171  
On the facts of the Arrest Warrant case, prosecution of DR Congo’s minister of foreign 
affairs, Mr. Yerodia, for crimes against humanity certainly could be regarded a legitimate public 
good, as the prohibition of these crimes has the status of a peremptory norm. Likewise, his 
prosecution by Belgium would also be suitable for the achievement of the public good. The more 
difficult question is whether prosecution of Mr. Yerodia by Belgium was also necessary in the sense 
that his prosecution was not possible by other means which would not violate DR Congo’s right to 
immunity of its highest officials under customary law. It is precisely at this point that the ICJ would 
have had to engage in a detailed analysis of the balance between public interest of the international 
community to combat impunity and ensure observance of jus cogens norms and the DR Congo’s 
customary rights. The ICJ would have to consider all the other possibilities to prosecute Mr. 
Yerodia such as: a) prosecution by DR Congo’s courts; b) DR Congo agreeing to waive the 
immunity; or c) Mr. Yerodia being tried at some international court or tribunal (such as ICC to 
which immunity would not apply). If prosecution was realistically possible under any of these 
options, then Belgium’s unilateral attempt, which indeed violated the DR Congo’s customary rights, 
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could be regarded as an unnecessary infringement. It is submitted here, that such an elementary 
application of the proportionality principle would provide an appropriate balancing of community 
interests and individual interests of states (and probably also would have resulted in a much more 
balanced and substantiated decision in the Arrest Warrant case).  
 
2.3 The changing role of state consent 
Besides the above discussed public interest norms central to the debate on emergence of 
some form of public order in the international community is reconsideration of the content and role 
of state sovereignty172 and the related concept of state consent. In particular the question whether a 
treaty can create obligations also for states that are not parties to the treaty has been a subject of 
considerable controversy in the contemporary international law.173 On the one hand states keenly 
support the principles of sovereignty and independence and thus also the consensual nature of 
international law.174 On the other hand, as already noted earlier, the current day world with its 
global problems requires some form of reconsideration of the role of the state consent in the 
international law-making.  
It seems to be a generally accepted opinion that a treaty does not create either obligations 
or rights for a state without its consent (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). This rule is embodied 
in Article 34 of the VCLT, and it has been applied by the International Court of Justice as 
expressing international custom.175 Moreover, Article 38 (1) (a) of the ICJ Statute provides that the 
Court in deciding disputes applies “international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognised by contesting states”. Such wording implies that the Court 
can not apply to a dispute any international agreements to which litigating states are not parties and 
thus essentially confirms the pacta tertiis rule. However, two categories of exceptions to the pacta 
tertiis are generally accepted. The first category comprises of cases where the provisions of a treaty 
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have entered into customary law.176 The second category refers to cases when treaty provides for 
lawful sanctions for violations of law, which are to be imposed on an aggressor state.177 
Nevertheless, a number of scholars argue that besides these two categories of exceptions the pacta 
tertiis rule is subject also to other exceptions. 
 
2.3.1. Limitations to the pacta tertiis rule – Article 2(6) of the UN Charter 
The discussion on the possible limitations to the pacta tertiis rule already for more that fifty 
years is focused on Article 2(6) of the UN Charter as a principal example of a treaty provision 
establishing obligations of non-parties. Article 2 (6) provides that the Organisation shall ensure that 
states, which are not members of the UN, act in accordance with principles enumerated in Article 2 
of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
This rule seems to provide an exception to the generally recognized position that states may not 
incur obligations otherwise  that through their own consent and thus Article 2(6) arguably attempts 
to create a form of public order at least as far as threats to international peace and security are 
concerned. 
Several authors claim that Article 2(6) is a particular legal expression of the 
comprehensive authority of the principles laid down in the UN Charter and, as such, takes 
precedence over the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, which is 
referred to in Article 2(7), if the maintenance of international peace and security is in jeopardy.178 
The supporters of this view include Kelsen,179 Jennings180 and Brownlie.181 Thus Kelsen believed 
that Article 2(6) creates binding obligations on non-parties because the Security Council can apply 
sanctions to members and non-members alike. According to Kelsen: “if the Charter attaches a 
sanction to certain behaviour of non-members, it establishes a true obligation of non-members to 
observe a contrary behaviour.”182 
Similarly, also Brownlie argued that Article2(6) imposes obligations on non-members. 
According to him the exception rests on the special character of the UN as an organisation 
concerned primarily with the maintenance of international peace and security in the world and 
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including in its membership the great powers as well as the vast majority of states. Brownlie 
maintained that whilst third states are not in principle bound by the constituent treaty of an 
international organisation, the possession of legal personality by an organisation may give rise to 
certain obligations on the part of non-member states under general international law.183  
The legislative history of Article 2(6) reveals that some states indeed supported the view 
that principles of the Charter should be binding on non-members.184 However, subsequent practice 
of application of Article 2(6) by the Security Council suggests that the provision is not an exception 
to the pacta tertiis rule. The Security Council usually only appeals or urges non-members to comply 
with its resolutions,185 rather than requires it as a matter of legal obligation. The non-members 
themselves in the past have emphasised that they comply with Security Council resolutions out of 
their own free will and not because of a sense of legal obligation.186 Most commentators also 
support this view and maintain that Article 2(6) as a norm of treaty law can not create obligations 
for non-members.187 
However, irrespective of which point of view could ultimately be regarded as the better 
one, it is clear from the arguments of Kelsen and Brownlie that the alleged limitation to the pacta 
tertiis is based on the exceptional nature of the UN Charter and the powers of the UN as an 
international organisation. Therefore even if Article 2(6) would be an exception to the pacta tertiis, 
it is doubtful if a more general principle applicable outside the context of the UN could be deduced 
on the basis of the example of Article 2(6). A further limitation of Article 2(6) is that it aims to limit 
the importance of state consent only with regard to situations that are concerned with threats to 
international peace and security. In its practice the UN Security Council has acknowledged that 
situations which do not involve inter-state use of force may nonetheless be regarded as involving 
threats to international peace and security. For instance the SC has stated that genocide (Resolutions 
918 (1994) and 925 (1994) with regard to events in Rwanda), the so called ethnic cleansing 
(Resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992), 820 (1993) with regard to events in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
apartheid (Resolution 216 (1965) with regard to Southern Rhodesia and Resolution 418 (1977) with 
regard to South Africa), terrorism (Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) on the Lockerbie bombing), 
piracy (Resolution 1838 (2008) with regard to Somali pirates), breach of the right to self-
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determination (Resolutions 232 (1966) and 253 (1968) on Rhodesia) all pose threats to international 
peace and security. Although “threats to peace and security” is a broadly interpreted concept, which 
is constantly evolving and expanding,188 it is likely that some situations which concern interests of 
the whole international community (such as depletion of ozone layer and other instances of threats 
to global environment) will not fall within the ambit of threat to international peace and security. A 
further reason why the example of Article 2(6) of the UN Charter is only of limited importance is 
that the list of non-members of the UN grows increasingly short, presently containing only states 
whose statehood is contested and the Holy See.  
 
2.3.2. Limitations to the pacta tertiis rule - global and objective regimes 
A further alleged exception to the pacta tertiis rule, which has been suggested by scholars 
and finds some support in state practice, is that of global and objective regimes.189 At the core of the 
doctrine of global regimes is the realisation of the fact that many of the problems that are facing the 
present day world require participation of all states. The obvious way to secure global participation 
is to have a universally binding normative regulation. The notion of global regime in essence 
proposes that treaties with large number of participants on issues, which are of common interests to 
all mankind, are binding on all states, even those which are not parties. 
The impetus for the doctrine of global regimes was provided by the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).190 The Convention provided that 
international seabed area is the common heritage of mankind and that no state or natural, or legal 
person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals of international seabed, 
except in accordance with the Convention. Such provision was eagerly supported by a large 
majority of states, which had no technology to engage in any actual exploration or mining of the 
deep seabed. These states wished that the few developed states, which potentially could engage in 
deep seabed mining, would be precluded from doing so in unregulated manner. Consequently, many 
states made statements to the effect that the particular provisions of the UNCLOS are universally 
binding191 and thus create obligations also for states which are not parties to the UNCLOS. Similar 
statements were made also by the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority 
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and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.192 The Commission stated that “the only 
regime for exploration and exploitation of the Area and its resources is that established by the 
UNCLOS.”193 Subsequently exploitation of the international seabed area outside the framework of 
the UNCLOS regime was declared to be wholly illegal.194  
However, it is evident from state practice that at its current stage of development 
international law does not recognise majority law-making treaties.195 The above mentioned claims 
with regard to the UNCLOS constitute one of the rare exceptions when states have claimed that 
certain treaty provisions have a universal application.196 Even with regard to the UNCLOS 
representatives of several states made statements to the effect that majority decisions would not 
create any obligations on dissenting states.197 Among these states also the US claimed that “neither 
the Conference nor the states indicating an intention to become parties to the convention have been 
granted global legislative powers.”198 
The other doctrine, which advocates an exception to the pacta tertiis rule, is the doctrine of 
objective regimes. Judge McNair has described the notion of objective regime in his separate 
opinion in the South-West Africa case: "From time to time it happens that a group of great powers, 
or a large number of states both great and small, assume a power to create by a multiparty treaty 
some new international regime or status, which soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability 
extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting parties, and giving it an objective 
existence."199 McNair essentially argues that certain treaties due to the special authority of a group 
of states parties or the permanent nature of the rights created by the treaty have erga omnes 
effect.200 In substantiating his assertion McNair brings examples of the Treaty on Permanent 
Neutrality of Switzerland of 1815 and other 19th century treaties on territorial issues concluded by 
the European states. Moreover, McNair finds support to the existence of treaties that create erga 
omnes effects in the famous ICJ pronouncement in the Reparation for Injuries case.201 In his 
opinion the Court clearly refers to the special authority of fifty states to create an entity with 
objective legal personality, which has to be respected by all states. 
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The notion of special authority of a group of states seems doubtful when considered in the 
light of principles of sovereignty and equality of states, especially since in a horizontal legal order 
states themselves proclaim to be the ones with the special authority. The more recent writings on 
this topic attempt to circumvent this problem by emphasising the need for acquiescence of other 
states to the competence of the particularly interested states as a basis on which non-parties to the 
particular regime could incur obligations.202 However, even if the acquiescence would authorise the 
particularly interested states, the question remains whether such treaties produce any effects also on 
the objecting states. In this regard Reuter notes that no “objective situation” or “status” is opposable 
per se, and that only recognition by other states makes it so.203 Such position certainly corresponds 
with the opinion that it is highly questionable whether under current international law a group of 
“particularly interested states” is able to create obligations for third states.204 Since these opinions 
also correspond with the contents of Article 35 of the VCLT, they seem to be better justified than 
McNair’s notion of special authority of a particular group of states. 
However, the doctrine of objective regimes appears to be more persuasive when 
considered from the perspective of special nature of the rights established by treaties which create 
regimes that could be described as objective or based on a status. These would be treaties that create 
certain objectively existing situations, such as treaties on boundaries or constitutive treaties of 
international organisation. Matters concerning status of territories and legal subjects in any legal 
system must enjoy a certain degree of stability. A minimum precondition for such stability is that 
the status can be invoked against all other subjects of the legal system. This is particularly so in the 
case of the international community where stability of territorial arrangements is closely bound with 
the maintenance of peace. The 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties205 provides further support for the opinion that treaties on territorial matters indeed could 
be regarded as an exceptional category of treaties, as Article 11 and Article 12 of the Convention 
establish a special regime for succession of treaties on boundaries and other territorial regimes.  
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty206 is often referred to as the most evident example of a treaty 
establishing an objective regime which imposes obligations on all states.207 The special status of the 
treaty is argued on both of the above mentioned grounds. Firstly, it has been created by 12 initial 
states parties, 8 of which could be regarded as particularly interested states, as they had made claims 
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to sovereignty over parts of Antarctica prior to the conclusion of the treaty. Secondly, the treaty 
directly concerns the territorial status of the Antarctica. One of the key provisions of the treaty is 
that existing sovereignty claims are put into a state of suspense and that no new claims shall be 
asserted.  
The proposition that the Antarctic Treaty creates an objective regime is open to the above 
mentioned criticisms.208 In a horizontal legal order there is no objective way to determine which 
states have the special authority to introduce an objective regime. As a result, states themselves 
proclaim to be the particularly interested ones, which is likely to result in competing claims. 
Moreover, the analogy with municipal legal systems in which a title or a status of a person is 
recognised by all other subjects of the legal system, is not entirely valid in international law. The 
reason why title or status is acknowledged in municipal system is that the title or the status are 
registered by some recognised authority. There seems to be no such authority in the international 
community. Moreover, the idea that a few states impose obligations on the rest of the international 
community, which are also likely to be in the interest of these few states rather that the international 
community, seems to be contrary to the principles of sovereignty and equality of states. 
Furthermore, it seems to be rather clear that contemporary international law does not 
recognise the existence of objective regimes. Documentation of the ILC’s work during the 
preparation of the VCLT reveals that a proposal to include a special provision on objective regimes 
was rejected. ILC noted that “as the theory of treaties creating objective regimes was controversial 
and its acceptability to the states somewhat doubtful, the Commission concluded that to recognise 
that such treaties create special legal effects for non-parties would be premature at the present state 
of development of international relations.”209 The period of time after codification of pacta tertiis 
rule in the VCLT has provided no evidence that states can incur obligations from international 
treaties otherwise than by their express consent.210 As evident from the above discussion, the 
doctrines of global and objective regimes yet find no persuasive support. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the only valid exceptions to the pacta tertiis rule remain those of treaty acquiring a 
status of international custom and lawful sanctions on aggressor state. 
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2.4. Conclusions  
The analysis of this chapter - the emergence of public interest norms, their collision with 
individual interests of states and finally the allegedly changing role of state consent - points to 
several conclusions. First and foremost, it is obvious that international law is developing some 
elements characteristic to public law. General recognition of existence of community interests and 
application of the so-called public interest norms by international as well as domestic courts are a 
clear indication of this trend. However, as can be observed from the above discussion, these 
developments remain rather limited in scope. Although public interest norms are recognized and 
applied by international courts, there is no evidence of a fundamental shift towards favouring public 
interests above individualistic interests. As evidenced by such recent cases as Arrest Warrant 
(Congo v. Belgium), Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) as well as by the 
ECtHR’s Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, when faced with a choice between community interests 
and individualistic interests of states, international courts still tend to prefer well established, state 
sovereignty inspired concepts, which manifest the Vatellian international law values, even if the 
protection of these values comes at a cost of public interests. Partly this tendency, at least as far as 
the ICJ is concerned, may be explained by the fact that the ICJ without compulsory jurisdiction in 
essence remains more of an arbitration tribunal rather than a court. As such it has to be most 
considerate towards its clients – the litigating states. To judge the validity of this proposition one 
only needs to consider the notable difference in tone between the ICJ’s inter-state contentious cases 
(which firmly tend to prefer sovereignty based rules) and advisory opinions (in which the ICJ feels 
more inclined to express its communitarian sentiments). 
The conclusion as to the role of community interests is somewhat different in the case of 
certain specialised fields. The EU law and to a lesser extent the ECHR system, provide examples of 
how the public law paradigm and accordingly community interests may be reconciled with 
individualistic interests of states. Within the EU law the public law paradigm is effectuated by 
means of institutionalized infringement proceedings and invocation of state responsibility not only 
by other states but also by individuals.211 Likewise, recognition of direct effect of the EU law and 
individuals as subjects of the legal system212, as well as their right to institute judicial review 
proceedings213, are all hallmarks of a legal system that provides avenues for protection of 
communitarian interests.  
Just as public interest norms are employed only as narrowly construed exceptions, 
similarly, the role of state consent has not really undergone any meaningful transformation in the 
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post-Charter era. Thus attempts to introduce public order notions in international law (whether done 
by academics, by international courts or by governments) have not resulted in reinvention of the 
structure of international law, but rather in some modest exceptions to the sovereignty based rules.  
Finally, the above discussion indicates that the limited scope of actual developments 
towards public law paradigm contrasts with developments in legal theory as advocated by 
international law scholars. In the scholarly discussion on transformation of international law (from 
sovereignty and bilateralism to a community and multilateralism based system) several key 
concepts keep surfacing. First and foremost, there is the idea that self-interest driven states have 
come to realize the need for an international community. Thus even relatively moderate authors like 
Brownlie have employed concepts such as “system of multilateral public order”214. The critics point 
out that this academic project (to talk about the international community as if it already exists and to 
talk so persistently that everyone becomes convinced that it does exist) is grounded in nothing but 
moral aspirations. They say that the downside of inventing legal concepts that are not present in 
actual state practice is that it blurs the distinction between law and morals, thus diminishing 
authority of legal rules.215  
These views certainly have some merit as they caution progressive development of law to 
be moderate. However, criticism of the shift to multilateralism and the public law paradigm as 
being an ivory tower academic project redirects attention away from the actuality that ideas of the 
international community and multilateralism are well present in positive international law. Public 
interest norms are a clear manifestation of that presence. The increased recognition of 
interdependence - be it with regard to global environment, economy or security - is the true diving 
force behind transformation of international law. The academic project is merely to point out the 
social reality and argue for an appropriate change in law. 
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3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION OF COMMUNITY 
INTERESTS IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
After the above overview of the role of community interests in international law generally, 
we now turn specifically to protection of these interests in the law of international responsibility of 
states. The enquiry continues the conceptual approach started in the previous chapter – protection of 
community interests is assessed on the basis of whether the law of state responsibility displays 
elements characteristic to public law, i.e., the public law paradigm in which responsibility rules 
provide for a legal relationship not only between the injured state and the state that has performed 
the breach, but also between the wrongdoing state and the community of states as a whole. This 
enquiry leads us to question theory foundations of the law of state responsibility - is state 
responsibility based on approaches characteristic to private law - with invocation of responsibility 
only by the injured and thus bilateralism as the prevalent mode of relations? Or is it rather based on 
public law model - where breach results in illegality and the whole community of states in some 
form or another may pursue invocation of responsibility thereby placing greater emphasis on 
multilateralism.  As will be explored latter on in this chapter, historically state responsibility has 
been predominantly based on the private law and bilateralism model. As noted by Aust: “[m]ore 
than any other domain of international law, state responsibility is traditionally characterised by its 
orientation towards reciprocity and bilateralism.”216  
This question whether state responsibility is based on private or public law paradigm is not 
merely of theoretical interest. In practical terms the distinction between private/public law paradigm 
determines who will be entitled to invoke responsibility. In the private law model it is generally 
only the injured that may invoke responsibility. This approach is exposed to considerable 
shortcomings. There may be various reasons for the injured state to be reluctant to invoke 
responsibility - it may be a weaker state that is dependant on maintaining good relations with a 
more powerful state; or the injured state may abstain from invoking responsibility due to other 
reasons of internal or international politics. As a result, the breach of international law may go 
unchallenged and thereby harm not only the interests of the injured state, but the rule of law in the 
international community as a whole. On the other hand, the public law paradigm, as explained later 
on in this chapter, does not consider a breach as an issue exclusively between the injured state and 
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the state that has performed the breach. Other states, international organizations (or indeed 
individuals) may be involved in the response to the unlawful conduct by either directly invoking the 
responsibility of the wrongdoer or applying other legal mechanisms such as collective 
countermeasures. 
This chapter focuses specifically on the historical development of the public law paradigm 
in the law of state responsibility. It begins with the origins of the law of state responsibility that can 
be found in ancient Roman law. It then turns to writings of scholars of 17th to 19th centuries when 
natural law inspired multilateralism was gradually ousted by positivism, which tended to see 
international responsibility of states as a strictly bilateral matter. The chapter then touches upon the 
re-emergence of the public law paradigm in the early 20th century. The second part of the chapter is 
dedicated to the period from the 1940ties to the present, when the topic was taken up by the 
International Law Commission. 
 
3.1. Historical development prior to the ILC 
3.1.1. Roman law origins 
The history of the law of international responsibility is rather short - at best we can trace it 
to writings of Grotius and Vatell. However, the intellectual roots in which state responsibility rules 
are grounded run considerably further back. The doctrinal origins of these rules may be traced back 
to Roman law.217 In particular Roman rules on extra-contractual liability (also known as delictual 
liability in continental Europe or tort liability in common law countries) and civil law actions such 
as restitutio in integrum218 have served as analogies for the better part of state responsibility rules. 
Since these Roman rules seem to belong to the genus of private law, one ought to conclude that it is 
the private law that has inspired most of the doctrine behind state responsibility rules.219  
Interestingly however, Roman rules on extra-contractual liability (despite nominally 
belonging to private law) also display strong public law features. Roman rules on delicts220 aimed 
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not only to compensate the injured party, but also to penalise the wrongdoer. Thus in a case of 
wrongful damage to property,221 the injured party was entitled to a compensation amounting to the 
highest value which the damaged property had in last 30 days prior to the occurrence of the 
damage.222 From the perspective of modern civil law this rule makes little sense – the wrongdoer 
has to compensate the entire value of the thing in question regardless of what was the actual damage 
that the owner suffered.223 This rule, however, makes perfect sense if we consider that early Roman 
law made no clear distinction between private and public law. The public law function of deterring 
wrongful action and insuring observance of law was served by what was essentially a private law 
claim. As a result, private law claims took up elements that were penal and therefore public in their 
nature.  
A further remarkable feature or Roman law, relevant for tracing intellectual roots of state 
responsibility doctrines, is that Roman private law in certain cases allowed for actio popularis – 
claims in general interest, where claimant did not have to prove any individual interest in instituting 
proceedings. For instance, such claims could be brought in cases of damage caused by something 
being thrown out of or fallen of from a building that has hit and injured another person. As any 
member of the public could potentially be injured by such conduct, the claim could be brought not 
only by the injured but by any person. 224 
Another arguably separate source from which state responsibility concepts may have 
developed are ancient international law rules on treatment of aliens and the associated right of 
reprisals.225 This proposition, however, may be challenged, as one may argue that these ancient 
rules on treatment of aliens and the right to use reprisals226 also resulted from private law analogies 
that statesmen first observed in their domestic private law systems, thus leading us back to private 
law notions as the only origin of modern state responsibility rules. Although reprisals seem to 
belong squarely to the sphere of international law, the parallels with primitive domestic legal orders 
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(like Roman law prior to the Lex Aquilia in 287 BC) in which privately enforced “eye for an eye” 
was the norm, are equally evident. Thus again the enquiry leads one back to domestic private law as 
the doctrinal origin of state responsibility rules. 
 
2.1.2. From Grotius to Anzilotti 
Constructing international responsibility solely in accordance with the private law 
paradigm has obvious disadvantages (especially if our idea of private law is entirely void of public 
law elements such as those present in Roman law). First and foremost, the private law paradigm is 
primarily concerned with the interests of the injured. The protection of legality (or the rule of law in 
the broadest sense of the term) is not the objective of private law. For the private law paradigm 
protection of the rule of law is at best a by-product of protection of individual interest. In developed 
domestic legal systems this limitation of private law is not a problem since there is also public law 
to guard the public interest. This, however, (both historically and now) has not been so for 
international law. The same private law responsibility mechanisms have to secure both the interests 
of the injured and the public interest of observance of the rule of law. Unsurprisingly, without 
mechanisms, which are specifically designed to protect public interests, these interests have 
remained largely unprotected. 
International lawyers as early as Grotius, being aware of this gap in protection of public 
interests, were endeavouring to argue for a right to bring claims for protection of public interest. 
Thus Grotius in 1646 wrote in his “On the Law of War and Peace”:  
“[K]ings and those who possess rights equal to those kings, have the right of 
demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against themselves or 
their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly effect them, but 
excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.”227  
By the right of other subjects of international law to “demand punishments” of the 
wrongdoer even when they are not themselves injured, Grotius seems to endorse the public law 
paradigm and multilateralism as indispensable parts of international law. However, in the following 
centuries natural law inspired multilateralism advocated by Grotius gradually gave way to strict 
bilateralism, supported by positivist legal thinkers. 
The first great scholar to embrace strictly bilateral (and thus also a private law oriented) 
conception of state responsibility was Vattel. Writing about a hundred years after Grotius in 1758 
he argued strongly against the practice of reprisals for protection of third country nationals. For 
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Vattel any state that engaged in such reprisals was assuming a role of a judge in relations between 
another sovereign state and a third country nationals – a right that it was not entitled to claim.228 
Vatell’s views (most likely motivated by the fact that the right to reprisals was often abused) fitted 
nicely with positivist notions of unlimited sovereignty that became predominant in 19th century. 
According to the prevailing opinion of the time, state responsibility was strictly a matter between 
the injured state and the state that had committed the breach.229  
The most notable proponent of bilateralist paradigm of 19th century was Italian Dionisio 
Anzilotti. According to Anzilotti international responsibility of a state may result only from a 
violation of a subjective right of another state (and not from a violation of a general interest of the 
community of states). Thus for Anzilotti the core of state responsibility is the right of the injured 
state to claim reparation.  Any other relationship between the wrongdoer and the whole community 
of states was “unknown to international law and repugnant to it”230. To understand why Anzilotti  
was so insistent on cropping the potential for enforcement of state responsibility one must 
remember that 19th century legal thought was cantered around positivism and state sovereignty. For 
a legal positivist a system which provided for rights, but had no meaningful mechanism to enforce 
them was not real law. So to make international law a “real” law, Anzilotti discarded all the 
elements of state responsibility doctrine which were controversial (such as reprisals in general 
interest). Likewise, adherence to state sovereignty required that explicit state consent be recognized 
as the only source of legal obligations. Therefore multilateralist public law concepts such as claims 
in general interest in the law of state responsibility had to be left out as states usually protested 
whenever states other than the injured state attempted to refer to the vocabulary of state 
responsibility.  
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2.1.3. Re-emergence of the public law paradigm 
Despite prevalence of the bilateralist approach, the public law paradigm did not entirely 
disappear from the debate even in the 19th century.231 By early 20th century there were prominent 
lawyers who attempted to advocate introduction of public law elements into the law of international 
responsibility. Thus in 1915 Elihu Root wrote:  
“Up to this time breaches of international law have been treated as we treat wrongs under 
civil procedure, as if they concerned nobody except the particular nation upon which the 
injury was inflicted and the nation inflicting it. [...] International law violated with 
impunity must soon cease to exist and every state has a direct interest in preventing those 
violations which if permitted to continue would destroy the law. [...] There must be a 
change in theory, and violations of the law of such character as to threaten the peace and 
order of the community of nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every 
civilized nation to have the law maintained and a legal injury to every nation.”232 
 Also other American authors took on a visionary outlook spurred perhaps by the ongoing 
raging of the First Word War in Europe. Thus Peaslee notes in 1916: 
“[I]t seems probable from present indications and the natural necessities of the situation 
that international law will ultimately provide for some method of central control over acts 
of nations of a quasi-criminal nature, and that individual nations will find it to their mutual 
interest to surrender some of what are at present deemed their sovereign rights, in the 
interest of the welfare and order of the community of nations. [...].The tendency will be to 
delegate the duties both of enforcing civil rights and of controlling quasi-criminal acts to 
authorized officials and to preserve “self-help” so far and only as it proves an orderly 
auxiliary.”233 
From these passages it becomes clear that some international lawyers in early 20th century 
unequivocally called for introduction of public law elements into the law of international 
responsibility. This in principle was nothing new – as already noted, Grotius did much the same. 
What was different this time was that the theory on state responsibility had by then considerably 
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evolved. Interestingly this evolution was mainly due to the technical brilliance and attention to 
detail of positivist scholars such as Anzilotti, who added considerable refinement to the structures 
of the doctrine. This refinement of theory allowed lawyers like Root and Peaslee to argue subtler 
points, such as distinction in modality of invocation (invocation by the injured state or by states 
other than the injured) on the basis of the content of obligation (that every state must be regarded as 
injured if the obligation breached threatens peace and order of the international community). Also 
the tragedy of the war made it easier to challenge the orthodoxy of the established doctrine (a trend 
that may also be observed during and after the Second World War). Thus even ideas as “radical” 
Peaslee’s suggestion to institutionalize enforcement of responsibility could be brought to the table 
and given serious consideration. 
After the First World War the natural law inspired multilateralist views of the international 
community were gaining ground. A prime example of this trend was the 1919 Versailles Treaty and 
its Covenant of the League of Nations.234 Article 11 of the Covenant declared any war or threat of 
war to be a concern to the whole League and that the League “shall take any action that may be 
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations”235. It would be a vast exaggeration to 
claim that by this frail (and as it turned out, rather ineffective) mechanism states had given up 
Anzilotti’s conception of state responsibility as a strictly bilateral matter. As fascinating as this 
development was, it belonged to a treaty rather that to general international law. Thus in practical 
terms it did little to oust breach of subjective rights as the only valid ground for invocation of 
responsibility. However, what this development did was to signal an emergence of alternative 
outlook of how interstate relations could be organized – an outlook that was premised on 
multilateralism rather than strict adherence to the private law paradigm.  
A further example of this multilateralist outlook was the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes236. Its preamble stated that war of aggression 
constitutes an international crime which violates solidarity of the members of the international 
community. Although the Protocol never entered into force, reference to state crime is of marked 
importance as the concept of crime arguably implies existence of public order and some form of 
accountability before community as a whole. 
The same trend manifested also in theory which started to move away from a strictly 
bilateral subjective-rights attitudes and began to place more emphasis on the objective character of 
international law. These were no longer lone voices, but rather leading figures of the scholarship. 
These trends, however, were not followed by a fundamental shift of state responsibility paradigm 
                                                 
234 Covenant of the League of Nations, 29 April 1919, Paris, [1919] UKTS 4. 
235 Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 29 April 1919, Paris, [1919] UKTS 4. 
236 League of Nations, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 2 October 1924, available at: 
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from private law and subjective rights conception to public law and illegality in which a breach 
would create a legal relationship between the wrongdoer and community as a whole. Although a 
rather optimistic time for international law (as international lawyers in an atmosphere of great 
expectations were preparing for 1930 Hague codification conference) the impetus for conceptual 
rethink of state responsibility rules was still too weak. 
Attitudes, however, began to change by 1930s with Hersch Lauterpacht challenging the 
commonly-held positivist view that states (being sovereign) may not be subject to punishment. In 
two of his seminal works - the 1927 “Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law” 
(which was a version of his 1925 doctoral thesis) and in the 1933 “The Function of Law in the 
International Community” Lauterpacht strongly criticized sovereignist and positivist conceptions of 
international law. The essential thesis of Lauterpacht was that international law (although with some 
temporary deficiencies) is just like any other law. As such international law must be a “complete 
system” based on a logically consistent theory. Unlimited sovereignty and positivism, according to 
Lauterpacht, lack this consistency. Lauterpacht asks - if will of the state is the ultimate source of 
law, then what is the source of the rule proclaiming this supremacy of state’s will? To avoid being 
caught up in endlessly circular argument, one must assume that some fundamental norm (such as 
pacta sunt servanda) is based in something other that the will of the state.237  
Lauterpacht refers to many instances where international law is based on domestic law 
analogies. Acquisition of territory by states, for instance, is based on rules much the same as those 
for acquiring private property in domestic legal systems.238 Treaties are governed by rules that are 
very similar to rules governing private contracts.239 Rules on responsibility (domestic responsibility 
for delicts and state responsibility in international law) share the same basic structures (for example, 
preconditions of responsibility are: breach of an obligation, damage and causal link between the 
breach and the damage, as well as justifications such as force majeure). Thus Lauterpacht argued 
that analogy is an indispensable part of any complete system of law, including international law. 
This in turn requires that analogies between domestic and international law must be extended also 
to modes of responsibility that states may incur.240 For him to limit state responsibility only to a 
duty of reparation between the wrongdoer and the injured and to deny a criminal law type of 
consequence would be illogical, unjust and contrary to existing practice.241 Thus Lauterpacht 
perceived state responsibility also in terms of multilateral obligations between the wrongdoer and 
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the international community. Lauterpacht’s scholarly brilliance as well as his visionary outlook on 
development of international law left a lasting impression on legal thinking of the 20th century and 
indeed his writings remain among some of the most cited sources even up to the present day. His 
influence has been particularly notable in the work of the International Law Commission, as the 
Commission played a key role in the development of rules on protection of community interests in 
the law of international responsibility. 
 
3.2. The Public law paradigm in the ILC’s work on international responsibility. 
 
The story of the ILC begins with a rather upbeat note.242 International lawyer in late 1940s is 
a sort of a hero on the ruins of the Second World War. It’s the international lawyer who brings to 
justice both Nazi and Japanese war criminals (better some than none at all); and it’s the 
international lawyer who proposes a new system for managing the world’s nations with a promise 
of human rights, dignity and “equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”243. 
Natural law is no longer a bad word, whereas positivism and unlimited sovereignty of states are on 
a defence. In this climate some of the most highly regarded international lawyers like Hersh 
Lauterpacht are blunt radicals (judging by today’s standards) seriously proposing the creation of 
world government with powers of international legislation.244 Indeed, late 1940s were a remarkable 
time for international law.  
3.2.1. The work of Garcia Amador 
It is in this atmosphere that the ILC started its work on international responsibility of states. 
By 1949 when the topic was formally selected for codification245, it already had a considerable 
background.246 However as noted by Ago due to “exceptional difficulties inherent in the subject, the 
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uncertainties with which it has always been fraught, and the divergences of opinion and interests in 
the matter, previous codification efforts have not proved successful, their resumption having been 
postponed until a more propitious moment.”247 In 1955 a Cuban member of the ILC – Garcia 
Amador was appointed as the first special rapporteur on state responsibility and the ILC actually 
began its work on the topic.  
Amador’s first report was as brave as radical.248 He starts by expounding his views on what 
it is that the ILC is called upon to do.249 Amador makes an argument that with the Second World 
War international law has undergone a profound transformation and in these new circumstances 
ILC’s task is not merely to compile outdated rules and doctrines. He seems to suggest that the task 
of the ILC is to propose rules that are suitable to the changing paradigm of international society. In 
other words, its purpose is to propose rules not as they were (or are) but rather as they ought to be.  
Several of his groundbreaking proposals must be mentioned. Firstly, he envisaged that the 
duty to make reparation is by far not the only consequence of a breach. Responsibility would also 
entail criminal law type consequences of sanctions or punishment.250 Secondly, invocation of 
responsibility would not depend only on states; also individuals would be entitled to make 
international claims.251 Thirdly, the rules to be codified and developed would concern only 
responsibility of states for damage caused to the person or property aliens.252 It would provide not 
only for principles governing the law of responsibility (attribution, invocation, etc.), but would also 
codify substantive obligations of states.253 
Unsurprisingly Amador’s proposals were met with harsh criticism. States as well as fellow 
ILC members were not keen on the idea that individuals would be recognized as subjects of 
international law entitled to bring international claims.254 There was scepticism about Amador’s 
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insistence that state responsibility would result specifically from breaches of fundamental human 
rights.255 Also Amador’s approach to limit the project to responsibility for injuries caused to 
foreigners was controversial as socialist states saw it as part of a capitalist agenda.256 Many were 
unhappy that the project did not deal with responsibility in a way that would include breaches of 
other areas of international law, such as law of treaties. After the initial feedback, the special 
rapporteur softened his stance considerably.257 However, his proposals were still considered to be 
radical and beyond the ILC’s mandate. The Commission opted to ignore Amador’s subsequent 
reports on a pretext that it was busy with other issues.258  
 
3.2.2. Roberto Ago and an attempted shift to public order 
 
In 1963 when Amador’s membership of the ILC ended Roberto Ago of Italy was appointed 
as special rapporteur on state responsibility. There were several lessons that he could learn from 
Amador’s experience. The ILC was not a forum to discuss reinvention of international law based on 
public law model. It was clear that the predominant view on what the ILC is supposed to do under 
its mandate to “progressively develop” international law was considerably narrower than what 
Amador had attempted. It was also clear that to succeed with the project it was necessary to stay 
away from issues which were perceived as being markedly in the interests of either one of the cold 
war blocks. Given the highly unsympathetic welcome that Amador’s ideas had received, Ago opted 
to start from a clean slate.  
Ago presented his first report to the ILC in 1969.259 He devised two skilful solutions to the 
problems that had stalled Amador’s progress. First, he proposed that the ILC would deal only with 
“the general rules governing the international responsibility of states.”260 Ago labelled these as 
secondary rules - rules that provide for general conditions under which the state is considered 
responsible and legal consequences which flow from responsibility. Thus Ago steered away from 
having to deal with substantive international obligations – the primary rules, which were bound to 
be notoriously hard to agree on. The advantage of secondary rules is that they are wonderfully 
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neutral (for the most part). They would apply to any breach of international law, whatever the 
content of a particular obligation. Thus the ILC would avoid proposing rules that would be 
markedly in favour of any of the cold war antagonists. 
The second skilful solution of Ago was the idea that injury is not a requirement of 
responsibility. In other words the responsibility would be objective – it is not necessary that any 
particular state suffers some detriment for the wrongdoer to incur responsibility. The very fact of 
breach is considered detrimental to the system of international law and therefore results in 
responsibility. The consequence of giving up injury as a requirement of responsibility is that the 
wrongdoer incurs responsibility (with resulting duty of continued performance, cessation, non-
repetition and reparation) even if no state has invoked it. This small nuance is of great significance 
for the public law paradigm, as it shifts (at least conceptually) the law of international responsibility 
from a bilateral relation between the wrongdoer and the wronged towards a system based on public 
order.261 
The skilfulness of Ago was that he managed to introduce this fundamental paradigm shift 
in a way that hardly anyone minded. There were no objections from the ILC members and only 
France and Argentina voiced some objections.262 It is possible that governments perceived the 
question as a doctrinal detail – hardly anything that could threaten national (or government) 
interests, something that officials tend to protect vigorously. Had Ago come out in his report 
announcing a new dawn for international society and calling on states to embrace public order, it is 
likely that the response would have been similar to that which was given to his predecessor. Ago 
clearly was mindful of how important perceptions are.  
Introduction of public order into international law was not attempted solely by Ago.  As 
already elaborated earlier, International lawyers as early as Grotius were endeavouring to do this.263 
However, with the creation of the ILC, the international legal system obtained an influential 
specialized institution, which rather frankly pursued an agenda of introducing public law 
fundamentals into the law of state responsibility. Lauterpacht, being the ILC’s special rapporteur on 
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the law of treaties, proposed that a treaty be void if it violates “such overriding principles of 
international law which may be regarded as constituting principles of international public 
policy”264. These overriding principles were later labelled as jus cogens and were retained by 
subsequent law of treaties rapporteurs Fitzmaurice265 and Waldock266 and eventually found their 
way into Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As Spinedi notes “the same people were 
dealing with codification of the law of treaties and of state responsibility”267. Hence the proposal to 
give up injury as a precondition of responsibility and thus to perceive responsibility in terms of 
multilateral obligations was part of a larger attempt by the ILC to introduce public law notions into 
international law. Given that sovereignist views were generally prevailing prior to the Second 
World War, these proposals indeed may be regarded as progressive development of international 
law.  
However, discarding injury as a condition of responsibility was not the only idea that 
signalled a shift to public law elements. Likewise, Ago proposed to introduce the notion of 
international crimes of state.268 This no longer was perceived as a nitty-gritty doctrinal issue. This 
type of strong language was bound to alarm governments. And it did. The ILC subsequently 
conceded to disapproving positions of states and the term “crime” disappeared from the Articles on 
State Responsibility. It did however retain the notion that there are breaches which concern the 
whole international community. The ILC dropped the strong language – instead of international 
crimes, this category was labelled as serious breaches. And more importantly, nearly all practically 
relevant consequences that would distinguish serious breaches from all other breaches were 
removed (with the exception of Article 48 providing for invocation of responsibility by a state other 
than an injured state and vague obligations of Article 41269). Considering the fact that the 2001 
Articles on State Responsibility were adopted more than 30 years since jus cogens entered the 
mainstream of international legal thought, the ILC may not, in terms of developing the law, claim 
any great success on this issue.  
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The conceptual foundations laid by Ago were retained by subsequent rapporteurs - 
Riphagen (1980-1986), Arangio-Ruiz (1986-1996) and Crawford (1997-2001) and eventfully also 
found their way also into Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(ARIO)270. These rapporteurs did however come up with novelties of their own that could be 
regarded as progressive development. In particular Arangio-Ruiz proposed mandatory conciliation 
procedures for all disputes involving state responsibility as well as mandatory arbitration for 
disputes involving countermeasures.271 States generally disapproved of these ideas and they were 
dropped. Crawford, whose foremost achievement is that he managed to persuade everyone to agree 
at least on something, also must be credited with rescuing (at least partially) the distinction between 
delicts and crimes (now termed serious breaches of peremptory norms). Also he somewhat salvaged 
the right to claim responsibility for protection of public interest  - what is currently Article 48 in the 
Articles on State Responsibility allows invocation of responsibility by a state other than the injured 
state, if the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.  
 
3.2.3. The function of the ILC - is it supposed to promote the public law paradigm?  
 
After examining the historical accomplishments of the ILC in the field, let us now turn to 
more theoretical considerations and in light of the foregoing discussion enquire: what is the proper 
function of the ILC? The obvious answer seems to be “the progressive development and 
codification of international law”. But what does it really mean? Has the ILC progressively 
developed and codified law of international responsibility? An explanation of the meaning of these 
terms may be found in Article 15 of the ILC’s Statute.272 Although the conceptual difference 
between codification and progressive development appears obvious, scholars and in particular ILC 
members have maintained that in practice the two are hard to separate.273 In 1947 Jennings 
concludes that “codification properly conceived is itself a method for the progressive development 
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of the law.”274 Current day ILC members seem to conceive the matter along the same lines. Pellet 
notes that all topics imply an aspect of progressive development, since customary rules always 
comprise some elements of uncertainty.275 He concludes that: “pure codification constantly 
interferes with progressive development; there is certainly no clear threshold.”276  
Having concluded that distinction between “progressive development” and “codification” 
is hard (and perhaps not even necessary) to draw, we come back to the initial question of the ILC’s 
function. In particular, regardless whether we call it progressive development or codification, is the 
ILC supposed to develop new law at all and to promote the public law paradigm? Here opinions 
differ starkly. For Jennings codification “does not necessarily imply a process which leaves the 
main substance of the law unchanged.”277 Similarly, when describing the task of a drafter of a 
multilateral treaty (which is the task of the ILC) he concludes that “existing customary law [...] falls 
into its proper place as valuable raw material for the construction of his [drafter’s] edifice; but he 
need not regard his draft as being necessarily a statement of what the law is, but can and should 
regard it as a statement of what the law ought to be.”278 Likewise, as we saw earlier, creation of new 
law was very much something that Garcia Amador in his capacity as a special rapporteur had in 
mind.279 Similarly, the whole push by the ILC to introduce public order ideas, such as jus cogens, 
international crimes and obligations erga omnes all border closely with the creation of new law.280 
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Modern opinions take a rather different outlook. For instance, Pellet is most critical about 
“utopian”, “unrealistic”, “moralist” and “absurd” approach to progressive development, which in 
his opinion, although intellectually attractive is practically impossible.281 For Pellet the ILC:  
“cannot change the whole system of the law of nations. Its duty is to try to 
understand the logic of existing rules and to develop them in the framework of this logic, 
not to change the underlying logic. [...]. Commission is (or should be) concerned with 
collecting and analysing precedents [...] and doctrinal views, assembling them with a view 
to ascertaining evidence of practice generally accepted as being the law and to deduce the 
existence of new trends, and elaborating drafts with concern for reasonableness, 
consistency and acceptability”.282 
Whatever it may be that Pellet perceives as reasonable, the interesting point is that his 
opinion comes remarkably close to what Jennings in 1947 referred to as “narrow or pessimistic” 
school of thought, which would “confine the art of codification” to restating existing rules of 
customary law.283 Tomuschat, along somewhat similar lines as Pellet, observes the fact that “states 
accept only balanced solutions which reflect the practices as they are observed in day-to-day 
transactions” and emphasizes that the ILC’s texts must be such that states would find them 
acceptable.284 One can not help but to remember Lauterpacht’s reflection that one of the main 
problems of international law is the low level of ambition in the doctrine.285 
However, lack of ambition of ILC members is hardly the reason for the decline in 
progressiveness of the ILC. As we saw earlier, all of the special rapporteurs on state responsibility 
(including those after Ago) at least to some extent made genuine attempts to develop the law. 
Likewise, the doctrine, although generally considerably more conservative now than in 1940s to 
1960s, has proposed new ideas.286 The real reasons behind the change of heart in the ILC lie rather 
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in the wider developments of the international community that have taken place in the second half 
of the 20th century and especially after 1990s.  
To understand what is the proper function of the ILC and what it ought to be in future, one 
needs to enquire what are these wider developments in international community. To say that the 
ILC should have more progressive development is a statement that may be disconnected from the 
reality of actual needs; a statement which assumes that more international law is good and 
necessary in itself.287 It may be more appropriate to ask what is the useful purpose that the ILC can 
serve under present conditions? A purpose that is adequate to what is actually happening.  
In the early days of the United Nations there was a broad agreement that general rules need 
to be codified and perhaps new ones developed. During and after decolonization there was another 
practical necessity - to create confidence in newly independent countries that international law (in 
the development of which they had no part) is not merely a tool of ex-colonial powers. There was 
an obvious need to have the new states to sign up to the codifying treaties, or else, it was feared the 
very fabric of international law would have undergone an unpredictable transformation.  
These necessities are no longer relevant. Much of the general international law is already 
codified. Newly established countries have (although reluctantly) embraced the system. The initial 
work plan of the ILC is largely accomplished.288 However, there are new winds blowing that may 
provide the ILC an opportunity to prove its worth. As Koskenniemi has pointed out, international 
law is experiencing certain trends, such as deformalization, fragmentation and empire.289 In the 
world of deformalization of international law, which in essence means prevalence of procedural 
standards, soft law and non-compliance procedures over strict binding rules and legal dispute 
settlement, the ILC in its present form (being a specialist in formulating legal rules) would find 
itself mostly out of work. In the world of fragmentation of international law the general 
international law expert would be equally redundant. Finally, for the empire (which tends to hold its 
views as an uncontestable truth) law has value only to the extent that it serves the empire’s purpose. 
In the world where the empire’s hegemony is not absolute and where law serves common rather 
than the empire’s purpose, the empire often disregards such law altogether (US “war on terrorism” 
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being an example)290. Thus empire has little need for the ILC, unless it can have the ILC working 
exclusively for the empire.  
Another important trend manifesting in international law is that of constitutionalization.291 
This implies a gradual emergence of public order of some sort as well as organization of political 
activity and workable means to enforce the law.292 This seems a true realm of general international 
law – precisely what the ILC is good at. However, the peculiarity of constitutionalization as it is 
manifesting presently is that it is not taking a form of one grand constitutional treaty (a kind of new 
charter of international society), but rather it is happening through developments in specific fields 
of international law, like human rights and trade law. Thus constitutionalization circumvents 
general international law, again leaving the ILC on the periphery of new developments.  
If the ILC is to play a meaningful role it must adopt to the conditions that it finds itself in. 
The fundamental need for the development of international law advocated by Lauterpacht in order 
for the international society to come out of its present “presocietal” phase (with its basic 
misconception that states rather than peoples of the world are the true subjects of international 
law)293 is as relevant as ever. At the same time it is also obvious that states have very little appetite 
for binding general international law treaties (deformalization and fragmentation at work) that could 
further this high-minded objective.294 In these circumstances two options seem available for the 
ILC. First, it can adapt to fragmentation by taking on topics of various specialized fields. The 
disadvantage of this option is that specialist bodies in these fields would probably not welcome such 
an intrusion (not to mention that the ILC members themselves are not specialists of specialized 
fields). If, however, the ILC would be able to find some mode of cooperation with the specialist 
bodies it could lend them the tremendous weight of its authority. The second option is for the ILC 
simply to tread along as it has treaded for the past 50 years gradually turning from a visionary into a 
technocrat legal adviser. 
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3.3. Conclusions 
 
The law of state responsibility throughout its historical development has been predominantly 
based on the private law (consequently also on bilateralism and subjective rights) paradigm. Roman 
law has played a seminal importance in development of modern state responsibility doctrines. 
Although itself Roman law had very few rules on topics of international law (diplomatic law, law of 
treaties and rudimentary rules on how wars are to be fought), it was abundant with refined private 
law notions. These private law notions served as a basis for most legal developments in continental 
Europe – including also the development of international law. Legal scholars throughout medieval 
ages, renaissance and up till the 20th century borrowed freely from Roman private law; 
unsurprisingly the influence of Roman law coupled together with 19th century positivist tendency to 
reinforce sovereignty above all else, led to a view that state responsibility ought to be perceived as a 
bilateral matter between the injured state and the state that has performed the breach.  
Therefore similarly to early Roman law, international law makes no distinction between 
criminal responsibility (based on the public law paradigm with the characteristic objectives of 
punishing and deterring future breaches) and responsibility for delicts (based on the private law 
paradigm where the primary objective is to grant remedy to the injured). Recognizing deficiencies 
of employing responsibility rules based only on the private law paradigm, already from 17th century 
there have been notable calls for introduction of public law elements (primarily a legal relationship 
between the community of states and the responsible state as well as a punitive element in the 
consequences of responsibility) into the law of international responsibility. From Grotius to 
Lauterpacht international lawyers have persuasively argued that strict bilateralism in state 
responsibility is a faulty idea that lacks logic consistency and results in ineffectiveness of 
international law. In early 20th century and in particular after the First World War influential 
international lawyers called for a rethink of the bilateralist conception of state responsibility rules 
i.e., that only the injured state is entitled to claim responsibility. Among these lawyers Hersch 
Lauterpacht was the most prominent – his writings setting a tone in favour of distinction between 
ordinary breaches and breaches that concern the whole community of states, thus paving way for 
multilateralism as an indispensable part of the law of state responsibility.  
However, these calls have been mainly in the works of scholars and there has been very 
little follow up in the actual state practice. Indeed, it is only after the Second World War that the 
multilateralism inspired notions entered the mainstream of international legal thinking. During the 
post war years the ILC sought to introduce expressions of public order into the general international 
law by proposing the concept of peremptory norms. Initially it might have seemed as a modest 
concession to multilateralism – their effects limited to invalidating treaties contrary to peremptory 
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norms. Yet the brilliant Special Rapporteurs of the law of treaties (Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice and 
Waldock) in all likelihood were well aware that introduction of peremptory norms in the law of 
treaties would resonate far and wide into the international legal system and would only start a 
gradual process or reorienting international law from bilateralism to community interests. In the law 
of state responsibility the idea of norms from which no derogation is permitted echoed as 
recognition of international crimes of states. However, the ILC’s work on the topic was 
cumbersome and dragged on well beyond 1960ties when the post-war political climate was still 
favourable for introduction of significant innovations. By the time the ILC had finally accomplished 
its epic work, states, including major powers, such as the US, were no longer interested in 
advancing protection of community interests in general international law. 
Nonetheless some public law inspired notions found their way into the Articles on State 
Responsibility. Among these notions three ideas are most prominent: first, that injury is not a 
requirement of responsibility; second, that in a case of a beach of obligations erga omnes any state 
may invoke responsibility; third, that some violations are more serious than others and therefore 
merit more aggravated consequences. Although these developments do not signal a radical 
remaking of international law along the public law paradigm, they are nonetheless crucial as they 
represent a definite shift away from exclusively bilateralist outlook. Thus the agenda of neo-Grotian 
internationalists in the ILC has achieved at least a limited success.   
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4. RISE AND DEMISE OF THE CONCEPT OF STATE CRIMES 
 
One of Ago’s proposals is of particularly marked importance for the discussion on the 
protection of interests of the international community, and therefore it merits special consideration. 
That proposal was to distinguish two basic modalities of international responsibility: one which 
would apply to all “ordinary” breaches of international law; while the second type of responsibility 
would apply only to grave breaches such as genocide and war crimes, which harm not only the 
directly injured state, but the whole international community.295 The first category was labelled as 
“delicts”, while the exceptionally grave breaches were initially referred to as “state crimes” or 
“international crimes”. This chapter continues the discussion of historic development of the public 
law paradigm in the law of state responsibility started in Chapters 2 and 3. However, as the 
discussion of the concept of state crimes plays a pivotal role in the evolution of protection of 
community interests (and it is also somewhat lengthy) it has been singled out from the rest of the 
discussion of history and elaborated in a separate chapter.  
 
4.1. Does international law distinguish between delicts and crimes? 
 
The idea of distinguishing between ordinary breaches and exceptionally grave breaches 
was proposed by Ago already in 1939.296 This proposal raised a fundamental question - is it proper 
to treat all breaches of international law in the same manner? Should a breach of bilateral 
investment treaty be treated in the same way as genocide or war crimes? In accordance with the 
classical view, i.e., in the period prior to the Second World War, it was considered that the law of 
state responsibility “provided for a single regime of responsibility applying to all internationally 
wrongful acts of the State, whatever the content of the obligations breached by such acts.”297 This 
view was challenged already in the period between the World Wars.298 However, immediately after 
                                                 
295 It must be noted that a distinction between “merely wrongful” acts and “punishable acts” was made already by 
Garcia-Amador, however, his actual draft articles did not address the issue as they were focused exclusively on 
responsibility for injuries to aliens. See Amador G. Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/96, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, p. 173. 
296 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session, 1996, Supplement No.10, UN Doc. A/51/10, p. 131. 
297 Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 
2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 80. 
298 Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 
2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 80. 
 81 
the Second World War the momentum was right for a conceptual change in the structure of 
international law aimed at ensuring that humanity would never again engage in destruction on such 
a scale. As a part of this momentum such rules as prohibition of use of force and of genocide came 
to be generally recognized as rules that stand apart from all other rules and concern the whole of the 
international community. Accordingly, a conviction emerged that the importance of the values that 
these rules protected required a separate modality of state responsibility.299 Thus after 1945 it 
became a rather popular opinion that there are two general categories of obligations, and that 
therefore there ought to be two separate modalities of responsibility. The first category comprised 
of obligations, which were of fundamental importance for the whole community of states, such as 
obligation not to engage in aggression or genocide. The second category consisted of all other 
obligations, which generally were not concern of all states and by and large were of lesser 
importance. As this distinction between delicts and crimes is the prime example of attempts to 
integrate public law elements into international law, it requires a more detailed analysis – firstly, 
whether international law has historically supported such a distinction. 
 
4.1.1. Recognition of state crimes in legal doctrine 
 
As already explored in Chapter 3, in the 19th century state responsibility in international law 
was mainly based on a bilateral model of relations between the injured and the responsible state. 
Likewise, the responsibility model was unitary – there was no distinction between regimes of 
responsibility on the basis of the content of the obligation breached (i.e., there was no distinction 
between international crimes or ordinary, less grave breaches). However, in the legal doctrine there 
were scholars who argued that in cases of serious breaches, such as breach of peace, the injured 
state may be entitled not only to claim reparation, but also to punish the aggressor.300 Similarly, 
Hall notes in 1884 that: "[w]hen a State grossly and patently violates international law in a matter of 
serious importance, it is competent to any State or to the body of States, to hinder the wrongdoing 
from being accomplished, or to punish the wrong-doer."301 However, authors of this period did not 
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argue for a differentiation between types of breaches and did not divide them into classes of serious 
and less serious breaches.302 
The first author who explicitly examined the question whether international law 
distinguished between separate categories of wrongful acts was Hersch Lauterpacht. In 1945, when 
revising the 6th edition of the Oppenheim’s International Law, he pointed out that the concept of 
international delinquency ranges from ordinary breaches of treaty obligations that involve no more 
that pecuniary compensation, to violations that amount to criminal acts.303 If ordinary breaches, 
according to Lauterpacht, result in the right of the injured state to claim reparation, then serious 
breaches (“by reason of their gravity, their ruthlessness, and their contempt of human life”304) result 
in the right to employ coercive measures, such as sanctions, reprisals or measures under chapter VII 
on the UN Charter.305 Around the same time as Lauterpacht, one of the most prominent Soviet 
lawyers – Levin - made a similar claim that in contemporary international law it is necessary to 
make a distinction between ordinary breaches “нарушение” and crimes “преступление”. The 
category of crimes, according to Levin, was a class of its own, as these threatened the foundations 
of international legal order.306 Some ten years subsequent to Levin’s publication another big name 
in the Soviet scholarship - Tunkin made an analogous claim and specified that the distinct category 
of the most serious breaches would include acts that threaten international peace.307  
Subsequent authors during the cold war years (from socialist as well as from capitalist 
countries) maintained the same underlying proposition that aggression stood apart from all other 
breaches and entailed more serious consequences for the responsible state.308 These consequences 
would include the right of the injured state to violate the rights of the state that engaged in 
aggression (including the right to use force against the aggressor) and the right of other states to 
assist the injured state (again including the use of armed force).309 Other authors, such as Verzijl, 
maintained that not only aggression, but also other breaches such as crimes against humanity and 
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war crimes are included in the category of “international crimes” and entitle the international 
community to apply sanctions.310 Some authors went a step further and suggested that any violation 
of jus cogens rules would belong to this category, thereby bringing also violations of prohibitions of 
piracy and slavery as well as violations of the right to self-determination within the ambit of 
“international crimes”.311 
 
4.1.2. Recognition of state crimes in state practice. 
 
Post war state practice provides considerable evidence that supports the idea that states 
differentiate between categories of breaches and modalities of responsibility that apply to each 
category. For instance, the UN Charter provides for several norms that apply to situations where 
fundamental community interests are threatened, which clearly go beyond the traditional bilateralist 
conception of state responsibility. The Charter also provides for remedies that impose obligations 
on the responsible state that are in essence punitive and therefore do not fit into the traditional 
“reparations only” outlook. First of all, the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter 
may take “preventive or enforcement measures” to “restore international peace and security”, which 
are binding on the member states. Moreover, Articles 5 and 6 of the UN Charter provide for 
possibility of suspending a Member “against which preventive or enforcement action has been 
taken by the Security Council” from “the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership”. 
Whereas Article 6 allows expelling a UN member which has persistently violated the Charter.  
These are all examples of the Charter allowing application of measures, which in their 
nature do not fit in with the concepts of strict Anzilottian bilateralism and go beyond the traditional 
rule that responsibility results only in a duty to make reparation. Moreover, the system envisaged by 
the Charter could be described as possessing a certain degree of public order, as the measures that 
may be taken against the responsible state are rather punitive than seeking to ensure reparation.  
Similarly, state practice also indicates that fundamental values of the international 
community are not limited only to prohibition of aggression.312 In the 1960ties the UN General 
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Assembly adopted a stream of resolutions in which it stated that the apartheid system maintained in 
South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security (classifying conduct as a “threat 
to peace” allows the Security Council to apply the coercive measures).313 In latter decades the 
practice of the Security Council, particularly after 1990s, indicates that “threat to peace” is a 
constantly evolving and expanding concept.314  Within the last fifteen years the understanding of the 
“threat to peace” has considerably broadened, from a narrow concept of threat or the use of armed 
force, to a wider notion applicable to all situations that may lead to the use of armed force. Thus 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, use of mercenaries, 
emergency situations and violent disintegration of states all have been considered as constituting 
threats to peace.315 In confirmation of such approach the president of the Security Council has stated 
that “the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological 
fields have become threats to peace and security.”316 Thus, it is possible to conclude that the Charter 
provides for a system in which certain fundamental community interests, are recognized as more 
important than other obligations. To make this distinction meaningful the Charter also provides for 
a possibility to apply specific measures that do not fit into the traditional “reparation only” 
conception of international responsibility and allows application of remedies which seek to protect 
the community interest. 
Likewise, statements from representatives of states already in 1960ties indicate that states 
recognize that certain breaches are more serious than others and that therefore these breaches must 
entail more serious legal consequences.317 Thus, for instance, representatives of some states at the 
General Assembly’s sixth committee explicitly stated that it is necessary to elaborate special rules 
of responsibility that would be applicable to the particularly serious breaches.318 However, it must 
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be noted that like nowadays, also during the cold war years, the opinions of states on this issue were 
diverging.  
 
4.1.3. Recognition of state crimes by international courts 
 
One possible drawback in the argument that post-war international law recognizes 
distinction between ordinary breaches and international crimes is that there are no judicial decisions 
that would support such a claim.319 Ago in this regard concludes that even in those decisions in 
which punitive damages are applied and therefore something akin to criminal responsibility could 
be inferred “the choice between different types of reparation has never been made on the basis of 
the content of the obligation breached.”320 However, he goes on to assert that such absence of 
judicial practice that distinguishes between “crimes” and “simple breaches” does not necessarily 
imply that states may not be subjected to any form of responsibility other that the classical duty to 
make reparation. To explain absence of judgments that acknowledge distinction between ordinary 
breaches and international crimes Ago argues that international tribunals only adjudicate the 
questions that states put before them. Generally, states do not authorise international courts and 
tribunals to determine whether other states may apply sanctions to them. As punitive measures that 
would be characteristic of criminal responsibility usually take the form of sanctions, it is only 
consequential that international courts have had no opportunity to address such matters. The fact 
remains, however, that judgments of international courts provide no evidence for distinguishing 
international crimes of states as a separate category of breaches. Thus, although there is some 
support from states to the idea of departing from the unitary model of responsibility (and the above 
discussed UN Charter norms support these assertions), it is similarly clear that this support is far 
from being unanimous and irrefutable.  
“Criminal” responsibility and thus also a more public law paradigm oriented approach may 
be inferred not only on the basis of what type of obligation is breached, but also on the basis of who 
is entitled to invoke it. In the classical Anzillotian bilateral relationship between the wrongdoer and 
the injured it is only the directly injured state that is entitled to invoke responsibility. The “criminal” 
responsibility on the other hand, at least in the form as it is known in domestic legal orders, implies 
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a relationship between the wrongdoer and the whole community.321 In 1976 when Ago’s fifth report 
on state responsibility was written essentially the only authority which clearly supported a view that 
a state could have obligations towards the whole community of states was the famous passage from 
the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case: 
“In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of 
a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising via-a-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such 
obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of 
acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body 
of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); 
others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal 
character.”322 
In this passage the ICJ points out two basic types of obligations: obligations that concern 
all states, such as obligation not to engage in aggression and genocide; and all other obligations 
which are premised on a bilateral model. From this distinction made by the ICJ Ago concludes that 
accordingly also acts that breach these obligations ought to be differentiated. The first category 
(labelled by Ago as “crimes”) are such that every member of the international community is in 
principle interested in their suppression. In case of such breaches every state is entitled to invoke 
responsibility even if that state is not directly injured by the act in question.323 The other category 
labelled as “delicts” comprises of breaches which are of concern only to the directly injured state 
and only that state is entitled to invoke responsibility. This distinction made in the Barcelona 
Traction has been and still remains one of the strongest arguments in favour of recognition of 
twofold regime of state responsibility.  
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32, para. 33. 
323 Specifically Ago notes that the ‘International Court of Justice seems to have implicitly recognized the need for a 
distinction between two categories of internationally wrongful acts of the State, depending on the obligation breached, 
and also seems to have recognized the logical consequences of that distinction as regards the regime of international 
responsibility’ see Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 90. 
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The conceptual rethink of the structure of international obligations expressed in the 
Barcelona Traction is of a rather recent origin. To appreciate the importance of this pronouncement 
one only ought to look at the positions expressed by states some 40 years earlier, for instance, 
opinions of states at the Hague codification conference of 1930. These opinions overwhelmingly 
confirm the unitary model of state responsibility, as at that period states made no distinction with 
regard to the consequences of the breach depending on the content of the obligation.324 As noted 
earlier in Chapter 2, since Barcelona Traction the ICJ has acknowledged existence of obligations 
towards the international community as a whole on a number of occasions.325 However, it has 
discussed the concept of erga omnes obligations only in terms of invocation or responsibility by 
states that are not directly injured or have only “legal interest” in observance of the particular norm, 
without implying existence of two separate responsibility regimes. Thus, it seems to be an 
overstatement to suggest that international judicial practice has come to recognize a distinction of 
two regimes of responsibility of states on the basis of the content of the breached norm.  
 
4.2. International crimes in the Articles on State Responsibility 
 
Judging the overall attitude of states to be positively disposed towards his ideas, Ago choose 
to press ahead with his proposal that breaches ought to be distinguished into two basic categories: 
international crimes and delicts. The proposal was embodied in the Article 19 of the Draft 
Articles326 adopted by the Commission at the first reading in 1996.327 However, in 1998 the ILC 
                                                 
324 See Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l 
and 2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 96. 
325 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), judgment of July 20, 2012, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012 p. 422; ICJ: Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), judgment of 30 June 1995, I.C.J. 
Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v 
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, para. 125. 
326 For discussion of the Article 19 see Bowett D. Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International Law 
Commission on State Responsibility, European Journal of International Law Vol. 9 1998 p. 163; Rosenne S. State 
Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reﬂections on Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics Vol. 30, Fall 1997-Winter 1998, p. 145; Tomuschat C. 
International Crimes by States: An Endangered Species? In: Wellens K., (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, 
Essays in Honour of Eric Suy. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 253; Rosenstock R. An International 
Criminal Responsibility of States? In: ILC, International Law on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century— Views from the 
International Law Commission, New York: United Nations, 1997, p. 265. 
327 Article 19 entitled ‘International crimes and international delicts’ provided that:  
1. An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act, 
regardless of the subject-matter of the obligation breached.  
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential 
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the 
community as a whole constitutes an international crime.  
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once again reconsidered the mater. Although majority of states were in favour of the concept of 
international crimes, several powerful states including the US, the UK and France pressed for 
deletion of the concept.328 These differences of opinions surfaced also among the ILC members, and 
therefore, due to inability to agree on the conceptual merits of distinguishing between delicts and 
crimes, the ILC opted to temporarily lay aside Article 19. 
When Crawford became the special rapporteur on state responsibility in 1997 one of his 
most significant proposals was to do away with article 19 and the concept of international crimes. 
According to Crawford, the main problem with the concept was that there was no state practice that 
would indicate that states accept existence of international crimes as a separate category of 
breaches. Another, a more minor reason, was the notion of “international crimes” was something 
that traditionally applied to international responsibility of individuals rather than states.  
 Instead Crawford suggested applying unitary model of responsibility to all types of 
breaches. Regardless whether there was a breach of a bilateral investment treaty or genocide the 
same basic responsibility model would apply. Crawford, however, did not intend to entirely discard 
all public law paradigm inspired notions and retained the idea that some basic rules require special 
protection. He envisaged that the same objectives that Ago intended to reach by the notion of 
“international crimes” could still be achieved by employing the concepts of jus cogens and 
obligations erga omnes. His idea was that the wrongdoer would be subject to an aggravated form of 
responsibility not because the unlawful conduct constituted an international crime, but because the 
conduct breached a jus cogens norm. In principle this idea is very similar to what Brownlie 
proposed back in 1960ties i.e., that all breaches of jus cogens would be regarded as international 
crimes. The Crawford’s version at a first glace differs only conceptually – the category of 
“international crimes” is discarded, however, in all practical terms the special responsibility regime 
applies to all breaches of jus cogens, just as Brownlie had proposed.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime may result, 
inter alia, from:  
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, such as that prohibiting aggression;  
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the right of self-
determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination;  
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the 
human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;  
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the 
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.  
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crime in accordance with  
paragraph 2 constitutes an international delict. See Draft Articles adopted by the International Law Commission, 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 1996, Supplement No.10, UN 
Doc. A/51/10, p. 131. 
328 See Comments and Observations of Governments A/CN.4/515 (2001). 
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The important question with regard to Crawford’s proposal is whether and how that 
proposal differs from the “international crimes” approach advocated by Ago? For one thing, the 
alarming language (i.e., the word “crime”) was dropped. Even if the category of “breaches of 
peremptory norms” would be materially identical to “international crimes”, labelling something as a 
“crime” caries a heavily loaded perception conditioned by domestic legal systems (evoking 
associations of worst possible behaviour, trial, punishment and prison) – a psychological effect 
which is not to be underestimated.   
However, more importantly – is international crime the same as a breach of a jus cogens 
norm? The ILC has contended that these concepts are not identical. Pellet argues that the concepts 
are in essence the same.329 If we consider the conduct prohibited by norms that are presently 
regarded by the mainstream legal thought as peremptory (prohibition of genocide, aggression, use 
of force, apartheid, racial discrimination, war crimes and crimes against humanity, violation of the 
right to self-determination), we find that these very norms would also be regarded as international 
crimes by Ago. However, Ago also regarded other breaches (such as wide scale degradation of 
natural environment and violation of rules on conservation of common heritage of mankind) as 
international crimes. But this is not to suggest that both categories are substantively different – there 
are also scholars nowadays who advocate that massive pollution of environment is (or ought to be) 
prohibited by a peremptory norm.330 Also generally scholars have attempted to bring together the 
theory on the concepts of jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and international crimes underlining 
that all these concepts essentially serve to protect the key values of the international community.331 
Therefore, it seems that categories of breaches of peremptory norms and international crimes are 
indeed very closely related. As both categories are open ended (whatever the community of states 
                                                 
329 Pellet notes that: ‘just like peremptory norms, crimes are to be considered extremely rare in the present state of the 
world; the international community does exist, but solidarities on which this community is based are still very limited. 
And this means that obligations ‘essential for the protection of fundamental interests’ are also unavoidably very limited, 
both in number and scope’ see Pellet, A. Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes! European Journal of 
International Law, 1999, Vol. 10 No. 2, p. 430. 
330 See Uhlmann, E., „State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing 
Criteria for Peremptory Norms". Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 11, 1998, p. 101; Berat, L. 
Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Genocide in International Law. Boston University 
International Law Journal Vol. 11, 1993, p. 327. 
331 See de Hoogh A. Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation 
and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996; Tams C. 
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005;  Tomuschat C. International Law 
Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century. General Course on Public International Law. 281 
Recueil des Cours (1999) pp. 81–88; Byers M. Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes 
Rules’, Nordic Journal of International Law Vol. 66, 1997, p. 211; de Hoogh A. The Relationship between Jus Cogens, 
Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective’, Austrian Journal of Public 
International Law Vol. 41 1991, p. 183; Weiler J., et al. (eds.), International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the 
ILC’s draft Article 19 in State Responsibility, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989. 
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recognizes as peremptory norm or a crime becomes that) without an exhaustive list of prohibited 
conduct they will always be subject to disagreement. However, substantively both categories seem 
to be reserved for norms that are most essential to the whole of the international community and in 
that sense they indeed converge.  
Yet, the real crux of the matter is in the issue of consequences that flow from either 
violation of peremptory norms or international crimes. A central peace of Ago’s design was that in 
cases of international crimes all states were regarded as injured (Article 40 of the 1996 Draft 
Articles). As injured states all states were entitled to employ countermeasures (Article 47 of the 
1996 Draft Articles). This sweeping entitlement to use countermeasures was accompanied by a 
further condition that invocation of responsibility in cases of international crimes is not subject to 
normally applicable limitations, i.e., that restitution could be claimed even if it resulted in a 
disproportionate burden on the culprit and even if it threatened economic stability, political 
independence or would impair dignity of the responsible state (Article 52 of the 1996 Draft 
Articles).  
Crawford, on the other hand, substituted the idea that international crime causes injury to 
all other states, by Article 48, which allows invocation by non-injured states. The main difference 
between Ago’s “legally” injured states and Crawford’s “states other than the injured” is in the scope 
of rights afforded to both groups – the list being somewhat shorter for the second group. Crawford 
attempted to make it up to the non-injured states by applying some of the special consequences that 
were attached to international crimes also to breaches of peremptory norms332, i.e., Articles 40 and 
41 in the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility. However, these special consequences, as further 
discussed in Chapter 5.3 are vague and therefore predictably rather weak. Thus, although the 
concepts of international crimes and serious breaches of peremptory norms are conceptually very 
similar, Crawford’s innovations may be regarded as a concession to states that objected to a fully 
fledged recognition of international crimes of states. 
 
4.3. Can states be criminally responsible?  
 
A question directly related to the issue of distinction between delicts and crimes is whether 
states in principle may be held criminally responsible. This has been one of the most controversial 
topics in the debate over international crimes of states. Much of the disagreement boils down to 
diverging perceptions of what the notion of criminality implies. A very common perception of the 
                                                 
332 See Crawford J. Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In: Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism 
to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 224. 
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concept of “state crimes” or “international criminal responsibility of states” is that it must be 
understood similarly as in domestic legal orders. First and foremost attribute of criminal 
responsibility in domestic legal orders is a penal element.333 Is such an element known to 
international law? This question goes to the roots of the doctrine on international responsibility, as it 
enquires what are the consequences of a breach of international law? For Anzilotti, as already 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the only consequence of a breach was the duty of the responsible 
state to make reparation (this obligation was owed exclusively to the injured state). Anzilotti saw no 
room for any kind of multilateralism in state responsibility and certainly no penal elements. A 
contrary view was expounded by Kelsen. Kelsen’s chief thesis – that law is a coercive order that 
functions because violations of law are punished by sanctions – required that to be real law, 
international law must provide for sanctions.334 Therefore in Kelsen’s view a breach of international 
law resulted in a rights of the injured state to apply coercive sanctions towards the responsible state. 
A third view, which was expounded by Lauterpacht, held that a breach of international law results 
in both – a duty to make reparation as well as a right to apply sanctions.335 
At the time of Ago as the special rapporteur, the ILC seemed to believe that it is quite 
acceptable to discuss international law in terms of penal elements. Thus Ago suggests that the term 
“sanction” may be used to “describe a measure which, although not necessarily involving the use of 
force, is characterized – at least in part – by the fact that the purpose is to inflict punishment.”336 
Crawford has suggested that he in principle agrees that there may be a regime of penal 
responsibility of states.337 However, in his first report he goes to some length to make a point that 
international law, as it is at present, does not provide for penal elements.338 Responses from states, 
on the other hand, indicate that while states have considerable objections to the idea that they could 
be criminally liable, they generally support a suggestion that response to exceptionally grave 
breaches may include penal aspects, rather than only the reparation of the injury to the specifically 
affected state.  
                                                 
333 See Deigh J., Dolinko D., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
334 Kelsen H. Principles of International Law, New York: Holt, Rhinehart&Winston, 1996, p. 22. 
335 Lauterpacht H. Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th ed. London: Longmans, 1955, p. 352. 
336 Report of the ILC on the Work of its Twenty-Fifth Session, A/CN.4/272, 1973 Yearbook of the ILC Vol. 2, p. 175. 
337 First Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.2, paras. 
89–92. 
338 In particular Crawford refers to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which in Velásquez Rodríguez v. 
Honduras concluded that international law at the present time does not provide for punitive damages. The Court 
concluded that ‘Although some domestic courts, particularly the Anglo-American, award damages in amounts meant to 
deter or to serve as an example, this principle is not applicable in international law at this time’. See IACHR Series C, 
No. 7 (1989), p. 52; ILR Vol. 95, pp. 315-316.  
 92 
If penal elements do exist in the law of state responsibility, they would be somehow 
expressed in particular legal concepts. Two such concepts need to be considered. First, the UN 
Security Council may adopt sanctions. The UN Charter itself makes no mention of sanctions, but 
provides for powers of the Security Council to take “measures” in accordance with the Chapter VII 
of the Charter. These Security Council’s “measures” in legal scholarship and in the political 
discourse are often referred to as sanctions – a term which is used in context of criminal law 
generally, as well as, for instance, by Kelsen, to designate a coercive element in a legal system that 
compels the responsible entity to observe the law.339 This ambiguity of terminology is confusing 
and makes one wonder whether Security Council “sanctions” would fit Kelsen’s understanding of 
“sanctions” and more importantly whether this concept implies a penal element?  
As far as Kelsen is concerned, his “sanctions” indeed seem to imply a penal element. 
Although his writings make it clear that the core feature of “sanction” is not the penal element, but 
rather the coercive element – there must be something that the injured or the community may do to 
coerce the responsible entity to observe law. The Security Council’s sanctions on the other hand 
seem to lack a penal element as they by definition are directed towards restoring peace and security 
rather that punishing. This is particularly evident in Article 39 of the UN Charter which states that 
the purpose of the Security Council “measures” is to “maintain or restore international peace and 
security” and makes no direct or implicit mention of punishment. 340 Such a reading of Article 39 is 
confirmed also in scholarly works including Simma’s commentary to the UN Charter.341 
The second concept through which penal element might come into the law of state 
responsibility is the concept of countermeasures.342 By means of countermeasures the injured state 
is entitled to take measures against the responsible state which would otherwise be contrary to 
international obligations of the injured state.343 Such a legal construct is typical for self-help based 
legal systems that lack public order and enforcement mechanisms at community level. The injury 
inflicted on the responsible state may serve both as punishment and as means to coerce it to observe 
the law. However, as the Articles on State Responsibility make it clear in Article 49 the purpose of 
                                                 
339 Kelsen H. Principles of International Law. New York: Holt, Rhinehart&Winston, 1996, p. 22. 
340 Article 39 of the UN Charter provides: “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
341 See Simma B. (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002; see also Österdahl I. Threat to the Peace. The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 in the 
UN Charter. Upsala: Iustus, 1998. 
342 For detailed discussion of countermeasures see Elagab O. The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in 
International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
343 Thus countermeasures act as a form of circumstance that precludes wrongfulness. Article 22 of the ASR provides: 
“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is 
precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with 
chapter II of Part Three.” 
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countermeasures is only to induce the responsible state to comply with its obligations, rather than to 
punish. In his commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility Crawford emphasizes this point 
more than once, by pointing out that countermeasures: “are taken with a view to procuring cessation 
of and reparation for the internationally wrongful act and not by way of punishment – they are 
temporary in character and must be as far as possible reversible in their effects in terms of future 
legal relations between the two states.”344 Whether Crawford’s opinion on the matter (which, him 
being the final special rapporteur on state responsibility, is inevitably also reflected in the text of 
Articles on State Responsibility) is the correct one, may be debatable. In practice the line between 
measures “inducing compliance” and “punishing” may be very thin. Indeed “punishment” itself is 
likely to be imposed with a preventive motivation i.e., with a view of inducing future compliance.  
However, Crawford’s view seems to be the better one, considering the risks associated with 
countermeasures such as escalation of conflict and political abuse. An open recognition of a 
punitive element in countermeasures could only aggravate these risks. 
The above conclusion is also reflected the Part Two of the Articles on State Responsibility 
dealing with legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act. The Articles state that 
internationally wrongful act results in obligations of continued performance (Article 29), cessation 
and non-repetition (Article 30) and reparation (Article 31) which may take the form of restitution, 
compensation or satisfaction. Thus the Articles on State Responsibility make no explicit or implicit 
reference to any punitive elements in the law of state responsibility (whether such a state of affairs 
is conductive for the public order and the rule of law is a matter to which the analysis will return at 
the end of this chapter). 
However, as becomes clear from Ago’s fifth report, his intention when he proposed the 
introduction of the notion of state crimes was not to suggest a modality of responsibility similar to 
that of criminal responsibility of individuals as it is known in domestic law (with punishment as the 
central element).345 The purpose, according to Ago, was simply to differentiate between breaches of 
                                                 
344 See Crawford J. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
345 In the 1976 commentary Ago notes that he sees little point in extending to international law the specific legal 
categories of internal law. However, he also notes that ‘Having said that, we hasten to add that, in our view, it would be 
a mistake to assimilate the right or duty accorded to certain States to punish individuals who have committed such 
crimes to the "special form" of international responsibility applicable to the State in such cases’ see ILC Yearbook 
1976, Vol. 2. part 2, para. 101. Ago continues by pointing out that: ‘[l]ogically we also exclude the possibility of 
deducing any kind of "criminal" international responsibility of the State from the existence of this right or duty to 
punish an individual-organ who has committed certain "crimes". Without going into an essentially theoretical dispute, it 
seems clear to us that it would not be justifiable in any case to refer to a "criminal" responsibility of the State with 
regard to the applicability of penalties to certain State organs, whether in one country or another. The assertion of the 
existence of a "criminal" international responsibility of the State might possibly be justified in cases in which the form 
of international responsibility applicable to the State itself would result in "punitive" action for purely punitive 
purposes. Even in such cases, however, some are of the view that "criminal" international responsibility of the State is 
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fundamental norms and ordinary breaches and to reflect this difference in the applicable 
responsibility regime. Thus whether breaches of fundamental norms are labelled as “crimes” or by 
any other name is immaterial. As Ago himself has noted “we are interested not so much in 
determining whether the responsibility incurred by a State by reason of the breach of specific 
obligations does or does not entail "criminal" international responsibility as in determining whether 
such responsibility is or is not "different" from that deriving from the breach of other international 
obligations of the State.”346 
This admission in principle takes out all the steam from the debate whether a state can be 
criminally liable. However, words obviously evoke perceptions. Whether we believe Ago or not 
that his intention was simply to differentiate between two kinds of breaches, the word criminal 
caries a strong connotation with worst kind of behaviour. It is indeed difficult to accept that this 
choice of terminology was not deliberately aimed to attach an additional emotional load to the 
consequences of a breach. 
A related point which merits attention is what the actual practice is with regard to the 
concept of international crimes of states. The term “international crime” came into use early in the 
first half of the 20th century. Thus already in 1923 a draft of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 
prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations, a war of aggression was designated as an 
"international crime"347. However, generally, international law, as far as it is expressed in the 
judgments of international courts and tribunals and in treaties makes very little reference to “state 
crimes”, but rather discusses international criminality mainly in terms of criminal responsibility of 
individuals.348 The Genocide convention349 may be regarded as an exception, as it specifically 
provides for state responsibility for the crime of genocide. However, the Genocide convention does 
not in any way indicate that this type of state responsibility would be anyhow different from the 
traditional mode of state responsibility.350 In state rhetoric, on the other hand, the vocabulary of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
precluded, since the concept of criminal international responsibility is for them necessarily linked to the existence of an 
international criminal jurisdiction, an idea which they refuse even to consider. Be that as it may, we see no point in 
extending to international law the specific legal categories of internal law.” 
346 Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 
2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 101. 
347 Official Journal of the League of Nations, Fourth Year, No. 12 (December 1923), p. 1521. 
348 Thus the Nürnberg Tribunal has held that ‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.’ see Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. 22, p. 53. 
466 (1948). 
349 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol. 78, p. 277. 
350 At the time of the adoption of the Genocide convention Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice as one of the drafters of the 
Convention stated that ‘the responsibility [mentioned in the Article 9 of the Convention] was the international 
responsibility of States following a violation of the convention. That was civil responsibility, not criminal 
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“international crime” is occasionally used. In particular the trend to refer to aggression, genocide, 
apartheid as international crimes was prevalent when the ILC adopted the Articles on State 
Responsibility in the first reading.351 Considering this context, the ILC specifically addressed this 
issue in the commentary to the Article 19, emphasizing that: 
“in adopting the designation ‘international crime’, the Commission intends only 
to refer to ‘crimes’ of the State, to acts attributable to the State as such. Once again it 
wishes to sound a warning against any confusion between the expression ‘international 
crime’ as used in this article and similar expressions, such as ‘crime under international 
law’, ‘war crime’, ‘crime against peace’, ‘crime against humanity’, etc., which are used in 
a number of conventions and international instruments to designate certain heinous 
individual crimes.”352  
Crawford has noted that such a choice of terminology raises a question – “why a term was 
adopted which had immediately to be distinguished from ordinary uses of that term in international 
law?”353 He emphasizes that since mid 1970ties the concept “international crime” has been mainly 
used to refer to crimes committed by individuals which are of international concern, thus increasing 
the terminological confusion.354 From the perspective of the public law paradigm, it is not so 
important whether breaches of fundamental norms are labelled as “international crimes” or by any 
other name, since in international law there is no fixed content attached to the concept of 
“international crime”. Nevertheless, the terminology is not entirely immaterial. As can be observed 
from the very strong reactions of states towards the use of the concept of “international crime” such 
a terminology evokes perceptions which states seem to be unwilling to associate with their conduct. 
States are willing to accept that they may be responsible for a “serious breach” of jus cogens, but 
are shrugging if someone proposes that they may be responsible for a crime.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
responsibility’ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Summary Records, 21 September-10 
December 1948, p. 440. 
351 Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part Two), commentary to article 19, para.12. The ILC specifically notes that ‘in 
the general opinion, some of these acts genuinely constitute ‘international crimes’, that is to say, international wrongs 
which are more serious than others and which, as such, should entail more severe legal consequences. This does not, of 
course, mean that all these crimes are equal – in other words, that they attain the same degree of seriousness and 
necessarily entail all the more severe consequences incurred, for example, by the supreme international crime, namely, 
a war of aggression’. 
352  Yearbook of the ILC (1976, II, Part 2), para. 59. 
353 First Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.2, 
para.74. 
354 Ibid. 
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4.4. Should a distinction between delicts and crimes be recognized? 
 
A question whether international law recognizes a distinction between delicts and crimes is 
one that belongs to the age old debates on lex lata and lex ferenda. In the arguments of supporters of 
the notion of international crimes the discussion of evidence of existing law (which as explored 
above is somewhat patchy) inevitably turns to a policy argument - even if it is not an existing law, 
the international community would be better off if such a distinction would be recognized.  
Ago, when presenting the draft Article 19 in 1976 made a case in favour of distinguishing 
two regimes of responsibility on the basis of one quintessential point – that the international 
community recognizes that certain obligations are more important that others.355 Accordingly, 
breaches of these important obligations also ought to result in a more aggravated form of 
responsibility. This recognition of the fundamental value of certain norms, according to Ago, finds 
expression in various forms. First and foremost, the existence of obligations that states regard as 
particularly important is evidenced by existence of norms jus cogens from which no derogation is 
possible. Similarly, the acceptance that certain obligations are owed to the international community 
as a whole give expression to the same underlying idea that these obligations are more important 
that others.356 In Ago’s opinion this distinction is meaningless, if it is not reflected also in 
responsibility rules.357 Thus Ago assumes that, if states differentiate between important obligations 
and ordinary obligations, they must recognize that violations of different obligations also require 
different responsibility regimes. It is hard to object to this proposition. Obviously, a distinction is 
not made only for the sake of distinction – logic consistency requires, that an element may not be 
inserted without a follow-up to make that element a part of the whole. As Lauterpacht famously 
observed, international law is a complete system, and as such it must be based on logically 
consistent theory. 358 
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injured thereby’, see Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document 
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358 Lauterpacht H, Régles générales du droit de la paix, 62 Recueil des Cours (1937-IV) p. 350. Lauterpacht also argues 
that non recognition of a criminal law type of responsibility would be manifestly unjust as individuals hiding behind a 
label of state would acquire immunity to perform criminal acts for which they would be prosecuted if they would 
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The difficulty with this argument, however, is that logically sound or not, consistent or not, 
states may have whished to recognize jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, but have been 
unwilling to recognize two separate regimes of responsibility. In other words the law “as it is” (lex 
lata) is not matching with the law “as it ought to be” (lex ferenda). Crawford points to this in his 
first report:  
“What can be said is that the developments outlined above confirm the view that 
within the field of general international law there is some hierarchy of norms, and that the 
importance of at least a few basic substantive norms is recognized as involving a 
difference not merely of degree but of kind. Such a difference would be expected to have 
its consequences in the field of State responsibility. On the other hand it does not follow 
from this conclusion that the difference in the character of certain norms would produce 
two distinct regimes of responsibility, still less that these should be expressed in terms of a 
distinction between “international crimes” and “international delicts.”359  
On some level one could certainly agree with Crawford who points to the obvious fact that 
even if international law makes a distinction between classes of obligations that is not the same as 
distinguishing two regimes of responsibility. The deficiency of Crawford’s argument, however, is 
that he does not address the point of logic consistency of the legal system raised by Ago and 
Lauterpacht (that distinction between obligations logically requires distinction of applicable 
responsibility regimes). Crawford simply avoids this point.  
Another argument of supporters of Article 19, which mirrors the argument made by Ago, is 
that with the establishment of the UN in 1945 a fundamental shift occurred in the normative 
structure of international law - certain common values such as protection of international peace and 
security were recognized as standing above individual interests of states. The Charter (so the 
argument goes) attempts to protect these values with norms and institutional mechanisms that are 
unprecedented (such as the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII). The recognition of 
jus cogens and the corresponding acceptance of hierarchy of norms are subsequent developments 
that only manifest the same intent to protect shared higher values of the community of states. Thus 
Article 19 merely expresses the same trend in the field of state responsibility. 
Subsequently other authors joined Ago’s cause. Thus Pellet argued that it is “obvious, 
evident, necessary, and indeed indispensable”360  that the consequences deriving from a breach of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
perform these acts as private individuals. See Lauterpacht H, Régles générales du droit de la paix, 62 Recueil des Cours 
(1937-IV) p. 350. 
359 See First Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.2, 
para. 71. 
360 Pellet, A. Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes! European Journal of International Law, 1999, Vol. 10 No. 
2, p. 426. Ago makes a similar argument in his 5th report on State Responsibility published in 1976 stating that ‘it is 
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bilateral treaty on some mundane subject ought to be differentiated from war crimes. Why so? 
Because delicts only breach particular rights of one or several states. Thus the harm that is inflicted 
by a delict remains rather limited in scope. Breaches that threaten peace and security on the other 
hand, harm the whole international community. As observance of fundamental norms is a necessary 
precondition for existence of the international community, accordingly, breaches of such norms are 
of concern to all the international community. In his 5th report Ago emphasized that: 
“It is in the interest of all States that these rules should be respected by all States. 
The juridical system of the community of States cannot tolerate free derogation from these 
rules through particular agreements; it has made many of these rules into rules of jus 
cogens. It is improbable that this juridical system can tolerate a situation in which a breach 
of the obligations imposed on States by at least some of these rules is regarded as a 
wrongful act no different from the rest and is treated accordingly.”361   
Establishment of international public order may well have been on the minds of the 
drafters of the Charter. It is no secret that Hersch Lauterpacht who happened to be advising the 
British representatives to the San Francisco conference, was very much supportive of the idea of 
making use of the post-war momentum to introduce significant changes in the structure of 
international law. However, even if the drafters of the Charter would indeed subscribe to 
introduction of a more advanced form of international public order, it is far from evident that states 
share the same enthusiasm some fifty years latter. Yet, was it necessary to reject the notion of state 
crimes altogether? As has been noted, it would have been better to distinguish between the 
imperfect text of Article 19 and the concept that it embodied.362 
 
 
4.5. Defining international crimes 
 
A further criticism of the notion of international crimes as envisaged by Ago has been 
addressed to the blurry definition of the concept. Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, which was dropped after the second reading, provided the following definition of an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
unthinkable that States could have believed that such a breach unhesitatingly qualified as a "crime", would entail only 
the consequences which normally followed from internationally wrongful acts that were much less serious, namely the 
right of the injured party to require the offender to make reparation for the damage sustained.’ see Fifth report on State 
responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 2, Yearbook of the ILC 
1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 96. 
361 Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 
2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 149. 
362 Abi-Saab G. The uses of article 19. European Journal of International Law Vol. 10.2, 1999. p. 339. 
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“international crime”: “[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of 
an obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community 
that its breach is recognised as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international 
crime.” 
This definition points out two elements which differentiate international crimes from other 
ordinary breaches. First, the obligation that is breached is essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community. Second, the whole of the international community 
recognizes such a breach to be a crime. The definition is obviously somewhat ambitious. Firstly, it 
takes it for granted that there is such a thing as an international community. Then it presupposes that 
the international community recognizes certain breaches as crimes. Although use of such concepts 
as “international community” and “international crime” has become commonplace, they surface 
mainly in the academic debate and occasionally in political discourse. These concepts are not 
established as strictly legal categories. 
Another criticisms of the definition contained in draft Article 19 was that it was circular – a 
crime is something that the whole community of states recognizes as a crime.363 To rebuttal this 
argument one might point out that also the definition of peremptory norms in Article 53 of the 
VCLT is similarly circular364, yet it is generally accepted. Similarly, like the definition of 
peremptory norms in the VCLT (a peremptory norms is such a norm that is recognized as 
peremptory), the definition of international crime may be lacking in explanatory value, however, it 
is fully operational for all practical purposes. It must also be pointed out that the definition of 
international crime, as it was adopted by the Commission in the draft Article 19, was narrower and 
at the same time more generalized compared to what Ago originally proposed.365 Anyhow, it is a 
peculiarity of definitions that they me be endlessly criticized, especially if they are made by others. 
A better view seems to be that suggested by Abi-Saab who invites to distinguish between the merits 
of the concept of international crimes and its perhaps imperfect formulation.366 
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Turning to the concept itself, for critics of the “international crime” the core argument was 
that the notion would be utterly subjective.367 In absence of a list of crimes each state would be free 
to assert a subjective position. This would result in divergent views and a chaos that would be  
detrimental for international law. This argument may hardly be substantiated. As has been noted, 
international law has successfully functioned with concepts that are even more subjective and 
vague, such as the concept of international custom.368 Certainly any state may suggest that a 
particular rule constitutes a custom. This subjectivity, however, has not prevented international 
courts and tribunals from determining and successfully applying customary rules. Similar objections 
against “subjectivity” and “politization” were also voiced with regard to determination of which 
norms qualify as jus cogens.369 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties famously leaves it 
up to the “international community of States as a whole” to determine which norms have the status 
of jus cogens and which do not.370 Thus as one observer notes “[the] most important norms are 
based on the most uncertain norm-creating mechanism.”371 True, however, as developments 
subsequent to the adoption of VCLT have demonstrated, states (with the peculiar exception of 
France) as well as international courts have had little difficulty in determining the list of jus cogens 
norms.372 Therefore, if the international community is able to agree on what constitutes 
international custom, and is likewise capable to deal with an even more challenging question of 
which customary rules possess the quality of jus cogens, there seems to be no reason to doubt that it 
would indeed be able to determine what conduct constitutes an international crime.373  
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4.6. Legal consequences resulting from international crimes.  
 
It must be noted that Ago’s initial idea to distinguish between two types of breaches on the 
basis of the content of the obligation (“ordinary breaches” and “international crimes”) was intended 
to be reflected also in the applicable responsibility regime. Thus Ago noted in his 1976 report:  
“[w]e should already be aware that in making a distinction between 
internationally wrongful acts on the basis of the degree of importance of the content of the 
obligation breached we shall necessarily be obliged subsequently to draw a distinction 
also between the regimes of responsibility to be applied. We have already emphasized that 
the distinction in question is a "normative" distinction: it has no place in our draft unless it 
leads to a difference in the consequences entailed respectively by certain more serious 
offences and by other breaches of international obligations.”374 
Ago concludes that such beaches as use of force, colonial domination, genocide, apartheid, 
endangering the conservation of common heritage of mankind would all constitute international 
crimes. In his 1976 Report Ago argued that the main distinctive consequence of international crimes 
is that the injured state (and also other states) are entitled to apply sanctions. This contrasts with the 
ordinary breaches which result only in the duty to make reparation. 
Therefore, after having established the need to differentiate between ordinary breaches and 
international crimes, the key practical question emerges - what is the actual responsibility regime 
(in terms of rights and obligations) that applies to international crimes? And even more importantly 
for the purposes of this study – whether the envisaged responsibility regime for international crimes 
reflects fundamentals of the public law paradigm (namely, whether there is a legal relationship 
between the responsible state and the community; whether there are punitive elements; whether 
there are enforcement mechanisms implemented on behalf of the community)? 
Even prior to the adoption of the “serious breaches” approach advocated by Crawford, 
when the ILC still used the concept of “international crimes”, it was suggested that the 
consequences of an international crime are so mild that the distinction between delicts and crimes 
makes little sense.375 Crawford in his first report noted “the marked contrast between the gravity of 
an international crime of a State, as expressed in Article 19, on the one hand, and the rather limited 
                                                 
374 Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II (Part One), para. 146. 
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consequences drawn from such a crime in Articles 51 to 53, on the other.”376 The 1996 Draft 
Articles (which still contained the “international crimes” approach), in addition of a right of every 
state to employ countermeasures, provided that in cases of international crimes restitution could be 
claimed from the responsible state even if it resulted in a disproportionate burden on the culprit and 
even if it threatened economic stability, political independence or would impair dignity of the 
responsible state (Article 52 of the 1996 Draft Articles).  Whereas other states in a case of 
international crime were under obligation: a) not to recognize the situation created by the crime; b) 
not to render aid or assistance to the responsible state that would maintain the created situation; c) 
to cooperate with other states in the application of the measures designed to eliminate the 
consequences of the crime (Article 53 of the 1996 draft).  
Although the above mentioned obligations that were intended to apply to international 
crimes aggravate the responsibility compared to a situation of other “ordinary” breaches, these 
consequences are indeed very limited. The obligation to provide restitution will often be materially 
impossible (for instance, if nationals of the injured state have been killed) and therefore there will 
be no option but to resort to compensation and possibly satisfaction. As for obligations incumbent 
on other states (to cooperate, not to recognize the unlawful situation, not to render aid), in practical 
terms these may often be of minor significance. The obligation not to recognize an unlawful 
situation is anyhow a rule of customary law.377 Moreover, the breach of these obligations itself will 
be an “ordinary” breach rather that an “international crime” and therefore, invocation will depend 
only on the injured state.  
Another problem with obligations of third states with regard to international crimes is that 
authoritative determination whether certain conduct constituted a crime or not may be unavailable 
or come only after a considerable period of time. While such a determination (by an international 
court or by the UN Security Council) has not been made, third states that are supporting 
commission of an international crime may argue that the specific breach is not a crime or that they 
were unaware of the fact that international crime is committed. Supply of weapons to a government 
that uses these weapons to perform crimes against humanity (such as Russian supplies of weaponry 
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to Syrian government from 2012 onwards) is a likely scenario that illustrates the limited value of 
Article 53 obligations which in effect produce no meaningful results.378  
In the 2001 version of the Draft Articles (when the “international crimes” approach was 
substituted by the “serious breaches” approach) the consequences of a “serious breach” were even 
further slimmed down. Initially Crawford had proposed an idea of aggravated damages, i.e., that in 
calculation of damages the gravity of the breach would be taken into account.379 By this proposal 
Crawford aimed to retain at least some punitive element that would apply to “serious breaches”. 
The proposal, however, proved controversial and was subsequently dropped from the Articles. Yet 
another limitation on the consequences of the “serious breaches of peremptory norms” was that 
these breaches had to be “serious”. It is insufficient that a jus cogens norm is breached for the 
special consequences to apply – the breach has to involve gross or systematic failure to perform the 
obligation.380 Finally, from obligations of third states the already mentioned obligations to 
cooperate, not to recognize or render aid were left in the final version of the 2001 Articles on State 
Responsibility. 
Compared to what was originally envisaged by Ago (at least conceptually, as Ago never 
proposed the actual text of Articles that now make up Part III): no punitive measures were retained 
in the final version of the 2001 Articles. The obligations of third states were also kept at a 
minimum, limited to the three obligations: that of cooperation to bring the breach to an end (Article 
41, para. 1); the obligation of non–recognition of the unlawful situation (Article 41, para. 2); and the 
obligations not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation (Article 41, para. 
2).381 Finally, also the added perceptual weight that was achieved by the concept of “international 
crime” was unattained by the 2001 Articles.  
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A further criticism of the consequences attached to “serious braches” as adopted in the 
2001 Articles on State Responsibility is voiced by Cassese.382 When considering Articles 41, 48 and 
54 of the 2001 Articles in context, Cassese points out that in terms of consequences of breaches the 
ILC in effect distinguishes three types of obligations: 1) ordinary or “contractual” obligations; 2) 
obligations erga omnes; and 3) obligations under peremptory norms. Breaches of each type of 
obligations result is different set of rights and obligations of third states. In case of a breach of a 
‘contractual’ obligation third states are not entitled to interfere in the relationship between the 
injured and the responsible state. Breaches of erga omnes obligations entitle third states to: a) claim 
cessation of the wrongful act and assurance of non-repetition; b) claim from the responsible state 
performance of obligation of reparation for the benefit of the injured state (Article 42); c) to take 
lawful measures against the responsible state to ensure cessation and reparation (Article 54). 
Finally, beaches of peremptory norms produce the same entitlements as beaches of erga omnes 
obligations and on top of that impose the three obligations named in Article 41 (to cooperate, not to 
recognize as lawful the situation created by the serious breach and not to render aid). According to 
Cassese, such a distinction between breaches of obligations erga omnes and obligations under 
peremptory norms is contrary to state practice, unnecessary and likely to cause confusion. Cassese 
convincingly argues that both categories - obligations erga omnes and obligations under peremptory 
norms in fact coincide: 
“[t]o contend that an obligation erga omnes may be derogated from would 
amount to denying its very nature as an obligation designed to protect fundamental values, 
the respect for which is an interest of the whole international community. It would amount 
to admitting that two or more states, by concluding an agreement, would be allowed 
legitimately to infringe on an interest shared by the whole international community. Both 
the notion of erga omnes and that of jus cogens aim at the same result, that is to prevent 
states from freely disposing of, and disregarding, values safeguarded by international 
customary rules.”383 
Consequently Cassese suggests that as both concepts have the same essential purpose - that 
of protecting fundamental values of the international community, third states (those not directly 
injured by the breach) ought to have the same rights and obligations with regard to the responsible 
state, regardless whether that state has breached an erga omnes obligation or a peremptory norm.384 
Cassese’s argument and his suggestion indeed seem well founded. A minor criticisms, which, 
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however, does not obliterate the merit of his substantive argument, is that distinction in 
consequences between breaches of obligations erga omnes and obligations under peremptory norms 
is justified with regard to a subgroup of obligations erga omnes i.e., obligations erga omnes partes. 
Article 48(1)(a) of the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility deals with obligations erga omnes 
partes, which will be owed to all other states parties of a particular treaty. These obligations are not 
necessarily of a peremptory character and, therefore, do not threaten fundamental interests of the 
international community. Hence the distinction in consequences, which need not be as serious as 
those applying to beaches of peremptory norms.  
To eliminate the unnecessary distinction between obligations erga omnes and peremptory 
norms, Articles ought to address specifically invocation of responsibility for breaches of 
peremptory norms, particularly emphasizing that these obligations are owed to the international 
community as a whole and entitle any state to invoke responsibility. This may be done by either 
redrafting the present Article 48 and Articles 40 - 41. In addition, consequences of responsibility for 
breaches of obligations erga omnes partes ought to be treated separately from obligations “owed to 
the international Community as a whole”. Breaches of obligations erga omnes partes ought to result 
in consequences that are currently provided in Article 48(2). 
However, the question most relevant for the purposes of this study is what consequences 
would be required in accordance with the public law paradigm approach? It is suggested that 
protection of community interests requires introduction of invocation of responsibility on behalf the 
community of states. Such a legal relationship between the responsible state and the community as a 
whole could take two forms. First and the most “public” form would be where responsibility is 
invoked on behalf of the community by an entity which has been explicitly granted such powers by 
the community. Such a development requires setting up of new institutional arrangements as well as 
procedures for their functioning. Also to function effectively, such a “public prosecutor” obviously 
needs to be impartial as well as endowed with real authority. Closest analogy of this type of 
invocation may be found in the European Union law where European Commission is entitled to 
initiate infringement proceedings against the EU member states on behalf of the community in 
accordance with Article 258 TFEU.385 At the present stage of development of the international 
community, when delegation of power from sovereign states is very limited and rather an exception 
than a norm, it is difficult to see such a model of invocation on behalf of the international 
community functioning in near future. Flat rejection of Arangio-Ruiz’s proposals on mandatory 
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conciliation procedures and arbitration for disputes involving countermeasures386 provide an 
example of how states would have treated any institutionalization of international “public 
prosecutor”. 
The second form of “public” involvement in the process of invocation would be where any 
member of the community is entitled to invoke responsibility on behalf of the community. Again an 
example of this type of invocation is already present in the EU law – Article 259 of the TFEU 
allows any member state to initiate proceedings for the violation of the EU Law against any other 
member state of the Union. This option appears to be considerably more workable with the present 
setup of the international community. Indeed such a scheme is embodied in Article 48 of the 2001 
Articles on State Responsibility. The downside of this second option is that it remains half 
bilateralist in a sense that responsibility is invoked by a certain member of the community against 
another member. Such a model of invocation somewhat losses the moral authority that a genuine 
public prosecutor enjoys, as it might always be argued that invocation is on behalf of the 
community only in name, while actually the invoking state is pursuing its own interests.387  
Another disadvantage of this option is that states may be unwilling to take on the trouble of 
invoking responsibility of another state and thus to perform a kind of public service, in particular if 
the invoking state does not directly gain anything from such “policing” of other members of the 
international community. As the experience of the EU shows, states are highly unwilling to engage 
each other in international litigation – in fact in around 60 years that member state v. member state 
infringement proceedings have been available in the EU, states have made use of this possibility 
only on three occasions.388 This unwillingness among the EU states to initiate proceedings against 
other states, however, may not be an entirely adequate example due to peculiarities of the 
institutional setup of the EU. States often feel they don’t need to take on the role of a “public 
prosecutor” as that role is successfully performed by the European Commission.  
In addition to invocation on behalf of the international community, also a punitive aspect 
to the consequences of an internationally wrongful act, if the act in question violates a peremptory 
norm, must be contemplated. Violations of peremptory norms tend to be more harmful to the 
international community than ordinary breaches, as they undermine community’s fundamental 
interests and thus endanger its functioning. Therefore, as Ago and others have argued, logic 
                                                 
386 Arangio-Ruiz G. Special Rapporteur, Fifth report on state responsibility , A/CN.4/453 and Add.1-3, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1. 
387 Here an analogy may be drawn with international criminal responsibility of individuals: states that employ universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for international crimes are often suspected of abusing the concept. However, if 
prosecution is conducted in the International Criminal Court the argument of acting on behalf of international 
community appears more convincing.  
388 The cases in which member states have instituted proceedings against other member states are 148/78 France v. UK, 
[1979] ECR 2923, C-388/95 Belgium v. Spain [2000] ECR. I-03123; and C-145/04 Spain v. UK, [2006] ECR I-7917. 
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consistency requires to differentiate crimes (or breaches of peremptory norms to employ the 
vocabulary of the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility) from other breaches also in terms of the 
applicable consequences.  Punitive or other aggravated form of responsibility provides members of 
the community with an additional motivation not to engage in the respective conduct, thereby 
protecting the essential interests of the whole community. Therefore whenever the discussion on 
state responsibility will be reopened, it is essential to return to consideration of the additional 
consequences that were included in Article 52 of the 1996 Draft of the Articles on State 
Responsibility.  
Moreover, an argument may be put forward that not only “international crimes” ought to 
entail punitive elements (in addition to the duty to make reparation), but also other breaches. Such 
breaches are those which are continuous, systematic and likely to be repeated in future (for instance 
if domestic law or governmental practices are contrary to international law). Examples of this type 
of violations would be the United States breaches of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations389 – the United States systematically breached the Vienna Convention with regard to 
nationals or various states, with Paraguay, Germany and Mexico instituting proceedings in the 
International Court of Justice (respectively in the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.)390, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America)391Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United Slates of America)392. The fact that the violations 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations were systematically continued even after the ICJ 
established that they constituted internationally wrongful acts shows that states may lack motivation 
to discontinue breaches. Similarly, states may choose to pay compensation rather that discontinue 
domestic measures that are contrary to international law. A possibility of a penal element in 
addition to the established duty to make reparation would add to the perception of public 
condemnation of wrongfulness of the respective conduct and thus provide an additional incentive 
for states to comply with their international obligations. 
 
4.8. Conclusions 
 
Scholars, states and international courts all seem to agree that there are two general 
categories of international obligations. The first category includes obligations which are of 
                                                 
389 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 261. 
390 ICJ: Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguy v. United States of America) Order of 
10 November 1998, I. C. J. Reports 1998, p. 426. 
391 ICJ: LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466. 
392 ICJ: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 
12. 
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fundamental importance for the whole international community, such as obligation not to engage in 
aggression or genocide. The second category is comprised of all other obligations which generally 
are of lesser importance and therefore concern only the injured state. This distinction becomes 
meaningless if breaches of both categories of obligations result in the same legal consequences. 
Therefore, as Ago, Lauterpacht, Tunkin and many others have argued, logic consistency requires to 
differentiate breaches of fundamentally important obligations from other breaches also in terms of 
the applicable responsibility regime. 
The ILC’s throughout its work on state responsibility attempted to accommodate this 
conclusion. However, to appease opposition to the concept of international crimes, the ILC sought 
to substitute “international crimes” with the concept of “serious breaches of peremptory norms”. 
This policy choice in itself may even be a welcome development as it reconciles doctrines on 
peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes and avoids introduction of a new concept of state 
crimes which significantly overlaps or even is identical to peremptory norms. A minor unwelcome 
side effect of such a choice is that the perception connotation of the word “crime” is not made use 
of. However, a problem of considerable importance with regard to the ILC’s shift towards “serious 
breaches” approach is that it continuously reduced the consequences attached to “serious breaches”. 
Thus the ILC dropped the idea that all states would be regarded as injured, if a serious breach of a 
peremptory norm is committed. Likewise, the ILC gave up on the idea that all states have a right to 
apply countermeasures and claim restitution even if it resulted in a disproportionate burden on the 
responsible state and even if it threatened economic stability, political independence or would 
impair dignity of the responsible state (Article 52 of the 1996 Draft Articles).  
These developments lead one to question a very common perception of international law - 
that it is gradually developing from a somewhat primitive and archaic condition to a legal system 
with all the proper hallmarks of the rule of law. Thus slowly but surely international law is 
supposed to evolve from unwritten custom to treaties, from co-existence to cooperation, from 
unlimited sovereignty to an international community. However, after reviewing rise and demise of 
the concept of international crimes, one starts to doubt applicability of this perception to the field of 
state responsibility.  
In fact the momentum for introduction of international crimes with meaningful 
consequences in terms of rights and obligation of the international community towards the 
responsible state was present only up until late eighties. Since then many states and in particular 
leading powers started to loose appetite for introduction of the concept. The interest went away 
completely with beginning of nineties as both the developed and the developing states had little 
interest in such developments. Why? The likely reason is that developed countries were no longer 
threatened by the socialist block and therefore felt it to be an improbable scenario that they would 
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require normative protection against aggression, war crimes and the like. Also developed countries 
found it far more appealing to pursue their agendas through export of liberal economic policies and 
through international economic institutions rather than by brute force. As a result, also the 
developing countries felt less threatened and willingly joined these policies, thus landing the world 
in an unprecedentedly hegemonious system in which everyone (with rare exceptions such as North 
Korea) seemed to be more or less on the same side. If, however, occasionally the powerful have to 
bring any disobedient state to heel, then obviously they are even less interested in any kind of 
meaningful system of responsibility for international crimes. Thus the concept of international 
crimes of states in the post-Cold War era made little appeal to anyone.  
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 5. PROTECTION OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS IN THE ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Having traced the historical evolution of the protection of community interests in the law of 
state responsibility, we now turn to the present state of this branch of international law. A seminal 
point in the story of development of the law of state responsibility was 2001 when the ILC formally 
concluded its work on this epic project that lasted for more than five decades. The work did not, 
however, result in a landmark treaty akin to the VCLT, as could have been expected, but rather in a 
General Assembly resolution which merely “noted” the adoption of the Articles by the ILC.393 This 
might seem like a petty conclusion to a monumental project. However, authors, especially those 
involved in the ILC’s work, like Crawford, have since argued that having “Articles” is in fact better 
for progressive development of state responsibility than having a proper treaty.394 Their key 
argument is that negotiating a treaty on the basis of the Articles would in fact reopen the debate that 
was concluded with much difficulty. Issues like state crimes, countermeasures of general interest 
and other contentious topics would again cause disagreement.395 This in turn might result in a treaty 
which, in terms of community interests, is even weaker than the present Articles. Another feared 
possibility is that the treaty would be reluctantly ratified and perhaps would not even enter into 
force – a scenario that would greatly diminish the authority of the Articles.396  
These indeed seem to be valid arguments. The weight of the authority of the ILC’s legally 
non-binding Articles on State Responsibility has been impressive. International as well as national 
courts, governments and scholars have willingly embraced the ILC’s work on state responsibility as 
an accurate reflection of existing law. This of course is not to say that the approval is unanimous. 
Some courts, for instance ECtHR in El-Masri v. Macedonia have tried approaches that thread 
entirely novel paths that dissonate with the ILC’s conclusions. In that particular case, the ECtHR 
found that Mr.El-Masri’s abuse conducted by the CIA agents at Skopje Airport was attributable to 
Macedonia because the abuse was “carried out in the presence of officials of the respondent State 
                                                 
393 UN General Assembly, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts: Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly, 28 January 2002, A/RES/56/83, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3da44ad10.html [viewed 
August 15, 2014]. Interestingly the General Assembly even avoided expressing any opinion on the articles but only said 
that it “takes note of the articles”, thus avoiding any express approval or disapproval of the articles. 
394 Crawford J. State Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 42. 
395 See Caron D. The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and Authority, 
American Journal of International Law, 2002, 86,  p. 862.  
396 The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations provides an example of such ‘failed’ treaty, see Gaja G. ‘New’ Vienna Convention on 
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations: A Critical 
Commentary. British Yearbook of International Law Vol. 58.1, 1988, p. 253. 
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and within its jurisdiction.”397 From that the ECtHR concluded that: “the respondent State must be 
regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory 
with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities.”398 Such interpretation considerably lowers 
attribution requirements compared to those included in the Articles on State Responsibility. The 
CIA agents clearly were not placed at the disposal of Macedonian authorities (Article 6 of Articles 
on State Responsibility), therefore, under the Articles their acts would be attributed only to the 
United States and not to Macedonia. Essentially, the Court attributed the wrongful conduct of the 
CIA agents to Macedonia, simply because Macedonia had consented to allow CIA rendition 
operations in Macedonia and Macedonian officials were present at the airport. Thus the Court held 
Macedonia responsible in a situation in which Articles on State Responsibility, if applied by another 
court, such as the ICJ, in all probability would not find Macedonia responsible. 
However, regardless of incidental bypassing of the ILC’s Articles, it seems uncontentious to 
suggest that they are at the focal point of the law of state responsibility as it presently stands. 
Therefore the present analysis of protection of community interests in the law of state responsibility 
will be premised on the ILC’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility. 
This chapter will proceed with assessment of four distinct elements in the Articles on State 
Responsibility which to greater or lesser extent were designed to protect interests of the 
international community. These elements are: 1) the so called objective nature of state 
responsibility, i.e., an idea that state incurs international responsibility regardless of the fact whether 
the breach has caused injury to any state; 2) invocation of responsibility by a state other than an 
injured; 3) serious breaches of peremptory norms; and 4) countermeasures of general interest also 
referred to as solidarity measures. 
 
5.1. Objective responsibility 
  
 As already discussed in Chapter 3, traditional law of state responsibility is premised on the 
private law paradigm – a modality of legal relationship which is established exclusively between a 
state that performs a breach of international law and another state that is injured by that breach. In 
the private law paradigm responsibility is a bilateral matter between the wrongdoer and the injured - 
one that is based on reciprocity of individual rights and obligations. In this paradigm for a state to 
incur international responsibility, there must be an injury to subjective rights of another state and 
the injured state needs to invoke international responsibility of the state that performed the 
                                                 
397 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 13 December 2012, El-Masri v. Macedonia, para. 206. Available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 [viewed September 28, 2014]. 
398 Ibid. 
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breach.399  This traditional law of state responsibility is reflected in the famous Reparation for 
Injuries advisory opinion where the ICJ observed that: “only the party to whom an international 
obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach.”400 The core purpose of this traditional 
approach is to protect subjective rights of states. Protection of the rule of law or objective legality 
only come as by-products of protection of subjective rights. 
 The ILC in the Articles on State Responsibility does away with this time tested approach. In 
Articles 1 and 2 it defines conditions for state responsibility. For a state to incur international 
responsibility it must perform a breach of an obligation and that breach must be attributable to the 
state. As becomes clear from the Commentary to Article 2 there are no further requirements.401 
Thus the ILC purposefully does not mention injury as a condition for responsibility. The ILC 
explains that breach and attribution are the only necessary conditions of responsibility and that 
“there is no exception to the principle stated in article 2.”402 The ILC reconfirms this point in 
commentary to Article 31 when it discusses reparation. It notes that: “the general obligation of 
reparation arises automatically upon the commission of the internationally wrongful act and is not, 
as such, contingent upon a demand or protest by any state, even if the form which the reparation 
should take in the circumstances may depend on the response of the injured State or States.”403 
This approach has been sometimes referred to as “objective responsibility”.404 It is 
“objective” in a sense that the state that performs the breach is responsible irrespective of whether 
any other state or other international actor is injured by the breach.  The logic is that the breach 
itself is considered harmful to the international community which has a general interest in 
observance of law. It is in this sense that responsibility becomes “objective” or automatic, even if it 
does not cause injury or is not invoked by anyone. The consequences of discarding injury as a 
requirement of responsibility are fundamental. Although it may appear as an insubstantial doctrinal 
detail, discarding the requirement of injury reorientates the law of state responsibility away from the 
                                                 
399 See Stern B. A Plea for “Reconstruction” of International Responsibility Based on the Notion of Legal Injury. In: 
Ragazzi M. (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005. p. 
193. 
400 ICJ: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 
174, pp. 181-182. 
401 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, p. 36. para. 9, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[viewed 2014, July 14]. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid.,  p. 91. para. 4. 
404 Crawford J. State Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 60; 
Nollkaemper A. Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Responsibility, Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies Vol. 16, 2 (Summer 2009), p. 546. 
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private law paradigm towards protection of community interests.405 As a result of this shift, the 
emphasis of the law of state responsibility is no longer placed exclusively on protection of 
individual rights of the injured state. Recognition of responsibility without injury acknowledges the 
interest of the whole international community in observance of international public order. As Pellet 
has pointed out: 
“a ‘reconceptionalisation’ of the very notion of international responsibility, which, by the 
elimination of injury as a condition for its existence, finds itself ‘objectivised’, in the sense 
that, from a purely inter-state approach we have passed to a more ‘communitarian’ or 
‘societal’ vision: responsibility exists in and of itself, independently of its effects.”406 
Apart from conceptual importance, giving up injury as a condition for responsibility has 
also other more specific consequences. If responsibility automatically results from a breach (as 
Articles 1 and 2 stipulate), that implies that commission of a breach also automatically results in 
consequences of a breach:  duty of continued performance, cessation, non-repetition and reparation 
- even if the injured state has not invoked the responsibility. This again constitutes a significant 
development towards protection of community interests. The fact that the responsible state is 
automatically under duty of cessation, non-repetition and reparation places an additional onus on 
the responsible state. If the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole, 
then performance of these new obligations (i.e., secondary obligations which result from the breach) 
may be demanded not only by the directly injured state but by any member of the international 
community. Thus the responsible state finds itself having new legal obligations on top of the 
breached primary obligations. For instance, a state that performs an act of aggression towards 
another state, in accordance with the Articles on State Responsibility, is automatically under an 
obligation to cease the breach and to provide reparation. The objective nature of responsibility 
means that the responsible state incurs these secondary obligations regardless whether the directly 
injured state invokes the responsibility. Existence of these secondary obligations is given meaning 
by allowing the possibility for other states to claim responsibility from the wrongdoing state, not 
because they are injured, but because they protect an interest of the whole international community 
in preservation of international peace and security. Thus objective nature of responsibility is a 
conceptual foundation that justifies invocation of responsibility by states that have not been directly 
injured and allows them to invoke responsibility with a purpose to protect community interests.  
 
                                                 
405 See Stern B. The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act. In: The Law of International Responsibility, 
Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 193.  
406 Pellet A. Remarques sur une révolution inachevée - Le projet de la C.D.I. sur la responsabilité des États. Annuaire 
français de droit international 1996, p. 4. 
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5.2. Invocation of state responsibility to protect community interests 
 
Invocation of state responsibility is a direct and obvious way to protect international legal 
interests.407 Shared interests of the whole international community are no exception. Whether it is 
international peace and security, protection of global environmental commons (such as the high 
seas, International Seabed Area, ozone layer or global climate)408, prosecution of perpetrators of 
genocide or protection of universally recognized human rights – all of these community interests 
need legal protection which may be enforced by means of invoking state responsibility. Invocation 
of state responsibility is relatively straightforward in cases where one state breaches an obligation 
that is owned to another state. The injured state409 may invoke responsibility of the responsible state 
and institute proceedings in a court or tribunal (if there is one with an appropriate jurisdiction). This 
modality of legal relationship is based on the private law paradigm, where the injured state protects 
its own rights, similarly to a private contractor enforcing a contract against a defaulting contractual 
partner. As we saw from the analysis of the previous chapters, this private law paradigm dominated 
the law of state responsibility right up to 1950ties when the topic was taken up by the ILC. In the 
Articles on State Responsibility this private law inspired modality of legal relationship is reflected 
in Article 42 which allows invocation of responsibility by the injured state i.e., the state whose 
rights have been breached. 
To spell out the details, Article 42 distinguishes three cases in which a state will be 
considered as injured (and therefore entitled to invoke responsibility).410 First is the already 
                                                 
407 See Weiss E. Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century. American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 96 (2002), p. 798. 
408 These interests are protected respectively by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 
1982, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (1982); Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, 1513 
UNTS 323; 26 ILM 1529 (1987); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
UNTS 107; 31 ILM 849 (1992). 
409 In legal literature the term „injury” is often employed as a synonym to “damage”. Both terms may refer to material 
as well as moral harm that is caused by a breach of a legal norm. However “injury” is often employed in a broader sense 
which includes also the so called “legal injury” i.e., harm that arises from the very fact that a legal norm has been 
breached. An example of “legal injury” would be a case where one state violates a peremptory norm such as prohibition 
of use of force. The state against which the force is used will be injured in the sense of Article 42 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility, whereas all other states of the international community will suffer only “legal injury” because a 
norm that is fundamental for the whole international community has been violated. See Stern B. A Plea for 
“Reconstruction” of International Responsibility Based on the Notion of Legal Injury. In: Ragazzi M. (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005. p. 194. The ILC in 
the Articles on State Responsibility used the term “injury” and therefore, for the sake of avoiding inconsistency, also in 
this work the term “injury” will be used. 
410 Note that discussion of injury is without prejudice to the earlier conclusion on the ‘objective’ nature of state 
responsibility, i,e., that injury is not a precondition of responsibility. That conclusion is still valid. However, the issue of 
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mentioned situation where a breached obligation is owed to another state individually. For example, 
if a state breaches a bilateral treaty, the other state will be entitled to invoke responsibility as the 
injured state. Secondly, a state may invoke responsibility as the injured state, if the breached 
obligation is owed to a group of states or even the whole international community, and the 
particular state is specially affected. For example, if a state party to the 1972 London Dumping 
Convention411 discharges oil from an oil platform in contravention of the Convention, it will breach 
an obligation owed to all other states parties. However, only the state at whose shores the oil will be 
washed up will be regarded as specially affected and therefore entitled to invoke responsibility as 
the injured state.  
The third instance when a state will be regarded as injured, is when the so called 
interdependent obligations are breached. These are “all or nothing” obligations – their observance 
makes sense only if all other parties equally observe them. A classic example of an interdependent 
obligation is Article 4 of the 1959 Antarctic treaty under which all states parties undertake an 
obligation not to make sovereignty claims over the unclaimed territories of the Antarctica.412 If any 
state party would make such claims all other states parties would be regarded as injured in 
accordance with Article 42 and thus entitled to invoke responsibility. 
However, invocation of responsibility becomes rather more problematic if the breach does 
not result in injury to any particular state, but nonetheless breaches a norm that protects interests of 
the international community as a whole. Existence of such obligations – obligations erga omnes, 
since they were first pronounced by the ICJ in its Barcelona traction judgment seem to have 
become undisputed. As the ICJ noted already in Barcelona traction: “[i]n view of the importance of 
the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection”413.  For 
instance, if Syria commits war crimes and crimes against humanity against its own people, or Japan 
violates international rules on whaling, or North Korea does not comply with a binding decision of 
an international organ such as the UN Security Council – in all of these cases there will be no one 
particular state whose individual rights are violated by these breaches of international law. 
However, these violations are obviously harmful to common interests of the international 
community as a whole. In theses cases invocation of responsibility by the injured state, as it is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
injured state has importance in determining who is entitled to invoke responsibility and what may be claimed. Only the 
injured state may demand compensation for itself and to resort to countermeasures.  
411 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London, December 29, 
1972, 1046 UNTS 120, 11 ILM 1294 (1972). 
412 Antarctic Treaty, Washington, December 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71 / 19 ILM 860 (1980). 
413 ICJ: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 
33. Note that in the more recent Belgium v Senegal judgment the ICJ referred not to legal interest, but simply to 
“common interest”. See ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Merits, Judgment of 20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 68. 
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formulated in Article 42, will not be of any avail in protection of community interests, as there will 
be no injured state. As a result, obligations which are of fundamental importance to the international 
community (e.g., to protect international peace and security, environment of the high seas or human 
rights) would remain purely declaratory, because their breach would not entitle any other state to 
bring an international claim. 
Likewise the interests of the international community may be adversely affected when an 
obligation owed to the international community as a whole is breached and there is an injured state, 
but the injured state does not invoke responsibility. There may be a number of scenarios where the 
injured state is either unwilling or unable to invoke responsibility. First of all, there may be cases 
when the injured state does not invoke responsibility for political, economic or other reasons. The 
injured state might issue a protest or condemnation but would stop short of actually invoking 
responsibility. Secondly, the injured state may be unable to invoke responsibility due to lack of 
international court of tribunal which would have jurisdiction over the dispute. In these cases a 
breach would occur, but it would not be followed by any legal consequences. This again is 
detrimental to the rule of law and the whole legal system as such, as any breach that is not followed 
by invocation of responsibility reduces the authority of law which is an important community 
interest in its own right. Therefore it is imperative that the legal system provides mechanisms by 
which not only individual interests of states are protected, but also wider interests of the whole 
international community. To achieve this, it is necessary that the right to invoke responsibility is not 
limited only to the injured state. 
 
5.2.1. Invocation by a state other than an injured 
 
In the Articles on State Responsibility a mechanism which allows invocation of 
responsibility also by non-injured states is embodied in Article 48. The Article provides that 
whenever an obligation, that is owed to a group of states or to the international community as a 
whole is infringed, not only the injured state, but any state is entitled to invoke responsibility of the 
state that performed the breach. As the ILC points out in the commentary to Article 48, a state 
invoking responsibility in accordance with this article “is acting not in its individual capacity by 
reason of having suffered injury but in its capacity as a member of a group of States to which 
obligation is owed, or indeed as a member of the international community as a whole.”414 This right 
of invocation is particularly important with regard to peremptory norms, such as prohibition of 
                                                 
414 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, p. 126. para. 1, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[viewed 2014, July 14]. 
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aggression, prohibition of genocide or protection of the fundamental human rights, which embody 
the most essential interests and values of the international community. As all obligations under 
peremptory norms are owed to the international community as a whole415, any state in principle may 
invoke responsibility of the wrongdoing state.  
Judicial practice of claims by non-injured states is rather limited. The ILC in its 
Commentary is able to point only to two historic precedents - S.S.Wimbeldon416 from the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and the South West Africa cases417 from the ICJ. In 2012 the ICJ 
delivered a judgment in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium 
v Senegal)418 which could be added to this list. In that case Belgium claimed that Senegal has an 
obligation to extradite former Chadian President under the 1984 Torture Convention. More 
specifically, Belgium argued that it is entitled to claim extradition as a specially interested state 
amongst other states parties, because it had previously instituted criminal proceedings and made the 
extradition request.  In other words it regarded itself as the injured state by Senegal’s breach of the 
Torture Convention in accordance with article 42 of the Articles on State Responsibility. The ICJ 
acknowledged Belgium’s right to claim extradition, but instead of regarding it as injured within the 
meaning of Article 42, it found that the obligation to extradite under the Torture Convention was an 
obligation erga omnes partes and that Belgium, being party to the Convention, was entitled to bring 
a claim for protection of collective interest.419 The Court did not refer to Article 48 of the Articles 
on State Responsibility, but the essence of the rule that it applied clearly mirrors the norm included 
in that Article. 
The Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) is another ICJ case in 
which invocation by a state other than the injured was at issue. The Court dismissed the second 
claim of Uganda in relation to abuse of unidentified persons by DRC soldiers at the Ndjili 
International Airport, since it could not establish whether they were Ugandan nationals (and 
therefore Uganda could not exercise diplomatic protection). However, the issue was addressed in 
some detail in the separate opinion of judge Simma. In particular Simma argued that the Court 
ought have considered the claim not on the grounds of diplomatic protection (as Uganda argued), 
                                                 
415 See Abi-Saab G. The Uses of Article 19. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1999, p. 339. 
416 Permanent Court of International Justice: S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 15, at p. 30. 
417 ICJ: South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319; South West Africa, Second Phase, 
Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6. In the Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC specifically 
points out that with Article 48 it intended to depart from the faulty conclusions established by the ICJ in the South West 
Africa cases. 
418 ICJ: Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), judgment of July 20, 2012, 
I.C.J. Reports 2012. 
419 Ibid., para. 69. 
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but as one brought in accordance with Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility, i.e., as a 
claim for protection of community interests.420 
More recently, in 2014, the ICJ rendered another judgement in which it recognized the right 
of non-injured states to invoke responsibility. The Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) 
case421 presents a model example of invocation of responsibility for protection of community 
interests. In this case Australia brought a claim against Japan for violation of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.422 At the core of the dispute was Article 8 of the 
Whaling Convention which allows killing of whales for scientific purposes. Australia claimed that 
Japan misuses this provision to disguise commercial whaling and thereby breaches several 
provisions of the Convention. The Court agreed with all claims put forward by Australia. 
Importantly, Japan’s obligations under the Whaling Convention were erga omnes partes i.e., owed 
all other states parties to the Convention, including Australia. Although Australia was not specially 
affected by the breach (it therefore would not qualify as the injured state in accordance with Article 
42) Japan did not even argue that Australia as non-injured state has no right to claim cessation of 
Japan’s alleged breach. Thus the judgment seems to demonstrate that the ICJ as well as the states 
involved in the dispute accepted the validity of the rules contained in Article 48 and regarded them 
as a reflection of the existing state of customary law. 
These developments are significant as at the time of the adoption of the Articles on State 
Responsibility the ILC itself admitted that Article 48 involves “a measure of progressive 
development”, thus acknowledging that it may lack the quality of a customary rule.423 The above 
judgments provide good grounds for an argument that the right of non-injured states to claim 
responsibility for protection of community interests (where erga omnes or erga omnes partes 
obligations are breached) has acquired the status of customary a rule. The broader importance of 
Article 48 being accepted as custom is that it opens a much wider possibility to bring claims for 
protection of community interests. If any member of the international community is entitled to bring 
a claim, that substantially raises the likelihood that there would be a legal response to a particular 
breach and the eventual dispute would be adjudicated. 
                                                 
420 ICJ: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. 
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422 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, December 2, 1946, 161 UNTS 72. 
423 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, p. 127. para. 12, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[viewed 2014, July 14]. 
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5.2.2. The concept of “a state other than an injured” 
 
The right to invoke responsibility for protection of community interests in Article 48 is 
defined as belonging to a “state other than an injured”. The choice of this particular terminology 
merits some attention. The ILC refrained from labelling states entitled to invoke responsibility 
under Article 48 as “interested states” or states having a “legal interest” or states that have suffered 
a “legal injury”. Instead the ILC refers simply to “a state other than an injured state”. The reason for 
this specific choice of terminology lies in the fact that the ILC refused to distinguish between 
various types of injuries. The ILC did not distinguish between actual material and moral injury 
(e.g., an injury to a state against which armed force has been used) and the so called “legal injury” 
(injury that results from the fact that an important interest of the whole international community has 
been violated even if the “legally injured” state has suffered no material or moral harm). The 
doctrinal validity of such designation has been criticized by some scholars.424 For instance, Stern 
argues that the ILC did not go far enough in support of communitarian approach. She claims that 
the ILC would have done better if it had explicitly recognized the concept of “legal injury” and 
would regard all states as “legally injured” when an obligation owed to the whole international 
community has been breached. Instead, according to Stern, the ILC chose to have a very restrictive 
understanding of injury – only material or moral injury. At the same time, in order to protect 
community interests, the ILC had to introduce a new concept of “a state other than an injured” 
which is entitled to invoke limited forms of responsibility if an erga omnes obligation is breached. 
Stern claims, first of all, that such an approach is logically inconsistent as violations of peremptory 
norms cause a “legal injury” to the whole international community. Why would otherwise members 
of the international community have a claim, if they are not injured? In criticism of the ILC’s 
approach Stern points out that: 
 “It is at the least curious that some states may invoke the responsibility of another 
State even if they are not injured. If a State is the beneficiary of an obligation which is 
violated, it is difficult to see why it should not be considered to be an injured state. It is 
well established – and the ICJ has clearly confirmed – that, in a case of an international 
obligation towards international community as a whole, all States have a legal interest in 
ensuring that there is compliance. [footnote to Barcelona traction omitted] In other words, 
                                                 
424 Dupuy, P.M. Back to the Future of a Multilateral Dimension of the Law of State Responsibility for Breaches of 
‘Obligations Owed to International Community as a Whole’. European Journal Of International Law Vol. 23 No. 4, 
2012, p. 1061; Kolliopoulos A. La Commission d’indemnisation des Nations Unies et le droit de la responsability 
internationale. Paris: LGDJ, 2001, p. 287. 
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it seems that all States able to invoke international responsibility should be considered to 
be injured States; if that is not the case, what is the justification for the fact that they may 
have a cause of action against the author of the internationally wrongful act?”425 
It must be noted that also some ILC members seem to share this view. For instance, Gaja 
has noted that the terminology used in Articles on State Responsibility with respect to injured states 
may be regarded as “questionable”. He specifically points out that the term “injured state” could 
also be used with regard to states entitled to invoke responsibility under Article 48, as they are also 
affected by the breach.426 
The second criticism voiced against the concept of “a state other than an injured” lies in the 
fact that the ILC introduced this concept specifically to accommodate countermeasures into the 
overall scheme of the Articles on State Responsibility.427 Countermeasures are a very powerful tool, 
which may be abused in particular by dominant states. Countermeasures may also lead to escalation 
of conflict rather than promote a settlement. However, in a legal system, such as international law, 
in which centralized enforcement mechanisms in effect are almost absent, the ILC felt that there are 
not many realistic alternatives to countermeasures (also states readily invoke countermeasures in 
their practice).428 It therefore opted to include countermeasures into the Articles on State 
Responsibility.429 The ILC, however, did not go as far as introducing “countermeasures of general 
interest” i.e., countermeasures that may be invoked by any member of the international community 
to protect community interests.430 Such countermeasures are very contentious as on the one hand 
they provide much needed means to enforce community interests.431 But on the other hand, they 
may potentially provide legal justification for abuse as states may apply countermeasures for 
political or economic gain, which in turn may destabilize the whole system of international law. The 
ILC therefore settled on the idea that only the injured states may apply countermeasures, while all 
                                                 
425 Stern B. The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act. In: The Law of International Responsibility, Crawford J., 
Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 196.  
426 Gaja, G. States Having as Interest in Compliance with the Obligation Breached. In: The Law of International 
Responsibility, Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 957. 
427 Stern B. The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act. In: The Law of International Responsibility, Crawford J., 
Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 200. 
428 See Dawidowicz M. Public Law Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on 
Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security Council. British Yearbook of International 
Law, 2006, p. 333.  
429 See Articles 22 and 49-54 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
430 See Alland D. Countermeasures of General Interest. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2002, p. 1221. 
431 For a position supportive of the countermeasures of general interest see Proukaki E. The Problem of Enforcement of 
International Law. Countermeasures, the non-injured state and the idea of International Community. New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
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other members of the international community may only employ “lawful measures” which by 
definition rules out countermeasures.432  
If resorting to countermeasures is a right vested in injured states, the ILC could not regard 
all states as injured whenever an erga omnes obligation is breached as that would lead to acceptance 
of countermeasures of general interest and risks of politically motivated abuse. The ILC therefore 
came up with the category of “a state other than an injured” which may invoke responsibility of the 
wrongdoing state, but would not be entitled to employ countermeasures. The ILC thus solved the 
problem of not allowing countermeasures to be used too widely. But along the way it had to give up 
the logic of the idea that invocation belongs only to the injured – which is at the root of Stern’s 
criticism.433  
These arguments are indeed well founded. However, the outcome - the actual entitlement of 
states other that directly injured to invoke responsibility for protection of community interests in the 
Articles on State Responsibility in effect remain the same. The only difference, if Sterns approach 
would be adopted, would be that a “a state other that an injured” would be labelled as “legally 
injured”, which in turn would require the ILC to redefine its terminology with regard to 
countermeasures. Interestingly enough, Crawford’s opinion resonates with the idea that a distinction 
is necessary between states that are directly injured and states which, although are not directly 
injured nonetheless have interests in compliance. Specifically Crawford points out that: “We cannot 
make progress in developing the idea of a public international law (rather than a private spectre of 
international law) unless we distinguish between the primary beneficiaries, the right holders, and 
those states with a legal interest in compliance.”434 The ILC opted to articulate this distinction in 
terms of “injured state” and “a state other than an injured”. An alternative, which would follow the 
logic that a right to bring a claim is based on fact that the claimant suffered an injury (be it direct or 
only “legal injury”), does indeed make sense in terms of doctrinal consistency. However, this would 
require redefining Article 49, providing that only materially injured states (and not legally injured 
states) are entitled to resort to countermeasures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
432 See Article 54 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
433 See Stern B. A Plea for “Reconstruction” of International Responsibility Based on the Notion of Legal Injury. In: 
Ragazzi M. (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005. p. 
195. 
434 Crawford, J. Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
Vol. 8. Issue 2, p. 320. 
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5.2.3. What a non-injured state may claim? 
 
Another important point with regard to “a state other than an injured” concerns the content 
of the responsibility claims that such a state is entitled to make. By definition such a state itself is 
not injured as a result of the breach. The claim that it brings is for the protection of the collective 
interest (for instance of states parties to a certain treaty) or for the protection of the interests of the 
whole international community. Since it has not suffered injury, it may primarily claim only 
cessation of the wrongful act as well as assurances and guaranties of non repetition. However, 
Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility allows a state other than an injured also to claim 
reparation in the interest of the injured state or other beneficiaries of the obligation. This again is a 
mark of public law paradigm inspired approach as the rational for such a claim would be protection 
of public interest. A state other than an injured would in effect act as a private attorney general 
seeking to protect another state or other beneficiaries (e.g., individuals or peoples) that were injured 
as a result of the breach. It thereby would also seek to protect collective interests of other states 
parties, other actors or interests of the whole international community.435  
This type of claim for reparation by a state other than an injured is particularly necessary in 
situations where there is a breach, but the injury is caused not to any particular state but to shared 
interests of the international community. For instance, if harm is caused to global environmental 
commons, such as the high seas, there obviously would be a need for reparation in the form of 
restitution (e.g., cleaning up the polluted area of the high seas). If Article 48 would not allow for 
invocation of responsibility by non-injured states or would limit such a claim only to cessation of 
the breach (which exists anyway on the basis of the primary obligation itself) an important 
international obligation would remain purely theoretical. The obligation not to pollute would exist, 
but its breach would not entitle any other state to demand clean-up as an expression of restitution. 
The interest that the primary obligation protects in effect would remain unprotected. The same 
holds true for breaches of human rights if the state that performs the breach mistreats its own 
nationals. Again no other state would be injured as a result of such a breach. In absence of a system 
of individual claims by injured individuals akin to that provided by the European Convention of 
Human Rights, obligations under human rights treaties would remain declaratory, as there would be 
no one entitled to claim compensation.  Therefore invocation of responsibility by a state other than 
an injured and its entitlement to claim reparation is an essential component of the primary 
obligations which protect shared interests of the international community.   
 
                                                 
435 For discussion of “private attorney general” see Rubenstein W. On what a Private Attorney General Is – and Why it 
Matters, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 6, November 2004, p. 2129. 
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5.2.4. Collective and individual action 
 
Another provision that is of relevance to invocation of responsibility to protect interests of 
the international community is Article 59.  This Article makes a general note that the Articles are 
without prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations. The aim of this provision is to address cases 
in which UN organs, most likely the UN Security Council, would make resolutions pertaining to 
state responsibility e.g., which would require a state to cease a wrongful act or provide reparation or 
make other pronouncements.436 As the ILC commentary to Article 59 explains, this article simply 
provides that the Articles cannot effect the Charter obligations.437 In other words, the Charter 
obligations would take precedence over any conflicting rules contained in the Articles on State 
Responsibility. In principle this means that the UN Security Council may impose obligations that 
are not based on Articles on State Responsibility. In absence of judicial review over measures of the 
Security Council438 it may disregard even those Articles that mirror customary rules. Although 
objectionable from the perspective of systemic consistency of law, from the perspective of 
protection of community interests, precedence of the Charter over Articles on State Responsibility 
is more likely to be a positive. Absence of enforcement mechanisms is one of the great weaknesses 
of international law. The UN Security Council, despite its considerable shortcoming of political 
bias, remains a rare institutional mechanism, which offers realistic possibilities of enforcement of 
community interests. The limiting factor here remains the scope of the Security Council’s mandate, 
namely issues of international peace and security.  
However, the Articles also emphasize that any state other than the injured may invoke 
responsibility if the conditions of Article 48 are met. This specific choice of wording seems to 
indicate that responsibility for protection of community interests need not be invoked collectively, 
but rather any state other than an injured may also individually invoke responsibility. The ILC’s 
commentary on Article 48 is silent on this point. However, a contrary interpretation (that claims for 
protection of community interests may be brought only collectively) would significantly reduce 
actual possibility of applying Article 48. Moreover, such a reading of Article 48 would require 
further elaboration of procedural aspects of how such claims are to be brought. This in turn would 
                                                 
436 See ICJ: Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 115. 
437 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, p. 143, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [viewed 
2014, July 14]. 
438 See Akande D. The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of 
Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations? International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 46(02), 
1997. p. 309. 
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require the ILC to engage with institutional aspects of admissibility of claims the details of which 
are in lex specialis of each particular court or tribunal.  
At the same time it must be noted that collective invocation of responsibility remains a field 
that must be developed if the law of state responsibility is to evolve beyond its present archaic state. 
One of the criticisms of the invocation of responsibility to protect community interests has been that 
states would possibly engage in a kind of vigilantism or invoke responsibility of other states purely 
for political gain.439 Collective claims would at least partly mitigate this possible risk. Invocation of 
responsibility jointly by multiple claimants would by itself indicate that the claim seeks to protect 
wider interests rather than individual interests of one particular state. Procedural rules of most 
international courts and tribunals presently do not allow for such collective invocation of 
responsibility. For instance in accordance with Rules of the ICJ, if several states want to institute 
proceedings they have to bring separate claims which the Court may decide to join.440 
 
5.2.5. Requirement of nationality of claims 
 
Having clarified when the non-injured states may claim responsibility and under what 
circumstances, we now turn to more problematic aspects of invocation of state responsibility for 
protection of community interests.  Article 48 ends with paragraph 3 which states that the 
requirements for invocation of responsibility by the injured state elaborated in Articles 43-45 
(notice of claim; nationality of claim; exhaustion of local remedies, waiver) apply also to claims 
brought by a state other than an injured. Thus the literal meaning of paragraph 3 seems to suggest 
that also claims by non-injured states for protection of community interests need to satisfy 
invocation requirements of Articles 43-45 – including the requirement of nationality of claims. The 
ILC’s commentary on the provision is brief and simply restates that provision - that claims under 
Article 48 need to satisfy conditions of admissibility of claims which include nationality of claims 
and exhaustion of local remedies.  
The customary nature of the requirement of nationality of claims as such is undisputed.441 
The ILC’s Articles on Diplomatic Protection restate this customary rule in Article 3: the state 
                                                 
439 See McCaffrey S. Lex Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility. In: Weiler J. et al. (eds.), International Crimes 
of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989, p. 244. 
440 See Article 47 of the Rules of the International Court of Justice, April 14, 1978, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&p3=0 [viewed August 10, 2014]. 
441 Permanent Court of International Justice: Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.) P.C.I.J. Reports, 
1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 12. Among other cases of diplomatic protection see: La Grand (Germany v. United States of 
America) I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466; Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 
America) I.C.J. Reports, 2004, p. 12. 
 125 
entitled to exercise diplomatic protection is the state of nationality.442  In other words, only the state 
of nationality of the injured person is entitled to bring international claims to address the injury 
sustained by its national. However, when applied to claims for protection of community interests 
requirement of nationality of claims is puzzling to say the least. The very idea of Article 48 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility is that any state party to a treaty or indeed any member of the 
international community may institute proceedings when erga omnes partes or erga omnes 
obligations are breached. Moreover, the claimant state under Article 48 seeks to protect collective 
interests. Linking such a claim to requirement of nationality, which by definition points to 
individual interest to protect nationals, makes little sense.  
For instance, obligations under human rights treaties are owed to all other states parties and 
their aim is to protect collective interest, namely, human rights. Application of requirement of 
nationality of claims would mean that a state is entitled to invoke responsibility only when one of 
its nationals has been mistreated. Such a state would no longer act as a concerned member of the 
international community. It would invoke responsibility as an injured state which is specially 
affected by the breach, i.e., in accordance with Article 42. Thus the requirement of nationality of 
claims, if applied to claims by states other than the injured, in effect deprives these states of any 
possibility to invoke responsibility. 
So how is the requirement of nationality of claims to be reconciled with the very purpose of 
Article 48? So far very few opinions have been expressed on the matter.443 Among these probably 
the most prominent is the one expressed by Simma who touched upon the issue in his separate 
opinion in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda). When discussing 
the right of Uganda to institute proceedings in a situation where it could not establish that the 
abused individuals were Ugandan nations, he notes:  
“regardless of whether the maltreated individuals were Ugandans or not, Uganda 
had the right — indeed the duty — to raise the violations of international humanitarian 
law committed against the private persons at the airport. The implementation of a State 
party’s international legal duty to ensure respect by another State party for the obligations 
arising under humanitarian treaties by way of raising it before the International Court of 
Justice is certainly one of the most constructive avenues in this regard. 
                                                 
442 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), available at: 
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443 See Scobbie, I. The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of ‘Obligations under Peremptory norms of General 
international Law’. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, p. 1201; Vermeer-Künzli, A. A 
Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Protection and State Responsibility Erga Omnes. International and Comparative Law 
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As to the question of standing of a claimant State for violations of human rights 
committed against persons which might or might not possess the nationality of that State, 
the jurisdiction of the Court not being at issue, the contemporary law of State 
responsibility provides a positive answer as well. The International Law Commission’s 
2001 draft on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides not only 
for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State (which quality Uganda would 
possess if it had been able to establish the Ugandan nationality of the individuals at the 
airport) but also for the possibility that such responsibility can be invoked by a State other 
than an injured State.”444 
Thus Simma clearly supports the view that Uganda in principle is entitled to claim 
responsibility for violations of human rights, even if the injured individuals were not Ugandan 
nationals. Even more so, Simma specifically refers to the right of a state other than an injured in the 
Articles on State Responsibility, i.e., Article 48. Similar opinion has been expressed also by Gaja 
who notes that: “the requirement of ‘nationality of claims’ does not apply when a State other than 
the injured State is entitled to invoke responsibility. The first State asserts a collective interest, and 
this is hardly reconcilable with the application of a requirement derived from nationality.”445 
Considering the logical fallacy that would result from an interpretation that a state, which brings a 
claim to protect collective interest is entitled to do so only with regard to injuries to its own 
nationals (and thus in effect is unable to bring claims to protect collective interests), it is suggested 
that Article 48 is to be interpreted in such a way that nationality of claims requirement does not 
apply to claims by non-injured states. 
 
5.3. Serious breaches of peremptory norms 
 
A further way how the Articles on State Responsibility attempt to foster protection of 
interests of the international community is by providing for special consequences for serious 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms. The ILC long intended to discern between 
ordinary breaches and international crimes. However, the proposals of the 1996 draft Articles with 
Article 19 on international crimes as one of the central norms did not meet with approval of states. 
As a result, the ILC consented to give up the idea of international crimes. A faint reflection of that 
                                                 
444 ICJ: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. 
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445 See Gaja G. States Having as Interest in Compliance with the Obligation Breached. In: The Law of International 
Responsibility, Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 963. 
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idea, however, survived in a form of serious breaches under peremptory norms (Articles 40 and 41 
in the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility).  
The importance of peremptory norms is reflected in the fact that special consequences are 
attached to serious breaches of these norms. These consequences are laid out in Article 41 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility. Interestingly enough, these consequences do not take form of 
special or aggravated obligations of the responsible state and do not provide for any punitive 
elements.446 Instead Article 41 is formulated in terms of obligations of other states. These 
obligations are three: obligation of cooperation to bring the breach to an end (Article 41, para.1); the 
obligation of non–recognition of the unlawful situation (Article 41, para.2); and the obligations not 
to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation (Article 41, para.2). Since the 
adoption of the Articles on State Responsibility the ICJ has made some use of these provisions. In 
the Wall advisory opinion the ICJ formulated obligations in terms very similar to those contained in 
Article 41.447 More recently in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece 
intervening) the ICJ explicitly referred to the Article 41 and obligations of non-assistance and non-
recognition.448  
However, compared to what the ILC had envisaged as consequences of international 
crimes in earlier versions of the Articles (in particular that every state would be regarded as injured) 
the final version of Article 41 in terms of protection of community interests seems somewhat half-
hearted.449 As Paulus has noted: 
“Unfortunately, there is not much to these consequences: the duty not to 
contribute to violations of international law is not limited to jus cogens, but extends to all 
obligations stemming from general international law (see Article 16 of the draft articles). 
The recognition of a consequence of such a violation may well be regarded as a 
contribution to the violation and is thus already outlawed by Article 16 for the violation of 
                                                 
446 For analysis whether present international law recognizes any specific obligations that apply to serious breaches of 
peremptory norms see Tams C. Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible State? 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No.5, 2002, p. 1161. 
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“ordinary” rules. The only additional legal effect, apparently, is the duty of cooperation – 
a duty which is quite indeterminate and therefore weak.”450 
In addition a further limitation on the consequences of breaches of peremptory norms was 
adopted in the final version of the Articles. Namely, that these breaches have to be “serious”. Thus 
it is insufficient that a jus cogens norm is breached for the special consequences to apply – the 
breach has to involve gross or systematic failure to perform the obligation.451 This specific 
requirement is contentious and it seems to have no basis in state practice or in scholarly opinions. 
Peremptory norms embody the most fundamental values of the international community. It is 
difficult to imagine a situation where genocide, crimes against humanity or apartheid could be 
considered as “not serious”. The primary norms prohibiting these actions already presuppose severe 
gravity and systemic quality of the conduct. The reason for inclusion of this additional criteria very 
likely has more to do with pleasing anxious state representatives and securing their support for the 
Articles than with codification of existing custom or indeed, progressive development. As a result, 
the consequences of serious braches of peremptory norms as defined in Article 41 are a far cry from 
what the ILC initially intended. These consequences, as the Wall advisory opinion demonstrates,452 
do have a potential to contribute to protection of community interests since they acknowledge 
distinction between ordinary breaches and breaches that concern fundamental interests of the 
international community. However, it must also be acknowledged, that this contribution is a very 
modest one. 
 
 
5.4. Countermeasures of general interest 
 
The last notion that deals with protection of interests of the international community in the 
Articles on State Responsibility is the notion of countermeasures of general interest. In the 1996 
draft of the Articles countermeasures of general interest (also known as countermeasures by non-
injured states or collective countermeasures) played an important role in the ILC’s design for 
protection to community interests. In accordance with 1996 version of the Articles, if an 
international crime had been committed, all states were regarded as injured.453 Consequently, as 
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453 See Article 40 of the Draft Articles adopted by the International Law Commission, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 1996, Supplement No.10, UN Doc. A/51/10, at 131. 
 129 
countermeasures are defined in terms of a right of an injured state, all states (being injured) were 
entitled to resort to countermeasures, whenever an international crime had been committed. As 
already noted, in the 2001 version of the Articles, the notion of international crimes was dropped. 
As a result, only the directly injured states retained the right to resort to countermeasures. 
However, in the final version of 2001 Articles in chapter II on countermeasures the ILC 
nonetheless included Article 54 with an ambivalent statement that all other states (those not 
directly injured) may resort to lawful measures to ensure cessation of the wrongful act. 
Whether this means that also non-injured states may resort to countermeasures when an 
erga omnes obligation has been breached remains a contested topic. In the commentary to Article 
54 the ILC after examining state practice on countermeasures of general interest concludes that the 
practice remains “limited and rather embryonic”.454 From that the ILC goes on to conclude that 
“the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest 
is uncertain” and that therefore “at present there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement 
[...] to take countermeasures in the collective interest.”455 On the basis of this conclusion the ILC 
felt that it would be best neither to approve, nor disapprove the existence of a customary rule 
allowing countermeasures by a state other that an injured. Therefore Article 54 speaks only of 
lawful measures taken by other states (known also as retorsions – acts that are unfriendly, but not 
wrongful). Such wording seems to exclude countermeasures, which by definition are wrongful, but 
excused, as they are a response to a previous wrongful act of another state.456 Thus the ILC for the 
time being opted to leave the matter unresolved. 
The ILC’s handling of this issue has been criticized.457 Some authors argue that state 
practice on countermeasures of general interest is neither limited, nor embryonic.458 For instance 
Proukaki points to about thirty examples of countermeasures by non-injured states (in contrast, the 
ILC’s commentary mentions only eight instances).459 Whereas Alland rightly points out that with 
regard to other norms codified in the Articles the ILC has arrived to a conclusion that a customary 
rule exists on a basis of even fewer examples of state practice.460 More recent state practice 
continues to provide examples of states using countermeasures in response to breaches of 
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459 Proukaki E. The Problem of Enforcement of International Law. Abingdon: Rotledge, 2010. 
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communitarian norms. Asset freezes imposed by the EU and the US on top Belarusian officials, 
including President Lukashenko461, EU’s measures against Zimbabwe462 as well as measures by the 
EU, the Arab League and various states against Syria463 and Iran464 are among the notable 
examples. Similarly recent sanctions by the US, the EU and other G7 states against Russia in 
response to annexation of Crimea and instigation of unrest in eastern Ukraine only add to this list, 
indicating that states regard themselves as entitled to resort to countermeasures of general interest.  
However, equally important for the ILC’s decision to leave out countermeasures of general 
interest from the Articles on State Responsibility seem to be policy considerations. To put it 
simply, countermeasures as such (even when taken by an injured state) are widely regarded as 
crude and dangerous. They are manifestations of primitiveness of international law, “mechanisms 
of private justice that find their raison d’être in the failure of institutions”465 which offer no better 
solution than eye for an eye as the basic principle for settling disputes. In absence of institutional 
mechanisms for determining whether a breach of an erga omnes obligation has been committed, 
decision whether to resort to countermeasures is left for self-assessment of each state leading to 
“decentralized policing of an international ordre public”.466  This in turn makes countermeasures 
very susceptible to abuse by powerful states. Likewise, countermeasures may also lead to 
escalation of conflict rather than promote a settlement.  
In light of the above concerns the ILC had a very difficult choice to make. On the one hand, 
there is the subjectivism of self-assessment, risk of abuse and escalation of conflict. On the other 
hand it clearly seems unacceptable that a state would breach a peremptory norm and there would be 
no legal response from the international community. Given the difficulty that either of the choices 
would pose, the ILC opted simply not to make the choice.  It must also be pointed out that 
Crawford in his capacity as the Special Rapporteur suggested inclusion of countermeasures of 
general interest in two specific circumstances: when a directly injured state has invited another 
state to apply such countermeasures and when a serious breach has been committed and there is no 
                                                 
461 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation 
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injured state.467 Crawford’s proposal was provisionally adopted on a second reading, but was 
dropped due to objections from states.468 
 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
Having reviewed those elements of the Articles on State Responsibility which were 
intended to advance the cause of protection of interests of the international community several 
conclusions seem to be pertinent. An overall observation that may be made is that the ILC despite 
an obvious intention to provide mechanisms to protect community interests was unable to depart 
from bilateralist paradigm and private law notions. In other words, although the ILC aimed to 
introduce multilateralism into the law of state responsibility it did so by using bilateral private law 
constructs. In principle the relationship between the wrongdoer and the international community in 
the Articles on State Responsibility is accepted by recognition of obligations that the wrongdoer 
owes to the international community as a whole. However, for purposes of invocation, these erga 
omnes obligations actually are split into series of individual relationships between the wrongdoer 
and another individual state. Most importantly there is no invocation on behalf of the international 
community. Rather each concerned member of the community is meant to act as a private attorney 
general. 
Another general reflection on the outcome of the ILC’s work is that it suffered considerably 
from tension between what the original designs of Ago and other Special Rapporteurs envisaged 
and what governments were willing to accept. Adding and dropping elements to a design when 
construction is already underway is likely to spoil any structure. Removing the concept of 
international crimes was tantamount to dropping the central pillar – props were needed here and 
there to keep the structure standing. No wonder that some elements were no longer coherent.  
That being said, it must also be acknowledged that the ILC has made limited but 
nonetheless very important advances in transforming the law of state responsibility from 
bilateralism towards communitarianism. Firstly, it introduced the idea of “objective responsibility” 
- an indispensable requirement for all other communitarian notions that found their way into the 
Articles. This simple solution to omit injury as a precondition for responsibility seems complete 
and without a flaw, a concept which radiates the quiet elegance of not having something. It serves 
                                                 
467 See International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc 2000, A/CN.4/507/Add.4, para. 417. 
468 For comparison of all three versions of articles on countermeasures of general interest see: Crawford J. State 
Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 704. 
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as a doctrinal cornerstone which opens the way for other notions based on the public law paradigm, 
such as invocation by a state other than an injured. 
Secondly, the ILC articulated an indispensable follow-up to the Barcelona Traction 
pronouncement in which the ICJ acknowledged that some obligations are owed to the whole 
international community. If obligations are owed to the whole community, then members of that 
community ought to have a right to invoke responsibility for breaches of such obligations, even if 
they are not directly injured. Invocation of state responsibility by a state other than an injured 
established in Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility acknowledges existence of such a 
right. Importantly, the right to invoke responsibility by non-injured states significantly widens 
possibilities to bring claims for protection of community interests. 
As for the specific consequences applicable to serious braches of peremptory norms 
(Article 41), it is overall a positive that the ILC attempted to salvage at least something from the 
notion of international crimes. If not much else, Article 41 at least acknowledges distinction 
between ordinary breaches and breaches that concern fundamental interests of the international 
community. However, it must also be recognized, that in terms of actual consequences the 
distinction is barely noticeable. From three obligations mentioned in Article 41 which apply to 
serious breaches, two (obligation not to recognize the situation created by the breach and not to 
render aid) exist already on the basis of the primary obligations irrespective whether Article 41 
mentions them or not. The only added value of the Article 41 is the obligation on other states to 
cooperate to bring to an end any serious breach. On the one hand this obligation to cooperate in 
principle reinforces multilateralism and the public law paradigm. But on the other hand the 
obligation is so general that one may doubt whether it has any practical relevance. Certainly states 
shall cooperate, especially within institutional frameworks such as the UN, but what if they don’t? 
Are states in breach of this obligation to cooperate if the UN Security Council is blocked by a veto? 
If so, which states are responsible and who would be entitled to invoke responsibility?  In absence 
of state practice and judicial precedents that would spell out the details, the obligation of 
cooperation for the time being remains somewhat shallow.  
Having such unspecific and arguably weak consequences for serious breaches of 
peremptory norms is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First reason is that the tremendous 
intellectual energy that went into elaboration of the concept of international crimes failed to come 
to fruition that would leave a notable mark on state behaviour. With that failure a direly needed 
recognition that community interests and values require protection by means of effective legal 
mechanisms has been indefinitely postponed; the movement of international law “from sovereignty 
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to obligation”469 has been delayed. Second reason is that weak consequences for breaches of 
peremptory norms have a detrimental impact on authority of these norms. If consequences for 
breaches of peremptory norms are essentially no different from consequences of minor ordinary 
breaches, then what is the point in distinguishing peremptory norms? Not providing for meaningful 
consequences that would apply to serious breaches in effect deprives peremptory norms of their 
meaning. In this sense Allott might not have exaggerated when he noted that the ILC with Articles 
on State Responsibility has left a long term destructive effect on international law.470 
As for assessment of countermeasures of general interest, a helpful starting point is that 
states do in practice have recourse to such countermeasures. Recent state practice, such as 
sanctions against Belarus, Zimbabwe, Syria, Iran and sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and instigation of unrest in Eastern Ukraine demonstrate that states regard 
countermeasures of general interest as lawful responses to breaches of communitarian norms. 
Despite their considerable shortcomings it is difficult to see how the present international 
community with its frequently defunct international institutions (the UN Security Council that is 
often blocked by a veto and the General Assembly that is habitually reluctant to exercise its powers 
to recommend measures under Article 10 of the Charter) could fare without countermeasures of 
general interest. As crude and risky as they are, countermeasures of general interest often are the 
only viable means of enforcement. Unless a fundamental reconstruction of international law takes 
place with movement from sovereignty to obligation and institutions with actual enforcement 
powers, countermeasures of general interest are a necessary part of the puzzle of enforcement of 
international law.  
 
 
 
                                                 
469 Crawford J. State Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 307. 
470 Allott P. State Responsibility and Unmaking of International Law. Harward International Law Journal, Vol. 29, 
1988, p. 2. 
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6. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In this chapter the study explores some of the recently prominent trends in international law, 
such as constitutionalization and fragmentation, and enquires how these trends relate to the law of 
state responsibility as codified by the ILC. After examining the basics of constitutionalization and 
fragmentation respectively, we will consider whether responsibility rules, which were codified and 
sometimes progressively developed by the ILC considerably earlier than the discussed trends, 
adequately reflect these trends. Likewise we will enquire how the trend towards 
constitutionalization of international law impacts the balance between public and private law 
paradigms in the law of state responsibility?  
 
6.1. Basics of constitutionalization of international law 
 
The topic of constitutionalization of international law has been one of the favourites of 
international law scholars in the past two decades, and, as a result, a great deal has been said about 
it.471 There have been many attempts to define constitutionalization and unsurprisingly such 
abundance of opinions has led to a controversy as to the very meaning of the concept.472 However, 
in its very core constitutionalization of international law seems to refer to an academic and political 
agenda that advocates for the introduction of constitutionalist principles in international law.473 As 
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473 Peters A. The Merits of Global Constitutionalism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 16, 2009, p. 398; 
see also Peters A., Armingeon K., Introduction  - Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 
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Peters has pointed out, constitutionalization comes about as a result of “deliberate creation of 
constitutional elements in the international legal order by political and judicial actors, bolstered by 
academic discourse [...].”474 These constitutional elements, that international courts, organizations, 
scholars and sometimes states attempt to introduce, are a broad category as there is no strict 
definition what elements are constitutional. What seems to be clear is that constitutional elements 
have much to do with an agreement on core principles that the society agrees to live by. But is there 
such an agreement on common values of the international community?  
A regular response would be that the common values of the international community are 
reflected in jus cogens norms which impose obligations with an erga omnes quality. Similarly, 
Article 103 of the UN Charter makes a good candidate for embodiment of an agreement on a 
common imperative (namely, that the UN Charter obligations and principles prevail over other 
international treaties). Likewise, one may argue that sovereign equality of states was and still 
remains the backbone of the international legal system and therefore deserves a place among the 
imperative values of the international community. All of these elements imply existence of an 
agreement on the common good of the international community – recognition that these elements 
are important in order to protect common values and a basic framework constructed on the basis of 
those values. 
 By recognizing existence of shared values constitutionalism challenges the traditional view 
in which the international sphere is compounded of sovereign states and organizations created by 
them and in itself has no inherent qualities, apart from those bestowed on it by states - as Allot has 
pointed out “a sort of constitutional wasteland or Empty Quarter”475. Constitutionalism on the 
contrary suggests that international legal order has inherent qualities originating in common values 
that international society has agreed upon. In this basic meaning (namely, that constitutionalism 
relies on understanding of the common good) the concept is very close to the idea of public order.  
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national and international systems. A more workable approach seems to be to define essential elements of a 
constitutional system (rule of law; legitimacy; responsibility, judicial review, democracy) and then to consider how 
these elements might be introduced into international legal system. 
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Apart from an agreement on common values, constitutionalism also implies an agreement 
on the fundamental principles of how international society is to be governed.476 As Klabbers has 
noted:  
“[a] constitutional order has to do with the empowerment of political institutions and with 
control of these same institutions, by creating fundamental rights for citizens and a system 
by which courts and other institutions can keep each other in check. A constitutional 
order, in other words, is one which helps create public authorities, but at the same time 
limits the power of public authorities and sets out proper procedures for the institutions of 
governance to follow. Thus constitutions typically will have rules on how laws ought to be 
made, how disputes ought to be settled, and which institutions shall exist, and will also 
have rules on the sort of basic values (typically cast in the form of fundamental rights ) 
that no official action may encroach upon.”477  
This is a broad category of issues many of which are highly problematic in international 
law: absence of majority law-making even on issues crucial for survival of the international 
community (a state may not be bound to observe international obligations if it does not wish to 
accept these obligations); absence of courts with mandatory jurisdiction (all existing international 
courts derive their jurisdiction directly or indirectly from consent of states); absence of judicial 
control over the rudimentary enforcement mechanisms (such as UN Security Council measures 
under Chapter VII). All of these deficiencies of international law demonstrate a stark dichotomy 
between the public law paradigm (which ought to govern international law if it is to perform its 
function as law i.e., to deliver genuine fairness and effectiveness) and between the present reality of 
sovereignty based legal system.  
The constitutionalization project is also closely linked to the phenomena of fragmentation of 
international law i.e., a tendency of various specialized fields of international law (such as human 
rights, trade law, environmental law etc.,) to develop on their own resulting in possible collisions 
between them. Indeed constitutionalization may be seen as a response to fragmentation478 – an 
attempt to create a common framework within general international law that would allow 
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flourishing of specialized fields and resolve collisions (for instance conflicts of jurisdiction between 
specialized international courts).479  
But is constitutionalization really the answer to fragmentation, if each specialized field sees 
its values and objectives (protection of human rights as opposed to protection of free trade which in 
turn may be opposed to protection of environment) as the most important ones. Is it possible to 
agree on the core values that are shared by all specialized fields of international law at least on an 
abstractly philosophical level? Is there a meta-value of the legal system without which other values 
become meaningless? Without such a meta-value the whole project of constitutionalizing 
international law arguably becomes hollow as it lacks a core purpose.  It is submitted that such a 
core purpose indeed may be found in the same place as most other liberal legal ideas, namely, in 
Kantian philosophy – implying not only Kant himself, but also most modern liberal legal scholars 
who in different vocabularies and guises advocate for constitutionalization of international law.  
Although many modern Kantianism inclined scholars do not start their analysis at a level of 
lofty philosophical concepts, it is nonetheless possible to trace the protection of human dignity (in 
the widest sense of this concept) as being the meta-value of the international legal system. If we 
accept the existence of a meta-value of the international legal system, it may be helpful in 
interpreting the fragmented specialized fields, as whatever the collisions in any given case, the 
interpreter of legal norms has his or her eyes on the overall purpose of protecting the meta-value. 
Thus, constitutionalization of international law, despite controversies at the level of views and 
opinions on details, is indeed one that has sound philosophical foundations and in principle may be 
employed as a teleological tool to overcome fragmentation. 
 Besides setting basic values and principles constitutionalism also has a more elusive and 
subjective (perhaps psychological) aspect which is nonetheless crucial. As has been pointed out 
“[c]onstitutionalism [...] signifies not so much a social or political process, but rather an attitude, a 
frame of mind.”480 Similarly, constitutionalization may not be purely formal – to be genuine it must 
be politically legitimate, it must reflect actual will of constituents of the legal system (a somewhat 
complicated question in international law since states ultimately are not the real subjects of 
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international law, while the ultimately real subjects – human beings – often take very little interest 
in all things international).  
 It also has been noted that constitutionalism merely boils down to using a constitutionalist 
vocabulary.481 One may then enquire - why is it better than other vocabularies? Koskenniemi makes 
a point that institutions of constitutionalism (first and foremost the courts) are in themselves no 
better that institutions of economics, socialism or religion. Thus Koskenniemi suggests that 
constitutionalism in itself is a political project, no better that any other political project. This 
approach essentially questions whether there is something inherently good about law? Obviously 
law provides a framework in which to manage the society’s activities. But so do other frameworks – 
economic, social and religious. What is inherently useful (or perhaps good) about law is that society 
agrees that law is to govern interrelation of all the other frameworks of that society.482 Having been 
elevated to a status of a superior framework, the law offers a possibility to resolve conflicts between 
other frameworks of that society. Therefore it is true that constitutionalization is a political project 
just like any other, however, if recognized as a framework that governs all other frameworks, it 
offers predictability and means to reconcile conflicting preferences. 
  
6.1.1. How constitutionalization of international law may come about? 
 
Is constitutionalization a process that happens by itself as various actors respond to issues 
around them? Or is it a premeditated effort, an agenda purposefully pursued in a top-down manner? 
A formal constitution in a form of grand treaty adopted by majority of states seems a very unlikely 
scenario. States find it difficult to agree on far more mundane, less complicated and less relevant 
topics even when these are taken one at a time. Similarly, it is unlikely that any of the existing 
treaties could tender for the title of the constitution of the international community. The UN Charter 
would be a possible candidate.483 However, the Charter is rather limited in scope and primarily 
centered on maintenance of international peace and security as well as institutional setup of the UN.  
It does not deal with substantive human rights and it is difficult to envisage a constitution which 
omits this issue. Likewise, it is difficult to envisage how one would go about resolving such cases 
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as 1998 Beef Hormones case of the Appellate Body of the WTO484 (deciding whether precautionary 
principle – being part of environmental law, had any place in WTO law) on the basis of the UN 
Charter. Therefore, if constitutional elements do materialize in international law, they are likely to 
come only in specific sectors (e.g., in Loizidou v Turkey the ECtHR has stated that the ECHR is a 
“constitutional instrument of the European public order.”485 As noted elsewhere “global constitution 
will be a patchwork quilt, and will most likely be identified rather than written in any meaningful 
sense: a material rather than formal constitution.”486 
A material constitution in absence of a formal one seems to be a trend that has already 
materialized within the EU.487 Although a formal EU constitution in a form of Constitutional treaty 
was rejected by referendums in France and Netherlands in 2005, scholars have maintained that in 
fact the EU has entered a stage of constitutionalization long before any formal constitution was 
elaborated.488 The process of EU’s constitutionalization was initiated and subsequently rigorously 
advanced by the European Court of Justice, which developed some of its hallmark doctrines such as 
direct effect,489 supremacy,490 state responsibility for breach of EU law491 and implied powers.492 
Thus, constitutionalist doctrines could in principle be introduced and advanced by international 
courts.  
However, as Klabbers has suggested, such a model of introduction of constitutionalism (as 
exemplified by judicial activism of the ECJ) could hardly be replicated on a global scale for the 
simple reason that no international court (not even the International Court of Justice) is able to exert 
influence even remotely comparable to that of the ECJ.493 For one thing, the ICJ’s jurisdiction still 
lacks compulsory character. Perhaps with an objective of making sure that states continue to refer 
disputes to the Court, the ICJ generally tends to see international law as a horizontal legal system 
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based on consent of states.494 Thus rather that being an activist court, the ICJ is renowned for 
staunch orthodoxy (consider how it expressly recognized existence of peremptory norms only some 
40 years after the notion was included in the VCLT). Hence at present it is difficult to envisage that 
the ICJ would suddenly take up judicial activism on a scale comparable to the ECJ. Other 
international courts, as already noted, could (and in fact they do) champion constitutionalist notions. 
However, constitutionalism through judicial bodies of specialized fields leads law into 
fragmentation, which again leads us back to the need for resolution of conflicts between specialized 
fields – a function of constitutionalization of general international law. This function may be 
accomplished only by a court of general jurisdiction and one that is superior to other international 
courts, i.e., the ICJ. 
Perhaps another even more fundamental reason that differentiates the ECJ from ICJ and 
precludes replication of the former’s success, is that the EU members states regardless of their 
opposition to particular doctrines with constitutional implications (such as supremacy of EU Law) 
at all times remain loyal to the overall project and specific aspects of the EU integration, such as the 
common market. The creative activism of the ECJ at times has been far from popular among the 
EU’s member states. In fact many of the ECJ’s fundamental doctrines encountered fierce opposition 
from member states up to the point where, for instance, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
directly questioned the lawfulness of the ECJ’s judgments.495 However, regardless of their 
discontent, EU member states have really come to question their commitment to the overall project 
itself.  
 Is there such a common project that most members of the international community would 
subscribe to? Peremptory norms are a likely candidate that could attract an overall support. 
Humanitarian and diplomatic law are also likely to be generally acknowledged. However, the 
difference of the international community (compared to the EU) is that individual members seem to 
have very limited motivation in protecting common interests whenever those collide with their own 
individualistic interests. For instance, although there is a common commitment throughout the 
international community to prosecute acts of genocide, when it comes to actual prosecution even 
the five permanent members of the Security Council find it difficult to agree whether particular acts 
constitute genocide.496 Thus absence of clear motivation to pursue a common objective prevents 
states from supporting even minimal constitutionalist policies. This lack of political will is 
inevitably reflected in the judgments of global international courts such as the ICJ, indeed making 
courts an unlikely avenue for introduction of constitutional notions into general international law.  
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6.1.2. Pluralist constitutionalization 
 
If we look at the examples of constitutional trends in the practice of international courts and 
tribunals, we will observe that mostly all instances have taken place in regional or sectoral context 
(within EU, ECHR or the WTO systems). There is very little that could be regarded as truly global 
constitutionalization, i.e., constitutionalist ideas and vocabulary that would pertain to the 
universally applicable general international law. If some principles are developed within the EU, 
other principles in the ECHR and yet other principles within the WTO system, this sounds rather 
like fragmentation. If various international organizations on the basis of their constituent treaties 
(which may pursue markedly different values and goals) develop different constitutionalist ideas - 
how can such a process be regarded as a constitutionalization (considering that constitutionalization 
implies an agreement on universally applicable core values)?  
The answer offered by constitutionalists is that this process is still constitutionalization, but 
a pluralist constitutionalization.497 In pluralist constitutionalization constitutional ideas are indeed 
developed in specific regional organizations or in global organizations which deal only with 
specific area of international law, such as the WTO law. However, these various constitutional 
regimes do not preclude each other. Even more so, the same constitutionalist ideas may be found in 
various constitutional regimes, thus providing a basis for truly universal constitutionalization. If 
constitution is not embodied in a single instrument there may remain uncertainty as to what rules 
have been recognized as bearing constitutional status. The response from the legal doctrine has been 
that constitutionalization may be pluralist also regarding sources.498 The idea with pluralist 
constitutionalism is that informal constitution is founded on common values that are shared by the 
whole international society, such as some of fundamental human rights. Scholars supporting this 
version of constitutionalism suggest that an additional expression of state consent to endorse the 
particular rules as constitutional is simply unnecessary, since these rules anyway express 
universally accepted values.499  
A criticism that may be directed towards the notion of pluralist constitutionalization is that, 
although various constitutional regimes do not preclude each other and may develop in parallel, as 
the theory suggests, they may nonetheless also collide. As each competing constitutional regime 
struggles for prevalence of its values, it is questionable whether this struggle may be regarded as 
                                                 
497 For instance Peters notes that: “A “moderate” constitutionalist reading in no way implies a uniform, coherent world 
constitution, and certainly does not imply a world state. The idea is not to create a global, centralized government, but 
to constitutionalize global, polyarchic, and multilevel governance.” See Klabbers J., Peters A., Ulfstein G. The 
Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 346. 
498 Tomuschat C., International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, Recueil des 
Cours, 1999, 281, p. 9. 
499 Charney J., Universal International Law, American Journal of International Law, 1993, Vol. 87, p. 529. 
 142 
being an international constitution. However, what the struggle does is that it provides a forum for 
discerning and assessing competing values – a practice which is indispensable in the process of 
understanding which values are to be regarded as constitutional.  
 
 
6.1.3. Constitutionalization and global administrative law 
 
Another strand of ideas presented in the contemporary debate that attempt to deal with much 
the same issues as constitutionalism is the so called global administrative law. With Kingsbury as 
the most vocal proponent of this strand500, the global administrative law approach places emphasis 
on administrative principles to bring coherence to international law, rather that on universally 
accepted values (as constitutionalists do). Thus the global administrative law approach is relatively 
much more down to earth as it avoids the uncertainties and loftiness that constitutionalism 
inevitably invokes. Instead global administrative law resorts to procedural aspects and technical 
detail of administrative principles. Partly the global administrative law approach resembles what 
Koskenniemi advocated as culture of procedural formalism501 – an attempt to rein in holders of 
power not by persuading them about merits of virtuous conduct, but rather by persuading them to 
adopt certain procedural rules that would quietly steer actors away from abuse of the power that 
they hold.  
 One of the key criticisms of the global administrative law approach has been that it avoids a 
fundamental question of where do the global administrative principles derive their validity from? 
Several responses are offered to this question. Esty suggests that it is not really important whether 
the underlying rules are legally binding or not – the important point is that the principles are 
applied.502 Bogdandy offers to turn to constitutive documents of various international organizations 
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and look at legal procedures and administrative principles contained therein – principles that are 
shared among many organizations would be the contenders for the status of global administrative 
law.503 
 
6.1.4. Constitutionalization and universality 
 
Scholars have sometimes described the above discussed phenomena in terms of universality 
of international law (rather than constitutionalization). For instance Simma distinguishes three 
different understandings (or “levels”) of universality of international law.504 The first “classic” 
understanding of universality of international law means that “there exists on the global scale an 
international law which is valid for and binding on all states.”505 Within this meaning universality of 
international law implies universal validity. The second understanding of universality implies that 
international law is a unified, organized and coherent system. The third understanding of 
universality is the one that is most relevant in the context of constitutionalization – it refers to a 
view articulated by “universalist” tradition of international legal thinking. As noted by Simma: 
“A universalist approach to international law [...] expresses the conviction that it is 
possible, desirable, indeed urgently necessary (and for many, a process already under 
way), to establish a public order on a global scale, a common legal order for mankind as a 
whole.”506  
A sense of this type of universality may be glimpsed from the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
Yusuf and Kadi I cases where the CFI held that the UN Security Council is bound to respect jus 
cogens norms.507 Thus the CFI based its judgment on a premise of fundamental sense of unity of all 
international law – law that projects fundamental human rights above all other values.508 Again 
Simma expresses this point by noting that universality of international law implies:  
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“The expansion of international law beyond the inter-state sphere, particularly by 
endowing individuals with international personality, establishing a hierarchy of norms, a 
value-oriented approach, a certain “verticalization” of international law, de-emphasizing 
consent in law-making, introducing international criminal law, by the existence of 
institutions and procedures for the enforcement of collective interests at the international 
level – ultimately, the emergence of an international community, perceived as a legal 
community.”509  
These very same elements are often used as descriptions of constitutionalization. Thus both 
universality and constitutionalization of international law are indeed very similar if not identical 
concepts.  
  
6.1.5. Criticism of constitutionalization 
 
Being a vastly popular topic and one which is embedded with certain vagueness, 
constitutionalization has attracted considerable criticism. This section will provide only a sample of 
various objections to the concept that have been raised without any pretence to afford an exhaustive 
overview. Firstly, scholars have questioned the very need to employ the concept of 
constitutionalization. For instance Bodansky has enquired what are the actual descriptive and 
normative claims resulting from constitutionalism?510 Why not talk directly about limitations on 
state sovereignty, judicial review, majority law-making and binding jurisdiction of international 
courts – why cloak these developments under a cover of constitutionalization? Similarly, Simma 
has questioned the need to introduce the idea of constitutionalization on top of already existing 
notion of universality of international law.511 These authors suggest that one can discuss elements of 
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constitutionalization straightaway without introducing the vague notion of constitutionalization - 
using such an unclear concept may be more confusing than helpful.  
Constitutionalists respond that the value of the constitutionalist approach lies in its 
comprehensive nature, namely, that the different features of the constitutionalism are not merely 
additive, but that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.512 It seems like a good enough 
argument since introduction of an overarching concept heavily laden with perceptions of public 
order and rule of law may indeed produce certain side effects which were not initially intended. In 
the case of constitutionalization the side effect is that constitutionalist outlook invites adding of 
those constitutionalist elements which are missing from international law. Constitutionalist agenda 
might have begun with core issues of recognizing some inevitable limitations on sovereignty (e.g., 
invalidity of treaties that conflict with peremptory norms) but, since constitutionalization is 
recognized as actually happening, it invites consideration of other elements characteristic of 
constitutional orders such as judicial review (for instance, reviewing measures of the Security 
Council) and democracy (the so called democratic deficit in the exercise of powers of international 
organizations or equal representation of interests of nationals of various states).  
 A related criticism is that the very term “constitution” is inappropriate in the context of 
international law, since it invokes associations with domestic constitutions and thereby invites 
inadequately high expectations. Constitutionalism then attempts to profit from these positive 
associations and elevate the status of international law and perceive it as more developed that it 
really is. A related argument which exposes fictionality of international constitutionalism is that 
national constitutions are achieved by real life sacrifices and struggles, whereas international 
constitutionalism only has the facade invented by international lawyers.513  
Both of these arguments, if elevated to a more abstract level, assume that there is the reality 
of international law and a constitutionalist agenda which attempts to “sell” ideas which do not exist 
in the “real” international law. A response to these arguments may be that law as a phenomena 
exists within the realm of ideas. Therefore, just like any practice that states believe to be law 
actually becomes law, an idea that international law is based on certain constitutional principles in 
fact makes it a constitutional system. In other words, if we perceive international law as 
constitutional order, it becomes a constitutional order. Whether particular ideas of what the law is 
crystallize as a result of lengthy violent struggles is not that important; the important point is that an 
idea of what the law is becomes generally accepted. It may be accepted as a result of “real life 
sacrifices and struggles”, but it may just as well be accepted as a result of seeing that it really makes 
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sense e.g., to enforce universally binding measures to avert climate change, even if some states do 
not consent to these measures. 
A further criticism is that introduction of constitutionalist agenda in essence is a political 
project, which intentionally seeks to benefit from legal undertones. The critics distrust the “promise 
of the end of politics”514 and rather see the process as “constitutional conceits”515. 
Constitutionalization proposes what should be the imperative values, so in that sense it certainly is 
concerned with a political choice. At the same time the conceptual point of constitutionalism is to 
place law somehow above the politics. Response from constitutionalists is that law and politics are 
not meant to exclude each other, rather they are complementary systems. Law is a product of 
politics, while at the same time law determines the formal rules by which the politics are played. 
Politics get legalized and law politicized.516 The introduction of legal and even constitutional 
principles contributes to the stability of expectations, legal certainty, and equal treatment of the 
relevant actors.517 Constitutionalization, it is argued, is a juridical alternative to moralizing on the 
one hand, and to power politics on the other.518  
Another criticism is that there is no political will to bring about constitutionalism, and that 
there are no mechanisms to enforce a meaningful constitutional order. Therefore, as the argument 
goes, international constitutionalization is idealistic and is bound to remain only symbolic. This 
view asserts that states pursue nothing but their national interests; that even projects like human 
rights protection and international cooperation in various UN bodies are agreed to with an intention 
in some way or another to further national interest. In response constitutionalists argue that, 
although it indeed is mainly an academic project (thus admitting that political will may be lacking), 
they nonetheless emphasize that academic exercises also shape our view of law and thus also 
supposedly influence the exercise of power. For instance it has been noted that: 
“[t]hus global constitutionalism as an academic agenda should follow the middle 
path between merely dignifying the status quo and hanging on to academic pipe dreams. 
In order to gain acceptance in the political realm, global constitutionalists might highlight 
the current situation of global interdependance. With such state of affairs, national and 
global public interests tend to converge more and, increasingly, national interests and 
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universal idealism are not necessarily in opposition. Therefore, global constitutionalism, at 
least in the long run, may even further national economic and political interests [...].”519 
 Furthermore, there is the possibility that the project of constitutionalization with limitations 
on state sovereignty and increase of the power of international organizations would be used to 
further interests of certain groups (like multinational companies) at the expense of other groups, 
such as workers and developing countries.520 On this point constitutionalist scholars suggest that 
constitutionalization needs to be accompanied by a sense of responsibility, which admittedly is very 
difficult to capture in legal rules.521 The trouble with a response to such a criticism is that it 
concerns specific implications of constitutionalist agenda – a topic which requires reorientation 
from conceptual to detailed. As most of constitutionalist discourse is at a rather high level of 
abstraction, it struggles with a concrete prescription for ensuring accountability on international 
level.522  
A number of related criticisms directed towards the project of constitutionalization of 
international law are concerned with its questionable legitimacy.523 First, it has been argued that 
there is no global demos and therefore there can be no institutions that may exercise constituent 
power.524 Likewise, it has been suggested that constitutionalism is created by lawyers and courts 
and as such it lacks legitimacy and results in a kind of juristocracy.525 Yet another criticism is that 
constitutionalization is predominantly a European project, which claims to speak on behalf of the 
whole humanity, which may not be willing to accept the European viewpoint on values as a 
“paramount ethic of the global community”526. Constitutionalist response to these criticisms has 
been varied and need not be repeated here; for the purpose of this study the important point is rather 
to note the multitude of issues in the constitutionalist debate. 
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6.2. Constitutionalization and sovereignty 
 
One of the key aspects in the process of constitutionalization is the change in the role that is 
played in international law by the concept of state sovereignty. State sovereignty has been the 
cornerstone of post Westphalian international law system and therefore its current erosion (or 
perhaps evolution) in the context of constitutionalization merits particular attention. It has been 
suggested that the basic characteristics of modern states are four: a) permanent impersonal 
institutions; b) agreement on authority that decides; c) sovereignty of the state; d) that the authority 
that decides receives loyalty of its subjects.527 Among these, the most essential characteristic of a 
modern state has been that of sovereignty. Being independent externally and internally a classical 
sovereign state as elaborated by Hobbes in Leviathan has no authority above it and wields total 
power over its territory and all its subjects within that territory.528  Positivist scholars of 19th and 
20th centuries took this definition to an extreme and interpreted it as meaning that the sovereign is in 
fact above the law and is not bound by it. In 1922 Carl Schmitt, a fervent proponent of this view, 
famously observed that: “he who decides on the state of emergency [when application of law may 
be suspended] is sovereign”.529 Thus for Schmitt sovereignty was a concept that remained outside 
the legal system - the sovereign could decide when the law stopped operating.530 This view was 
even more aggravated by the idea propagated by some positivists that international law was not real 
law as it did not foresee sanctions.531 As a result, the sovereign (even of the worst kind, such as in 
Nazi Germany) could rule supremely and essentially disregard international law.  
Another strand of thought, propagated most notably by Alfred Verdross, postulated that 
sovereignty was a concept that operated within the legal system.532 In the context of international 
law sovereignty merely implied that states are independent from other states, but remain subject to 
the rules of international law. Presently this view has become the generally accepted standard.533 To 
express this vision of sovereignty modern international law proclaims sovereign equality among 
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states as the defining feature of the international community.534 States whether large or small, 
prosperous or poor, powerful or week - all are in theory equal.535 On this basis, as noted by 
Koskenniemi, the sphere of state’s liberty is delimited by spheres of liberty of other states: “[b]ut 
the delimitations of freedoms in this way requires that we do not rely on the self-definition of the 
members of their liberties. In other words, a State’s sphere of liberty must be capable of 
determination from a perspective which is external to it.”536 This resonates with modern 
constitutionalist outlook which holds that sovereignty is certainly not above the international law, 
but rather is contained within and defined by international law.537 
However, the community of these sovereign equals, at least up till the second half of the 20th 
century, may hardly be regarded as community in any real sense of this word. Each state pursued its 
own individualistic interests and any unification for a common purpose generally was ad hock, such 
as military alliances. As Cassese puts it, the international community in most of the modern era has 
been a “cluster of entities, separate and unconnected, which have been compelled by historic 
reasons to somehow live together in an uneasy cohabitation.”538 The rules that this community used 
for mutual interaction regulated only the barest essentials of coexistence such as law of treaties, 
exchange of diplomats and use of force. Most importantly, this international community had no 
methods for enforcement of the law apart from self-help of the injured state. Consequently, force 
could be used on any occasion to defend actual or perceived rights, including intervention to protect 
rights of other states. Unsurprisingly such a community has been beset by constant wars and 
therefore, at least with regard to legitimized violence, was no different from pre-Westphalian 
international societies.539 
Then starting with late 18th century several ideas gained prominence within states that left an 
impact also on the perception of what the international community ought to be like and how 
sovereignty ought to be exercised. First, the French revolution introduced the notions of liberté, 
égalité, fraternité540. These concepts introduced as guiding principles of public life within France 
had inevitable repercussions on the French outlook (and that of other states) on many international 
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maters and manifested as doctrines proclaiming equality of states, prohibition of slavery, non-
intervention in domestic affairs of other states and outlawing of aggression.541 Another important 
idea that came around by late 19th century was that of a nation state. The core of this doctrine was a 
conviction that the best way to organize a state is to build it on the basis of a single nation. The 
implication on the international community was that nations that were scattered among several 
states ought to unite into a single state (for instance Italy and Germany), whereas states uniting 
several nations (such as Ottoman Empire) ought to split up.  
One more important doctrine that impacted the international community and limited the 
confines of sovereignty was the doctrine of self-determination of peoples. It was voiced by the US 
president Wilson at the end of the First World War and also by communist thinkers such as 
Lenin.542 It had a significant impact on decolonization and the resulting increase in the number of 
states, and still continues to be one of the core principles of modern public international law.543 The 
development of the above mentioned ideas impacted the makeup of the international community, 
although, there was still very little of community as international law remained a law of coexistence 
rather than of cooperation. 
There have been several attempts to set up more advanced forms of cooperation in the 
international community, which potentially could have impacted the notion of state sovereignty, but 
all of these (in particular prior to the second half of the 20th century) have had only a very limited 
success. The starkly unsuccessful attempts include collective security systems designed by the 1648 
Treaty of Münster (that was a part of the so called Westphalian Peace Treaties), the 1815 Treaty of 
Paris, establishing the Holy Alliance by Austria, Russia and Prussia, and the 1919 League of 
Nations. The Treaty of Münster, as already noted in the first Chapter, attempted to constrain the 
rights of states to resort to war by prohibiting war for religious causes, providing for collective 
enforcement of obligations and a three year settlement period before force may be used.  However, 
these specific mechanisms were never used by states.544 A much more lasting legacy of the 
Westphalian Peace was the notion of sovereign equality, which in effect removed rather than 
imposed limitations on the use of force.  
After the Congress of Vienna, the so called Concert of Europe consisting of Austria, Russia, 
Prussia and latter also France attempted to resolve conflicts by diplomatic negotiations rather than 
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by war. Actually these states appropriated a right to intervene in conflicts, in particular to suppress 
any revolutionary movements. Whether this collective security system enhanced or limited 
sovereignty is a contestable matter, particularly because most of these movements were popular and 
democratic. Finally the League of Nations must be added to the above list. Although institutionally 
more advanced than previous attempts at collective security, it failed similarly to its predecessors, 
as it also lacked institutional mechanisms to enforce limitations on states and strongly depended on 
the good will of its members.  
The latest version of a collective security on a global scale is that established by the UN 
Charter. Its functioning has been considerably more successful than that of the League of Nations, 
as besides declaratory ideals it also reflects realities of power (even if somewhat outdated) in the 
form of veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council. With the adoption of the UN 
Charter two important developments have taken place, which directly pertain to the scope of state 
sovereignty.  First, the international community recognized the prohibition of the use of force. This 
crucial norm besides its other function of limiting violence is also directly aimed at safeguarding 
state sovereignty – it gives an additional normative protection to the concept of sovereignty as it 
prohibits the most common means by which sovereignty is violated. General acceptance of the 
peremptory character of the prohibition of the use of force is probably the single most important 
element in limiting sovereign rights and establishing basis for constitutionalization of international 
law. 
The second development that has taken place since the adoption of the Charter and which 
leaves a notable impact on the concept of sovereignty is the widespread recognition of human 
rights. Human rights limit what states may do within their territory and with their nationals. Some 
of those rights have acquired peremptory character. As a result of these developments, according to 
Tomuschat: “States live, as from their birth, within a legal framework of a limited number of basic 
rules which determines their basic rights and obligations with or without their will […]. One may 
call this framework, from which every State receives its legal entitlement to be respected as a 
sovereign entity, the constitution of international society or, preferably, the constitution of the 
international community [...].”545 These developments have led authors to suggest that international 
law does not only protect sovereignty, but also prescribes the limits of sovereignty.546 
In scholarly discourse the concept of sovereignty has attracted considerable criticisms, as it 
is regarded as the key element which is employed to resist attempts at developing the international 
community based on public order. It is sovereignty that allows states not to agree to any meaningful 
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regime to address the urgency of climate change;547 state sovereignty precludes other states from 
aiding civilians caught up in civil wars and being attacked by their own government;548 and it is 
sovereignty that allows states to exhaust their natural resources up to a point where environment has 
been utterly degraded.549 That being said, it must be added, that the debate also is not limited to 
simplistic condemnation of an orthodox legal concept. As already noted, sovereignty as a 
foundational element of international legal order plays a pivotal role in deterring hegemony. 
Moreover, to follow the indeterminacy argument advocated by Koskenniemi, where one would see 
sovereignty as the problem and community as a solution, someone else may see community as a 
disguise for empire and thus sovereignty as a solution.550 
Nevertheless, regardless of indeterminacy, there are merits of sovereignty that are likely to 
be acknowledged even by the staunchest of constitutionalists. The idea of a sovereign state has been 
the core concept which has made it possible for the present international community to come into 
existence and perform indispensable functions. Although there are many shortcomings that may be 
attributed to sovereign states, they do ensure some sense of legal order within their territories, they 
limit violence by establishing monopoly on the use of force, they also assume some responsibility 
for the actions of their nations (when their conduct is attributable to the state). Likewise on the basis 
of sovereignty states have created a system within which they can interact with each other in a 
predicable way, to adopt rules, to adjudicate disputes and at least to attempt to limit grossest forms 
of violence. And last but not least, the concept of sovereignty is the key normative safeguard against 
abuse of smaller states by hegemonic powers; whereas international constitutionalism may easily be 
employed for sidelining fundamental principles of international law with a purpose of furthering 
hegemonic agendas. 
However, regardless of its pros and cons, the concept of state sovereignty seems to be losing 
its position as a foundational norm of international law. As noted by Peters:  
“States are not ends in themselves, but are composite entities whose justification 
lies in the fulfilment of public functions needed for human beings to live together in peace 
and security. When human needs are taken as a starting point, the focus shifts from states’ 
rights to states’ obligations vis-a-vis natural persons, and a state that does not discharge 
these duties has its sovereignty suspended.”551 
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This process that has been termed as “humanizing of sovereignty” is the central element in 
the transformation of international law from a system centred on states to a system primarily 
centred on individuals.552 Throughout the 20th century states have gradually been loosing their 
previously unchallenged authority as the sole subjects of the international community. In particular 
in the last 50 years since the end of the Second World War international intergovernmental 
organisations  have slowly but surely established their presence in the international community. 
Although international organisations are created by states concluding a respective international 
treaty (and therefore in principle could be dismantled by an amendment or denunciation of the 
constitutive treaty) international organizations tend to amalgamate more authority over time. Thus, 
due to disagreements between states and officials with loyalty towards the organization rather than 
towards particular states, international organizations are often able to dominate over individual 
member states. This trend may be observed in a number of successful international organizations 
such as the Council of Europe, The European Union, the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
6.2.1. Limitations of sovereignty through international organizations 
 
Fundamental to the development of the international community has been the cooperation of 
states within international organisations. The times when international organisations merely 
provided a place of discussion and decision making for states seem to belong to the pre-UN era. The 
current day international organisations, supported by their own administrative structures and 
surrounded by a vast myriad of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and interest groups are by 
themselves important participants of international legal order, capable of shaping the behaviour of 
states.  
Considering that many of the problems of the current day world have outgrown the national 
boundaries553 and, therefore, require international regulation, the role of international organisations 
is only likely to increase. The possible future reforms of international organisations, influenced by 
what David Kennedy has called the “new age internationalism”554, can be expected to introduce 
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significant changes to the present understanding of state sovereignty and to propose endorsing 
international organisations with powers to legislate for the international community.  However, 
regulation of the behaviour of states by means of international organisations is directly linked to the 
fundamental question of whether state consent should remain the sole basis of all international law? 
Or whether the international community has reached a stage at which at least a limited form of 
international public order could limit the all-pervasive applicability of the requirement of state 
consent? Developments in the Security Council over the last decade provide evidence that states 
might have started to turn a corner in their traditional sensitivity towards any limitations of state 
sovereignty and consensual nature of international obligations.  
Thus on September 28, 2001 the Security Council in response to the attacks of September 
11 adopted Resolution 1373 on measures to combat international terrorism.555 The peculiarity of 
this resolution is that its provisions seem to be of legislative nature. Instead of providing for specific 
sanctions aimed at particular states or persons,556 the resolution provides for obligations formulated 
in general and abstract manner without geographical or time limitations. Szasz has noted that due to 
these peculiarities “a significant portion of the resolution can be said to establish new binding rules 
of international law – rather that mere commands relating to particular situation.”557 Although with 
the Resolution 1373 the Security Council rather explicitly assumed a competence of a legislator, the 
reaction of states towards this ground braking development was surprisingly welcoming.558 This 
most likely was due to the feelings of condemnation of the attacks of September 11, and also due to 
the fact that states in general had no objections to the substantive contents of the resolution. 
However, the fact that such a resolution was adopted in the first place, establishes a very important 
precedent to which the Security Council may return at some latter point in time. 
A more recent example of legislation by the Security Council is the Resolution 1540 
(2004).559 The resolution provided for a number of measures with regard to the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and imposed an obligation of states to adopt “appropriate laws and 
regulations” to implement these measures. Unlike with the Resolution 1373 (2001), this resolution 
raised objections of several states against the “increasing tendency of the Council in recent years to 
assume new and wider powers of legislation on behalf of the international community, with its 
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resolutions binding on all states.”560 However, despite these criticisms no state refused to comply 
with the resolution.561 
Both of these precedents as well as the overall approving reactions of states indicate that the 
Security Council could indeed be assuming some legislative functions. It certainly seems that these 
precedents were not singular exceptions, but rather heralded an emergence of a new category of 
international obligations. The President of the Council in April 2004 boldly confirmed this by 
noting that the adoption of the legislative resolutions constituted “the first major step towards 
having the Security Council legislate for the rest of the United Nations’ membership.”562  
However, it must be noted that powers of the Security Council to impose obligations is 
clearly limited by the UN Charter. The Council can impose binding obligations (as opposed to 
recommendations) only when it has determined existence of a threat to peace under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. “Threat to peace”, as already noted, is an evolving and expanding concept, which has 
come to include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, use of 
mercenaries, emergency situations and violent disintegration of states.563 Szasz has suggested that 
“massive assaults on international environment” could also be perceived as treats to peace.564 Such 
a wide formulation of “threat to peace” suggests that the Council could develop a practice of 
adopting Chapter VII resolutions to regulate a very broad range of issues. In the words of one 
commentator “taking initiatives along such lines the Council might, conceivably, become the 
worlds all-purpose legislature.”565 
However, regardless of what the Security Council is to become in the decades ahead, at least 
within the nearest future it is unlikely to function as an all-purpose legislator. First of all, the 
Council can successfully legislate only as far as the legislation reflects the general will of the states. 
If the Council adopts a resolution, which is disregarded by a majority of states, it is difficult to see 
how it could attain any enforcement. Secondly, the reactions of states to the adoption of Resolution 
1540 (2004) indicates that the Council’s legislation should only be employed as an emergency 
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method for cases when regulation is urgently needed and the traditional ways of creating rules of 
international law take too long. Finally, there are a number of issues concerned with the question 
whether the Security Council with its untransparent negotiation process and the restrictive rules on 
participation of specially affected states is the most appropriate organ of the UN to legislate 
international law. 
Another body that possibly could assume increased legislative powers and thereby decrease 
the role of state sovereignty and promote shared interests of the international community is the UN 
General Assembly. As the ICJ noted in the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons566 the General Assembly resolutions can have normative value as they provide evidence 
for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of opinio juris. Likewise in the Nicaragua 
case the Court held that the effect of consent to the text of Assembly resolution may be understood 
as an acceptance of the validity of the rules declared by the resolution.567 Moreover, an argument 
can be made that in cases where a formal undertaking is made by members to comply with a 
resolution, the application of the principle of estoppel leads to a conclusion that they are bound by 
the resolution, regardless of its originally non-binding character.568  
Consequently, as Sands notes “there appears to be no reason to exclude the possibility that 
the position taken by a member of an international organisation through its vote in favour of a 
recommendation could subsequently be opposed to that state as an expression of its legal position 
regarding the subject-matter dealt with in the institutional act – assuming of course that the latter 
has used normative, as opposed to purely recommendatory, terms.”569 Resolutions of the General 
Assembly on large scale driftnets demonstrate the above described effects. On December 22, 1989 
Assembly adopted Resolution 44/225, which called for moratorium on large scale driftnets by June 
30, 1992. In 1990 and 1991 it adopted Resolutions 45/197 and 46/215 respectively, both of which 
reaffirmed the initial resolution and called for its full implementation. Commentators have 
expressed views that due to these resolutions the prohibiting on the use of large scale driftnets has 
acquired the status of a customary norm.570  
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Whether it may be the Security Council or the General Assembly, the above discussed 
trends indicate that understanding of sovereignty is undergoing erosion or certain evolution. 
Possible limitations to sovereignty that may only be envisaged on the global level are in fact already 
operational at some regional organizations. The most marked example of sovereignty limitations 
and indeed transfer of sovereignty from states to an international organization is that of the 
European Union.571 The ECJ in its pivotal judgment Van Gend&Loos famously observed that the 
European Community created by the 1957 Rome treaty572 “constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.”573  
Presently, some 56 years later, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union574 
(TFEU) in Article 3 spells out that the Union’s institutions have exclusive competence with regard 
to customs union, monetary and commercial policies, marine resources, fisheries and competition. 
The EU is endowed with the Commission which monitors observation of the EU law and if 
necessary institutes infringement proceedings against non-compliant member states in the ECJ. The 
jurisdiction of the ECJ is compulsory and infringement proceedings may result not only in lump 
sum to compensate the damage caused by the breach but simultaneously also in penalty payment.575 
The ECJ has explicitly recognized that the infringement proceedings against member states perform 
a public law function of ensuring general and uniform observance of the EU law.576 Thus the EU 
provides an example of a rather developed public law paradigm approach with multiple layers of 
legal relationships between the community and the responsible state. A breach of the EU law may 
result in invocation of responsibility: 1) by the injured state; 2) by any other state that is concerned 
by the breach; 3) by the Commission on behalf of the EU; and 4) by injured individuals in national 
courts of the member states. In some of these actions applicants may claim punitive measures (in 
the form of penalty payments), while all of the above claims are subject to compulsory jurisdiction 
of either the EU or national courts. The example of the EU demonstrates that limitations of 
sovereignty in law-making may be supplemented by further limitations of sovereignty with regard 
to enforcement of law. The EU states are not only bound by legislation which in many aspects is 
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majority lawmaking, but also they have no option to opt out from adjudication and enforcement. 
The resultant legal system is one that provides for an elaborate public order and is strictly based on 
the rule of law.  
 
6.2.2. Sovereignty and individuals as international actors 
 
 Besides states and international organizations several other actors have been recognized in 
international law as being members or at least semi-members of the international community. 
Among these are colonial peoples with a right to external self-determination, peoples that have a 
right to internal self-determination, national liberation movements, non-governmental 
organizations577 and most importantly individuals as bearers of fundamental rights and international 
criminal responsibility. All of these actors in pursuit of their agendas actively encroach on state 
sovereignty and to some extent compete with states for political and legal authority.578   
Among these actors the most prominent role has been played by individuals. This 
development has predominantly taken place within the broader process of recognition of human 
rights. Scholars adhering to constitutionalist perspectives, however, make a further argument that 
the ultimate international subjects are individuals rather than states.579 Accordingly, also the 
ultimate normative source of international law, as suggested by constitutionalist scholars, is 
humanity and not sovereignty.580 Such an approach does away with the present mainstream opinion 
that only states (being the exclusive creators of international law) deserve to be regarded as the only 
real subjects of international law. This approach is not fundamentally new as scholars in 1930ties 
made somewhat similar arguments.581 Thus Lauterpacht famously noted that: “individual is the 
ultimate unit of all law, international and municipal.”582  
What is new in the contemporary debate is that modern day constitutionalists argue that 
since individuals are in ultimate terms the real subjects of international law, they ought to have 
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attributes characteristic of legal subjects, i.e., rights to bring claims and in some form also take up 
obligations or even make law.583 For instance Peters suggests that the role of individuals in 
international society has changed to an extent that individuals “have in legal terms become active 
legal subjects and in political terms transnational citizens.”584 She finds evidence for this in the fact 
that individuals (mainly through NGO’s) enjoy certain rights of participation in international legal 
process (for example, participation rights provided in a soft-law form in the World Bank safeguard 
policies to persons affected by the projects financed by the World Bank)585 and notes that 
participatory rights “are at least on the halfway point between merely having rights and making law, 
and blur the line between law-producers and bystanders.”586  
Another way how individuals participate (although indirectly) in the law-making process is 
by initiating claims in international courts. Individual claims, as demonstrated by the ECJ, may 
provide a very fertile ground for developing law through adjudication. The most notable example, 
apart from the EU law, allowing claims by individuals is the system set up by the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms. However, there are several other such 
systems both at regional level (Inter-American Human Rights Court), as well as mechanisms at 
global level (such as the mechanisms under ICCPR and the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the 1964 Washington Convention587). All of these 
mechanisms leave a dent on the notion of sovereignty as states besides having to observe their 
primary obligations under applicable treaties, are subject to jurisdiction of judicial bodies in which 
the line between interpreting and making rules at times may become very thin. As noted by 
Bogdandy, the decisions of international judicial institutions increasingly: “have effects beyond 
individual disputes.  They exceed the confines of concrete cases and bear on the general legal 
structures.  The practice of international adjudication creates and shifts actors’ normative 
expectations and as such develops legal normativity.”588 This phenomena is accompanied by a 
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frequent trend amongst states themselves to treat judicial decisions as primary sources of 
international law.589 
However, constitutionalist scholars also raise a conceptual objection to the idea that the 
above discussed procedural powers (to bring international claims and somewhat participate in law-
making) are the right criteria for determining subjects of international law. They object to the 
classical notion, famously expounded by Kelsen, that individuals are only semi-subjects of 
international law to the extent that they possess particular international procedural rights 
independently of states.590  Constitutionalists dismiss this view as overly positivist, in which the 
only valid criteria for defining law is existence of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms.  
According to constitutionalists, availability of sanctions is not an indispensible element as long as 
there is some form of remedy available – individuals under general international law may not be 
entitled to bring international claims freely, however, they have other venues to protect their rights 
– for instance to bring claims in domestic courts or to employ other remedies such as compliance 
and complaints mechanisms under various international treaties.591 The mechanism under Aarhus 
Convention on Environmental information592 (with its compliance Committee which reviews 
complaints submitted by individuals as well as by NGOs) provides an example of such an 
alternative remedy.  
A side effect of the elevation of the status of individuals and the correlative erosion of state 
sovereignty is demonstrated by the principle of responsibility to protect.593 Although responsibility 
in name, this concept stands apart from all other responsibility norms (the so called secondary rules 
that become operational only when a primary rule is breached). Responsibility to protect in contrast 
is a primary rule. The idea behind the notion of responsibility to protect is that sovereignty is 
coupled with certain obligations, specifically - to protect people in its territory from mass atrocities. 
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If a state fails to perform this obligation other states have an obligation to intervene and insure that 
gross atrocities are not committed.594  
The development of the responsibility to protect doctrine is fascinating from the 
constitutionalist perspective as it shifts some of the basic assumptions of the sovereignty based 
international law. The starting point of the analysis in application of the responsibility to protect is 
whether inhabitants of a particular state are in need of protection from mass atrocities. Such an 
approach marks a distinct departure from the outlook of traditional international law, which is 
premised on the Lotus principle - states may act as they please as long as the conduct does not 
violate explicit prohibition contained in international law.595 The responsibility to protect reorients 
the focus from state’s rights and freedom of action to a general obligation towards its population as 
well as towards the international community. Secondly, the responsibility to protect may be 
conceptualized as a form of a social contract between a state and its population. The sovereignty of 
a state holds only as long as the state performs its essential function to avert mass atrocities. If it 
fails to perform this obligation, its sovereignty is suspended and the international community is 
entitled and indeed under obligation to step in and stop the atrocities.  
 
6.3. Constitutionalization and state responsibility 
 
What effect the above discussed constitutionalization and the phenomena of erosion of state 
sovereignty has or ought to have on the rules of state responsibility? The first and very obvious 
consequence of the erosion of state sovereignty is that more often conduct on international stage is 
performed by actors other than states (predominantly international organizations but increasingly 
also transnational corporations).596 Accordingly, these actors are also more likely to be involved in 
breaches of international law. Thus NATO may unlawfully bomb some third country, the Security 
Council may adopt resolutions that violate individual human rights, the EU may breach the WTO 
rules, garments factory in a developing country may violate fundamental human rights or private 
security company may breach humanitarian law. In all of these cases state responsibility may not be 
the primary mode of international responsibility. They may be adjudicated as cases of responsibility 
of international organizations or responsibility of private law companies in national courts.  
However, leaving state responsibility out altogether and instead addressing possible claims 
solely on the basis of responsibility of international organizations or transnational companies may 
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create a gap in legal protection of the injured. It would also possibly allow states, which had 
procured or at least were complicit in the breach, to avoid responsibility. To reflect the reality of 
transfer of powers to actors other than states, international law must provide mechanisms for 
responsibility of those actors. However, international law must also ensure that states themselves do 
not evade responsibility by acting through other actors. The problem of states hiding behind 
international organizations is particularly pertinent due to lack of international litigation 
mechanisms in which claims against international organization may be brought.597 An additional 
layer of issues arises with regard to joint responsibility of states and organizations.598 
 
6.3.1. State responsibility and international organizations 
 
The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO)599 attempt to 
address some of the above issues.  The Articles provide not only for responsibility of organizations 
(including in connection with acts of states), but also for responsibility of states in connection with 
the conduct of international organizations.600 Specifically Articles 58-60 of ARIO provide that a 
state performs an internationally wrongful when it aids, assists, controls, directs and coerces an 
organization to perform an internationally wrongful act.601 In addition ARIO provide for Article 61 
which attempts to catch cases where states would circumvent their obligations by causing an 
organization to perform a breach.602  
Also provisions on attribution of conduct play a central role in determining whether a state 
is responsible for its conduct when it acts within a framework of an international organization, for 
instance, in a UN peacekeeping operation. Judicial practice on this issue remains limited with the 
ECtHR providing most of existing precedents. The principal rule suggested by the ILC in Article 7 
of ARIO is that of “effective control”. In accordance with this provision the conduct of an organ of 
a state that is placed at the disposal of an international organization is considered to be an act of the 
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organization only if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct. As the effective 
control test is rather hard to satisfy, the provision tilts in favour of having states rather than 
organizations responsible. From the constitutionalist perspective the provision is a welcome 
development as it ensures a greater possibility for injured individuals to attain remedy, which may 
be altogether absent if conduct is attributed to an organization, such as the UN. The controversial 
Behrami and Saramati judgment of the ECtHR illustrate this point.603 The ECtHR found that the 
contested conduct was attributable to the UN for the reason that the UN had “ultimate authority and 
control” over the conduct. As the result the Court did not have jurisdiction and the injured 
individuals had no possibilities of judicial redress. If, however, the Court would have applied ILC’s 
“effective control” test it would have found that the UN had no such control over French, German 
and Norwegian troops during their deployment for the UN missions and consequently that the 
conduct was attributable to the respective states. After a barrage of criticisms604 in subsequent Al-
Jedda decision the ECtHR explicitly acknowledge ILC’s “effective control” test as the valid 
measure for determining attribution.605 However, it also managed to refer to its earlier “ultimate 
authority” approach, thus leaving the question unresolved as to what in its opinion is the right 
approach.  
Another problem with the responsibility of international organizations is that member states 
may have varied amount of rights in the organization and accordingly some member states may 
have greater influence over the organization. A manifest example is the UN where the permanent 
members of the Security Council wield not only much greater de facto political power but also 
formal power in the form of veto rights. Similarly, realities of economic might, size of territory, 
population and other indicators of power are given formal acknowledgment in the internal rules of 
other organizations, such as the European Union. Still in other organizations where formally the 
voting rights are equal often take important decisions informally (for instance WTO) effectively 
sidelining smaller states. 
Considering this de facto inequality, a question arises whether such disparities are reflected 
in the rules governing the responsibility of organizations. The short answer is “no”. The ILC’s 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations do not deal with allocation of 
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responsibility within the organization leaving it to the lex specialis of the organization itself.606 The 
seeming injustice stemming from the fact that general responsibility rules do not attend to the finer 
details of allocation is somewhat reduced by the fact that in most cases the powerful states will also 
have more to loose than small states if the organization is held responsible, for one thing, the they 
are likely to be contributing more to the budged of the organization from which the eventual 
compensations would be paid.  
 Furthermore, there are several elements of constitutionalist outlook that may in principle be 
contemplated with regard to responsibility of international organizations. One such element is to 
widen the scope of entities that are entitled to invoke responsibility of international organizations. 
The EU provides a good example of how this may be done: in the Van Gend&Loos judgement the 
ECJ famously proclaimed that not only states but also individuals are subjects on the legal 
system.607  Article 340 of what is now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives 
substance to this idea by providing that the EU institutions have both contractual and non-
contractual liability, which as interpreted by the ECJ may be invoked by injured individuals or 
companies.608 On the level of general international law such a rights may be contemplated only as a 
distant lex ferenda. Even in fields that are relatively more developed than general international law 
(such as the WTO law) invocation of responsibility by individuals is far from being accepted. Thus 
WTO Panel deliberately contrasted the WTO law to the EU law and stated that “WTO did not 
create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or members and 
their nationals.”609 
Another indispensible principle from a constitutionalist perspective (besides the rights of 
individuals to invoke responsibility of international organizations) would be judicial review of acts 
of organizations. In some respects judicial review performs a function similar to claims of 
responsibility - both judicial review and claims of responsibility may catch violations of law. The 
peculiarity of judicial review, however, is that it may result in proclaiming an act in question null 
and void, thus automatically rectifying the legal position of any number of affected individuals. 
Presently it is only the EU that places such an advanced form of constitutionalism inspired 
mechanisms at disposal of individuals. Although the ECJ has been greatly criticized for its 
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restrictive approach to locus standi of individuals willing to challenge legality of EU’s acts,610 the 
fact remains that no other international organization has anything that would even remotely 
resemble judicial review mechanisms accepted within the EU. In other international organizations 
such possibilities are considered only as a matter of lex ferenda.611  
 
6.3.2. State responsibility and international standing of individuals 
 
Increasing prominence of individuals as direct holders of international rights, as already 
noted, is an important part of the constitutionalist agenda. To make those rights meaningful 
international law ought to provide for mechanisms of their enforcement. Unsurprisingly, 
constitutionalist scholars argue that state responsibility “should move further beyond a purely inter-
state responsibility.”612 Primarily this would mean that international conventions that establish 
obligations of states to provide effective remedies in cases where rights of individuals are breached 
(a typical obligation included in many human rights treaties), would be interpreted as providing 
obligations owed directly to effected individuals. Such an elevation of individual’s role would be a 
clear indication of a shift towards the public law paradigm, as it endorses the most progressive 
modality of invocation of state responsibility. In this scenario invocation of responsibility is 
entrusted directly to the effected individuals who are likely to have strong motivation to vindicate 
their rights and to pursue their claim, upholding legality as a by-product of protection of their 
individual interests.  
To suggest that a right of individuals to directly claim state responsibility would be accepted 
as a matter of general law of state responsibility seems like an unrealistic proposal (states have 
amply demonstrated that they are not willing to accept even far less courageous propositions – 
consider the above discussed rejection of the notion of state crimes). Such trends are currently 
present only in specific sectoral treaties like the ECHR and the Aarhus Convention613 among states 
that are more willing to promote international standing of their nationals. It seems paradoxical that 
states being a legal fiction conjured for the purpose of management and representation would be 
unwilling to accept remedies established for the benefit of their own nationals.  
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611 For suggestions on the possible accountability mechanisms see Wellens K. Remedies against International 
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 Similarly, the constitutionalist outlook invites us to consider a closely related topic – 
whether the requirement of nationality of claims which severely limits possibilities to protect 
injured individuals ought to be reconsidered. 614  The requirement of nationality of claims, famously 
pronounced by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
case, is widely recognized as a customary rule.615 Its essence is that the state entitled to exercise 
diplomatic protection is the state of nationality.616 As already noted earlier, there seem to be good 
reasons why the requirement of nationality of claims is inappropriate with regard to claims for 
protection of community interests under Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility, including 
claims for protection of fundamental human rights. The very purpose of Article 48 is to ensure that 
any state party to a treaty or indeed any member of the international community may institute 
proceedings when erga omnes obligations are breached. Human rights norms that have customary 
nature and impose obligations erga omnes apply regardless of nationality of the injured. Why then 
only the state of nationality may bring international claims? The age old rational that injury to 
nationals is an injury to the state is anyway a fiction, which does not outweigh the interest of the 
community of states as a whole to enforce protection of human rights.   
Another related issue that international constitutionalism seems to question is whether states 
have a duty to exercise diplomatic protection (as opposed to the traditional view that diplomatic 
protection is a right). Special Rapporteur on diplomatic protection Dugard had proposed that states 
had duty to exercise diplomatic protection in certain cases. Those would be cases when a serious 
breach of a peremptory norm has occurred and the injured individual, after being unable to bring the 
case before national or international courts, requests the state to bring an international claim. 617 The 
ILC dismissed this proposal, noting that international law does not recognise such an obligation. 
From the constitutionalist perspective recognition of state’s obligation to exercises diplomatic 
protection would be a very welcome development, as it would contribute to protection of human 
rights and thus facilitate one of the core objectives of constitutionalization.618 
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6.4.3. Transnational corporations and state responsibility. 
 
With the advent of globalization (primarily globalization’s economic aspects of free trade, 
free movement of capital and in particular foreign investment) some companies have become global 
players with assets and business operations all over the world. Some of these companies (most often 
referred to as transnational corporations or multinational corporations619) have higher profits than 
annual budgets of smaller states.620 Transnational corporations have wide-ranging interests the 
world over and inevitably attempt to influence national and international policies to suit these 
interests. Smaller or poorer states in particular may find it hard to deal with the economic might of 
transnationals and thus may succumb to their pressure (the same would be true also with larger 
states with poorly established rule of law). This phenomena is further aggravated by the tendency to 
privatize functions that have historically been in the domain of states621 (consider the role of private 
military companies in Iraq and Afghanistan wars). As state functions are transferred to private law 
entities, it is important that the transfer does not serve as means to evade responsibility. Therefore it 
is imperative that transnational corporations may be held responsible also at an international level 
where NGOs or other states would intervene and where at least somewhat impartial judicial forum 
would be available.  
The first practical step necessary to facilitate responsibility of transnational corporations at 
an international level is to recognize their international legal personality. Some scholars argue that 
transnational corporations already possess an international legal personality.622 However, there is no 
international law (hard law as opposed to soft law) that would impose international obligations on 
transnational corporations. As for soft law, there are several documents, most importantly the 
OECD’s “Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises”623; and “Norms of the Responsibilities of 
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Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises” by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.624 
The present ILC work on international responsibility (Articles on State Responsibility and 
the ARIO) does not deal with responsibility of transnational corporations. The reasons for not 
addressing issues pertaining to transnational corporations (and thus not reflecting the reality of their 
rise) are several. First and foremost, the existing ILC codifications are concerned with other subject 
matters, namely responsibility of states and of international organizations. As these topics are 
complicated enough on their own, it is understandable that the ILC did not whish to overburden 
their drafts with additional controversial issues. Within the Articles on State Responsibility and 
ARIO transnational corporations are not even mentioned, apart from the commentary to the Articles 
on State Responsibility where the ILC envisages cases where conduct of transnational corporations 
may be attributed to states. Seemingly insignificant, however, the possibility of attribution of 
corporation’s acts to states (by means of Article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility) provides 
an avenue whereby corporation’s unlawful conduct may be reviewed in international litigation. 
 One of the most significant proposals with regard to the responsibility of transnational 
corporations has been to consider that transnational corporations would be regarded as direct 
addressees of human rights treaties. This is a somewhat radical proposal, as human rights treaties (at 
least judging by the ordinary meaning of their texts) are addressed only to states themselves. Such 
an approach also risks triggering an unwelcome attitude from states where states may feel relieved 
of their human rights obligations, since corporations are responsible. Thus admission of 
responsibility of transnational corporations risks shifting the burden from states to transnational 
corporations. 
 A development that would be welcome from constitutionalist perspective is recognition of 
corporate criminal responsibility. At this point international law does not provide for corporate 
criminal responsibility, as the whole body of international criminal law addresses only 
responsibility of individuals. 625 There are no precedents of prosecutions of corporations at any 
international court or tribunal.626 As in national legal orders the debate on corporate criminal 
responsibility canters around problems in determining the subjective aspect of crimes i.e., whether 
and how the intent may be established. Jorgensen has suggested that the notion of corporate crime 
may be used as a “general principle of law” and thus brought into international law even without 
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specific developments in positive law.627 Even if true, (which is questionable as there seems to be 
no universally and uniformly accepted notion of criminal responsibility of corporations in national 
legal systems) the recognition of principle itself is still a long way off from international 
prosecution of corporate entities. 
 
 
6.4. Basics of fragmentation of international law. 
 
Another phenomenon that has attracted considerable attention in recent years is the 
phenomena of fragmentation of international law.628 The concept has to do with specialization and 
technicality of specific fields of international law. The problem at the root of the fragmentation is 
that each field, for instance human rights, trade law, environmental law, criminal law or the EU law, 
(and institutions of that field) tends to see itself as more relevant that other fields (and institutions). 
For example, when a human rights lawyer is dealing with a case that involves aspects of both 
human rights and, for example, trade law, he or she will tend to see the human rights aspect as the 
more important one. Similarly, when the European Court of Justice is engaged with a particular 
issue, such as the law of the sea and the EU law proper, it will likewise prefer its own perspective 
and regard the case as an EU law case.629 As has been noted with regard to fragmentation: 
“[i]ts connotations are clearly negative: something is splitting up, falling apart, or 
worse: bombs or ammunition can be designed to fragment and thus become even more 
destructive. In international legal parlance, the term has gained such prominence out of the 
fear that international law might lose its universal applicability, as well as its unity and 
coherence, through the expansion and diversification of its subject-matters, through the 
development of new fields in the law that go their own way, and that legal security might 
thereby suffer.”630 
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Fragmentation reflects the fact that there is, in the words of the ILC, no “single legislative 
will behind international law”631. The result is that specialists of each field pursue agendas of their 
own field (without much consideration for the larger picture) and when this has been going on for 
some time international law ends up being split into separate and possibly conflicting regimes. 
When it comes to a particular dispute, a question arises - which regime to apply?  As Koskenniemi 
has noted, the choice of the frame will determine the decision, but for determining the frame there is 
no meta-regime, directive or rule632. Thus “in a world of plural regimes, political conflict is waged 
on the description and re-description of aspects of the world so as to make them fall under the 
jurisdiction of particular institutions.”633 As a result, various fields compete for institutional 
supremacy. They do that by disguising essentially political choice as to which field must prevail, by 
technical re-description of the issue in their particular specialist language. Koskenniemi’s main 
objection to such an approach seems to be that legal experts rub on themselves a little of stardust 
that emanates from the grand word “law”, even when in reality they will be making political 
choices. However, such an approach is hardly objectionable as long as the law embodies values of 
the international community. If the law does embody the values and preferences of the community, 
a legal expert will not resolve the issue in accordance with a free roaming discretion but will decide 
in accordance with the values embodied in the rules. But here we come full circle back to the 
problem of collision of values and a question arises whether the international community has 
identified its meta-values? 
On an apparent level fragmentation is occurring due to substantive increase in a number of 
law-making treaties that address the same issues from different perspectives. On a deeper level it 
has been suggested that fragmentation is a result of a “transposition of functional differentiations of 
governance from the national to the international plane.”634 On national level these differentiations 
are unlikely to cause considerable difficulties as the vertical structure of governance, constitution 
and possibly also a constitutional court will resolve any differences and make an authoritative 
pronouncement which field and accordingly which values are to prevail. International law on the 
other hand, lacking these elements of centralization, is unable to settle such conflicts. Although 
general international law, as observed by Schachter: “serves as a highway between otherwise 
isolated villages of international trade law, international human rights law, international 
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humanitarian law, international criminal and other branches of international law”,635 it is unable to 
provide a definite resolution as long as there is absence of hierarchy of international institutions. 
Fragmentation is also closely related to constitutionalization. Fragmentation demonstrates 
the need for constitutionalization. However, constitutionalization may also appear as a disguised 
attempt to dominate and thus provoke a counter reaction that it was initially intended to 
overcome.636 Fragmentation is, after all, the result of a conscious challenge to the unacceptable 
features of that general law and the powers of the institutions that apply it.637 It is the specialized 
fields which often are more refined and coherent that the general international law and which 
provide blueprints for possible developments at universal level. Indeed, it is in these systems that 
the more progressive innovations of international law occur. Examples of such progressive 
developments include special rules on reservations to human rights treaties and methods developed 
in environmental law for carrying along the unwilling states with framework conventions with 
separate binding protocols.  
The problem of fragmentation is aggravated by the fact that special regimes are barely 
subjected to political control. Within each specialized field the dominant role in terms of shaping 
the policy is played by legal experts. Whether that is a desirable state of affairs is a contestable 
issue. Rule by legal experts was precisely what internationalists of the first half of the 20th century 
envisaged. Is it better to be ruled by experts, than by politicians? The answer suggested here is that 
it depends on the moral quality of those legal experts.  The assumption underlying the view that 
legalization must be generally viewed as a positive holds as long as the law itself reflects moral 
values and, therefore, a legal expert (guided by law and values enshrined in that law) is likely to 
make better policy choices.  
Fragmentation has an additional layer, if we consider that norms can emerge from distinct 
normative orders - a process that has been labelled as normative pluralisation. The idea behind 
normative pluralisation is that rules that prescribe behaviour may come not only from legal norms 
but also from moral norms, cultural norms as well as from internal norms of organized entities, such 
as internal norms of Catholic Church. These normative orders may clash among themselves, most 
typically when cultural norms come into conflict with criminal law (for instance honour killings 
may be perceived as culturally acceptable but certainly they violate national criminal law). 
Likewise, internal norms of Catholic Church may preclude clergy from adequately reporting cases 
of sexual abuse and thus obstruct application of criminal law. In international law the normative 
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pluralisation may play out as conflicts between “soft law” and binding treaty law or customary law. 
In principle such a collision poses no problem, as it must be resolved in favour of “hard law”. The 
difficulty in practice, however, is that soft law covers ever waster areas and in such fields as 
environmental law is the preferred modality of regulation. The new elaborate specialised rules 
which emerge from such regulation may easily come to nought the moment they collide with any, 
however trivial, hard law rule, thus obliterating all efforts that went into elaboration of the new 
regulation.  
 
 
6.4.1. Is fragmentation really a problem? 
 
Although fragmentation presents the above mentioned challenges, mostly it is not regarded 
as spelling out the end of international law. This is due to the fact hat international law has several 
mechanisms that allow it to respond to cases of conflicting specialised regimes. Firstly, the starting 
point is to identify who can do something about fragmentation in an attempt to resolve the conflict? 
Obviously all the principal actors who shape rules of international law, such as states, international 
organizations, international courts as well as national courts, all of these (and first and foremost 
states) must see that the system is consistent and coherent. Among the institutional actors the 
International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice are the ones that ought to 
provide most input to harmonize international law, as both are well suited for such a task as well as 
closely related in terms of the scope of their mandates. 
 The ILC has taken up the topic of fragmentation and in 2006 it delivered a much cited report 
- Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission.638 In that 
report its principal author Marti Koskenniemi suggests several methods for resolving conflicts 
between various fields of international law. The first method suggested by the ILC is to apply 
hierarchy of norms. The idea of jus cogens is now firmly established and all the major international 
courts have recognized it.639 However, the practical effect of the concept in some cases has 
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remained problematic. For instance in Al-Adsani640 the ECtHR found that, although prohibition of 
torture was a jus cogens norm, the Court could not disregard rules on state immunity. It must be 
noted that six judges dissented and argued that “under general international law the rules on state 
immunity could no longer render a claim against a foreign state inadmissible in national courts 
where the claim was based on the peremptory prohibition of torture.”641 Also other cases, for 
instance, Congo v. Rwanda642 display a similar trend - although the ICJ generally recognizes jus 
cogens norms, it does not give preference to these norms when they require the Court to set aside 
some long established rules, such as the rule on state consent as a requirement to Court’s 
jurisdiction.643 An additional example of the possibility to apply certain hierarchy of norms is 
provided in Article 103 of the UN Charter. The article has been made use of in Lockerbie cases644 
by the ICJ and also by the ECJ in the Kadi.645 In Kadi the ECJ only formally paid respects to the 
Article 103, while in effect the Court ignored it and went on to proclaim the prevalence of the EU 
law fundamental rights over the Charter obligations.  
A further method for dealing with collisions between fragmented fields is to interpret rules 
so as to avoid any conflict. Methods of interpretation are well established in Article 31 of the 
VCLT, which provides that legal rules should be interpreted in the context with any other relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. This general propositions 
certainly makes sense, as any lawyer is familiar with systemic interpretation as one of the basic 
methods for establishing the actual content of legal norms. However, what does this method of 
interpretation really require once we get down to an actual situation is less clear. Article 31(3)(c) of 
the VCLT in particular provides that when interpreting a treaty, one considers “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. In Al-Adsani the ECtHR explained 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Better late than never, in its Congo v. Rwanda judgment of 2006, the Court affirmed both that this category of norms 
was part of international law and that the prohibition of genocide belonged to it. A year later, the Court restated its 
recognition of jus cogens in the Genocide case.” See Simma B. Universality of International Law from the Perspective 
of a Practicioner. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009, p. 272. 
640 European Court of Human Rights: Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 Nov. 2001, at 
para. 61. 
641 European Court of Human Rights: Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Rozakis and Caflisch, 
joined by Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić , at para. 3. 
642 ICJ: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, at para. 67. 
643 See Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada, and Simma in Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2006, p. 6. 
644 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 
(1992), p. 3; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 
1992, I.C.J. Reports (1992), p. 114. 
645 General Court: Case T–85/09, Kadi v. Commission, [2010] ECR II–5177. 
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that, “any relevant rules of international law” refers to the recognized sources of international 
law.646 
A question, however, arises - does “parties” means only those states that are parties to the 
dispute in question or parties to the treaty which is being interpreted? The difference in the outcome 
depending on which of these two interpretations is employed is likely to be considerable. Especially 
in cases of interpretation of global multilateral treaties the “parties to the treaty” approach will 
result in proliferation of widely accepted international obligations, even if states involved in the 
dispute had no intention to become bound by these obligations. In fact such an interpretation of the 
VCLT provides a quiet way to shift towards majority legislating for the whole community of states. 
Although such a reading of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT would advance systemic coherence, so far 
apart from scholars, it has gained very little support. For instance, the WTO panel when faced with 
this issue had more trust in the traditional concepts of sovereignty and consent: “[i]ndeed, it is not 
apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty interpretation which could 
have as a consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a party is affected by 
other rules of international law which that State has decided not to accept.”647 
As well founded as it may seem, such a restrictive interpretation of the word “parties” in 
effect precludes other multilateral treaties from being used in interpretation, since given the 
multitude of international treaties we seldom find a situation where both states in the dispute are 
also both parties to all the substantively applicable treaties. The ILC has concluded that the 
restrictive interpretation of the word “parties”: “makes it practically impossible ever to find a 
multilateral context where reference to other multilateral treaties as aids to interpretation under 
article 31(3)(c) would be allowed.”648 On the other hand broad interpretation of the Article 31 of the 
VCLT sits uneasily with the principle of state consent (which as we saw earlier in Chapter 2 is still 
one of the foundational blocks of international law). Thus the systemic interpretation might be 
helpful, but it is by no means a definitive solution to the problem of fragmentation. It is, however, a 
method that is readily available and can be used in interpretation. Whether Article 31 may be used 
for systemic interpretation in the broad way indicated above, itself is a question of interpretation of 
the VCLT. Here the subsequent practice is of importance, and, for instance, the ICJ has 
                                                 
646 European Court of Human Rights, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. no. 35763/97, Judgment of 21 Nov. 2001, 
para. 55. 
647 WTO, Panel Report, EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R; 
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demonstrated that it is willing to use systemic interpretation in a number of cases, although not in a 
broad sense suggested above.649  
 
6.5. Fragmentation and judicalization  
 
The concept of judicalization refers to proliferation of international courts and tribunals, 
which has been one of the hallmarks in development of international law.650 Not only has the 
number of international courts grown considerably, but also the number of cases before each court 
has been slowly but steadily growing. Such previously unattended institutions as the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the international Criminal Court find their work load gradually 
increasing. While other international courts, in particular those that are open to claims by 
individuals such as the ECtHR and the ECJ are struggling to deal with a vast numbers of 
proceedings.   
Judicalization may be seen as a sign of constitutionalization and also as a phenomena that 
substantiates introduction on constitutionalism. Proliferation of international courts obviously poses 
a challenge to systemic coherence of international law. Constitutionalism promises to deal with 
such a challenge as it aspires to impose hierarchy between conflicting regimes and their institutions. 
Judicalization may also be considered as a manifestation of fragmentation, as increasing number of 
international courts give preference to values of their filed of specialization. The ECtHR may prefer 
protection of human rights over general international law; WTO bodies may prefer trade law over 
environmental law; or the ECJ may prefer the EU law over the UN Charter obligations, thus leading 
to fragmentation as a result of judicalization.  
The core question in the judicalization and fragmentation debate enquires who has the 
supreme authority to interpret (and thus also inevitably shape) rules of general international law? 
Universal courts, such as the ICJ, probably feel that it is their proper function. Various specialized 
courts and tribunals on the other hand are entrusted (at least explicitly) to interpret only the specific 
treaties which create the specialized system in question. However, since these specialized courts are 
dealing with real-life disputes which present them with mixture of issues from various fields (rather 
                                                 
649 In the Oil platforms case the ICJ employed Art. 31 of the VCLT and interpreted the specific bilateral treaty between 
the USA and Iran in light of general international law. See ICJ: Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 Nov. 2003, [2003] I.C.J. Reports 161, para.41; in Djibouti v France 
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France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 177. 
650 See Romano C., The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, The New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 31, 1998, p. 709. 
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than sanitized hypothetical questions belonging exclusively e.g., to human rights or the law of the 
sea), these specialized courts inevitably find themselves dealing also with other specialized areas 
and with general international law.  
Each court is likely to have specific preferences, which will colour their view of the general 
international law. A well known example is the disagreement between the ICJ and the ICTY on the 
meaning of the world “control” in the Article 8 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility.651 
When in Bosnian Genocide case the ICJ had a chance to revisit its much criticized Nicaragua 
decision, it attempted to play down the impact of ICTY’s pronouncements by suggesting that they 
must be read only in the limited context of ICTY’s jurisdiction (the involvement of Serbia via 
paramilitary groups under its control meant that the conflict was international rather than internal 
and thus allowed the ICTY to fully apply international humanitarian law). Antonio Cassese who 
was on the ICTY’s bench openly stated that his intention with the Tadic judgment was indeed to 
depart from the ICJ’s strict reading of “control” which allowed states to engage in atrocities of the 
worst kind with total impunity. 
International courts have similarly disagreed on other issues. Another perhaps less well 
known example of diverging interpretations is Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular relations which provides for a right of a detained foreigner to contact his or her consulate 
and to be notified of this right. The Inter-American Human rights Court in its 1999 advisory opinion 
explicitly stated that this right is “part of the body of international human rights law.”652 The ICJ in 
the Avena judgment concluded the exact opposite - that neither the text nor the object and purpose 
of the Vienna Convention support the  conclusion that the rights contained in Article 36 (1) (b)  are 
to be classified as human rights.653  
 
6.5.1. Parallel proceedings. 
 
A practical consequence of fragmentation of international law is that the same issue may be 
brought to different international courts (with each court likely to have its own preferences). A 
notable example that illustrates parallel proceedings is the Mox Plant. In this case proceedings over 
the same dispute between Ireland and UK (concerning potential pollution of the Irish Sea by the UK 
                                                 
651 Cassese A. The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 
European Journal of International Law Vol. 18, 2007 p. 649. 
652 Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 Oct. 1999, para. 141. 
653 ICJ: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, [2004] I.C.J. Reports 12, 
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based nuclear facility) were started in Hamburg ITLOS654 as well as in the tribunal under the 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention)655 and subsequently also in the European Court of Justice656. The parties to a dispute 
refer to an international court which they believe will be a more favourable forum for their side of 
the argument. A somewhat different example of parallel proceedings are cases initiated by Georgia 
against Russia over the war between the two states in the summer of 2008. Georgia brought 
proceedings in both the ICJ, claiming a breach of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination657, and in the ECtHR.  As opposed to previous example, these cases were 
not instances of each party picking a more favourable forum, but rather a situation in which the 
injured party attempts to engage all the mechanisms that it finds available.  
The clash between jurisdictions of these courts (and the respective specialized fields of 
international law) has generated considerable excitement amongst commentators.658 However, as 
Simma points out, regardless whether one sees the process as emergence of a self-organizing 
system of international courts or an “uncoordinated mess of diverse mechanisms” the proliferation 
of international courts and tribunals has not resulted in any notable problems for consistency of 
international law.659 Courts generally attempt to reconcile their views and often refer to judgments 
of each other. One notable exception to this intellectual cooperation is the ICJ, which generally 
refuses to rely on authority of other international courts. It is not that the ICJ dislikes relying on the 
authority of others (it makes plenty of references to arbitral awards delivered prior to ICJ’s creation 
and to the Permanent Court of International Justice). Perhaps it is rather that the ICJ finds no other 
considerate way of stating that it is the highest international law authority.  
There are also methods available for dealing with parallel proceedings. Such generally 
recognized procedural principles as lis alibi pendens (the court does not exercise jurisdiction if the 
same parties are before another court with the same dispute) and res judicata (the court does not 
exercise jurisdiction if the same dispute has already been decided)660 offer a solution. Another 
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possible option is the principle of comity, which was employed by the ITLOS in the Mox Plant 
case.661 
At present it is undeniable that various international courts are not structured in anything 
that resembles a coherent system.  Indeed international courts occasionally even emphasize 
uniqueness of their respective treaty system that stands apart from other specialized fields and 
general international law. Thus in Tadic the ICTY explicitly stated that the ECHR creates a “self 
contained system”662. In Kadi I the ECJ also clearly made a point that it is an “autonomous legal 
system”, an idea which the Court used to disregard prevalence of the UN Charter obligations over 
the EU law.663 Can international law remain a coherent system given the tendency to split into 
diverse specialized fields each with particular values and interpretation methods? One certainly can 
take an alarmist view that international law is descending into chaos. However the present process 
may as well be viewed as a process of formation of an international court system.664  
 
6.5.2. Hierarchy of international courts 
 
A seemingly obvious way to address the issue of divergent interpretations of international 
law between different courts would be to introduce some kind of hierarchy amongst them. Several 
ideas have been expressed by authors as to what form such hierarchy of international courts could 
take. Thus it has been suggested that the ICJ could assume the role of an appellate body for other 
international courts; or it could function as a constitutional court of the international community.665 
Other suggestions propose that the ICJ could give something akin to preliminary rulings in 
questions of general international law.666 
If the ICJ would assume any of the above roles it is likely that its superior position would 
anyhow create tensions with other subordinate courts. The criticisms of the ICJ are well known, in 
particular the already mentioned historically orthodox stance on jus cogens, non-recognition of 
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consular rights as human rights and restrictive interpretation of “effective control” test in rules of 
attribution of state conduct are only a few examples from a rather long list. The ICJ may be 
perceived by some as a “guarantor of the unity of international law”667, whereas by others it may be 
perceived as a “guardian of the ancient regime”668. If the ICJ is to take orthodox positions also in 
the future, other more progressively inclined courts would tend to do all they can to avoid their case 
going to the ICJ.  
On the other hand the idea of hierarchy is an appealing one as it does offer solutions to the 
fragmentation of international judicial plane. Simma suggests that the ICJ should indeed be 
regarded as the highest authority, at least on matters of general international law. However, he also 
adds that “international courts are entitled to respect for their interpretation of those areas of 
international law over which they have been given jurisdiction.”669 The idea seems appealing as it 
gives impression that collisions between various international courts could be resolved by giving 
supremacy to interpretation of the specialist. To follow through with this argument - all 
international courts should heed the views of the ICC on criminal law; the ITLOS on the law of the 
sea; WTO bodies on trade, and the ICJ on general international law.  As appealing as it seems, this 
suggestion runs into the problem of how to know whether a case is about “law of the sea” or 
“trade”, or “environment” or perhaps it is all “EU law”. As Mox Plant starkly illustrates, defining 
the dispute (as “law of the sea” or “EU law”) will also determine the competent court. Given that 
the parties and the courts are free to define their disputes as they please and that most disputes may 
easily be cast as belonging to several specialized areas and will inevitably involve aspects of 
general law, it is difficult to see how “respect for interpretation of the specialist” could be helpful in 
resolving conflicting outlooks. 
 
6.6. Fragmentation and state responsibility 
  
An obvious result of fragmentation is that specialized fields, such as human rights law under 
the ECtHR, trade law under the WTO system and the EU law, each have developed also lex 
specialis responsibility rules. In each of these systems certain elements of the general responsibility 
law are maintained as reflected in Articles on State Responsibility, such as those pertaining to basic 
premises of what constitutes an internationally wrongful act, attribution and circumstances 
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precluding wrongfulness. However, on issues of content and implementation of responsibility, the 
specialized fields show considerable variations compared to the general rules as elaborated by the 
ILC. Thus the ECHR allows invocation of state responsibility by individuals, while the WTO 
system allows claims by states other than the injured state even when the obligation breached is not 
an obligation erga omnes (which is the requirement included in the Article 48 of the Articles on 
State Responsibility). Another example of a lex specialis responsibility rule is Article 41 of the 
ECHR, which provides for “just satisfaction” as a special modality of reparation.  
The fragmentation of responsibility rules in itself presents no considerable problems as long 
as it is clear which of the specialized regimes apply - ECHR rules for ECtHR cases, EU Law for the 
ECJ and the WTO law for WTO dispute resolution mechanism. However, difficulties may arise 
when competing claims are put forward as to the applicable regime and claims are brought in 
different forums. The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility addressed this issue in very general 
terms by the lex specialis clause contained in Article 55. The clause simply provides that Articles 
do not apply to the extent that the question is covered by special rules, i.e., in a conflict between lex 
specialis and lex generalis special rules are to be applied. Thus the Articles on State Responsibility 
attempt to resolve collisions only between special regimes and general rules, but not between 
competing special regimes. And even in the question of specialis v. generalis the clause of Article 
55 does not resolve all issues. For instance, most international treaties are silent on the right to take 
countermeasures. Does that mean that parties intended to have treaty regimes in which 
countermeasures are not applicable? Or the general rules of the ILC’s Articles, including 
countermeasures, were expected to fill the unregulated gaps? Crawford seems to concur with 
Simma and Pulkowski, who argue that the principle of effective interpretation of treaties, which 
stems from the duty to interpret provisions in the light of treaty’s object and purpose, requires 
adoption of interpretation that best gives effect to the norm in question.670 In other words, one ought 
to assess whether a fallback on general rules, including countermeasures, is expedient to serve the 
purposes of the regime.671 
Recourse to the principle of effective interpretation of treaties does not however resolve 
collisions of competing lex specialis. To some extent the already mentioned generally recognized 
procedural principles - lis alibi pendens and res judicata may be employed to resolve collisions.672  
Another possible option is the principle of comity, which was employed by the ITLOS in the Mox 
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Plant case.673 However, these principles will come into play only within the context of parallel 
proceedings. They will not resolve collision of specialized regimes reviewed before one particular 
court. The decision on which specialized responsibility rules are to apply will again revolve around 
preferences of the competent court, which is likely to apply special rules of its particular 
constitutive document.  
The earlier mentioned subcategory of fragmentation, when states move away from legally 
binding law and rather employ non-binding or open-ended provisions, poses a particular challenge 
for application of the law of state responsibility.  An example of this trend of deformalization is the 
ILC’s Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers674, which provides for the principle 
“equitable and reasonable utilization” with only a barest minimum of hints as to what that principle 
implies.675 Also the 1997 UN Convention on Non-navigational uses of international water-courses 
provides for a similarly vague “equitable and sustainable use”. Can such general concepts be filled 
with precise legal content? If we look at domestic analogies, domestic courts, in particular 
constitutional courts, often employ such concepts and develop practice that imbues them with 
particular meaning. On the other hand, use of such provisions in treaties means that: “to agree to a 
treaty is to agree on a continued negotiation.”676 Use of such non-binding and open-ended 
provisions may often render the law of international responsibility altogether inapplicable. In 
accordance with the foundational premise responsibility arises from an internationally wrongful 
act.677 In deformalized international law the wrongful act may not occur in the first place and, 
therefore, would not entail responsibility. The unwanted behaviour in a deformalized legal 
relationship may at best lead to non-compliance procedure, which merely invites the non-complying 
state to comply. 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
Considering that the public law paradigm includes the same elements that form part the 
constitutionalist agenda (in the context of international responsibility - invocation of responsibility 
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by or on behalf of the community or other institutionalised responses), it would be unjustified to 
argue that there is constitutionalization happening and therefore the public law paradigm must be 
introduced into the law of state responsibility. Introduction of the public law paradigm is the 
objective (or at least one of the objectives) of constitutionalization. It is indeed one of the core 
purposes of the constitutionalization project. Similarly, the decline in the importance of the concept 
of sovereignty is not brought about by constitutionalization. This decline is rather due to actual 
changes in social actuality in which many of the centres of human activity - scientific, commercial, 
artistic or academic - are no longer delineated on the basis of allegiances to particular states. Thus, 
decline of sovereignty, rather than being the caused by constitutionalism, signals an urgent need for 
constitutionalization. In contrast, fragmentation is a process that is actually occurring and it is 
generally due to developments in specialized fields, as specialized regimes attempt to find more 
suitable solutions to unsatisfactory aspects of the general responsibility law. At the same time lex 
specialis of the specialized regimes possibly demonstrates a way forward for the lex generalis state 
responsibility rules. 
To conclude, a few following reflections seem pertinent. It is no secret that international law 
as a legal system, when compared to functioning national legal systems, seems to be considerably 
flawed. Although, as famously noted by Henkin, “most nations observe international law most of 
the time”678 the rule of law at international level remains patchy at best. Reasons for this poor 
condition may be conceptualized on many levels. However, one reason stands as a background to 
all others. It is what Allott has referred to as having inherited from history “a world order that is a 
fundamental world disorder”679. What he refers to is the world order comprising of states and 
governments, dominated by national and international bureaucracies that mostly do not represent 
the people they govern. Indeed, many national bureaucracies (about a third of them) are outright 
authoritarian.680 International bureaucracies are no better – pursuing self-defined “rationalist” 
policies they often have no political accountability whatsoever.681 Another actor on international 
stage – transnational corporations – are concerned with profit above all other considerations and 
therefore poke both groups of bureaucrats to guide them into their favoured direction. This is a vast 
generalization, nonetheless, one is tempted to suggest that generally this is the crew that steers the 
global ship without much regard to where the passengers i.e., the peoples of the world want to 
travel. 
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The root cause of this pitiful condition of international law may have much to do with our 
inability to re-imagine international society which would finally actualize “the moral and political 
unity of the human race”.682 It seems that we simply have very few ideas which re-conceive the 
global order. Can social reality change before humanity has conceived such a change?  The core 
concepts of the existing philosophy of international law are states and national interests. Sovereign 
states, in terms of social actuality, are increasingly loosing their centrality in many areas of human 
endeavours. National interests, as a rule, are interests of economic, political and bureaucratic elites. 
The same, of course, holds true of nationals societies. However, in international society, the 
situation is aggravated by the fact these players are exclusively the only players. If in national 
systems (at least those of democratic variety) the average citizen does have at least some channels 
of influence on social life (through civil society, private litigation or voting), then on international 
level these avenues are virtually absent. This constitutes, as Allott has pointed out:  
“an international system which was, and is, post-feudal society set in amber. 
Undemocratized. Unsocialized. Capable only of generating so-called international 
relations, in which so-called states act in the name of so-called national interests, through 
the exercise of so-called power, carrying out so-called foreign policy conducted by means 
of diplomacy, punctuated by medieval entertainments called wars or, in the miserable 
modern euphemism, armed conflict. This is the essence of the social process of the 
international non-society.”683 
 This state of international law presents a stark contrast with many national jurisdictions 
which although not ideal, embody a considerably higher standard of democratic representation and 
rule of law. The difference in standards of rule of law, even between a regional system, such as the 
European Union law (which itself is criticized for democratic deficit) and general international law, 
as evidenced by Kadi cases, is considerable. It is therefore unsurprising that the unwritten agenda of 
many international lawyers, including those in the International Law Commission, for years has 
been to introduce elements into international law that would raise the rule of law standard of public 
international law. In other words, the agenda has been to make international law in which 
democratic, liberal and rule of law based states may live in. In the last two decades this agenda has 
predominantly featured under the title of “constitutionalization” of international law. 
Constitutionalism requires agreement on shared fundamental values. It seems uncontentious 
to suggest that fundamental values of the international community (at least the barest minimum of 
                                                 
682 Suárez F. On Laws and God the Lawgiver (1612 Williams G.L., (trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944., book II, 
chapter 19.9 p. 348. 
683 Allott P. International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World. Hull: Hull University Press, 
1989. p. 10. 
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them) are reflected in peremptory norms. However, for this agreement on values to be meaningful it 
must be accompanied by mechanisms that would allow the community to enforce the agreement. 
The law of state responsibility is the central pillar in the enforcement structure of international law. 
It is therefore the law of state responsibility that must provide for adequate means to enforce the 
community’s agreed values. Nevertheless, the tremendous advances in substantive norms of 
international law that have been achieved in the past seventy years, in particular in such areas as 
human rights, trade law, environmental law and other areas have not been matched by 
developments in the law of state responsibility. The law of state responsibility remains firmly 
rooted in archaic pre-Charter international law – one that is based on private law rather that public 
law paradigm.  As such it is geared predominantly for protection of private (individual) interests of 
states, rather than for protection of common interests. In any legal system private interests are taken 
care of by those holding them. It is public interest (i.e., community interest) that require special 
facilitation either by empowering public institutions or individual actors to take up the protection of 
a public cause. Unless such mechanisms are provided, common interests will be ignored for 
individual gains – a situation which is all to familiar in the present day international community. 
As the historical overview of the ILC’s work demonstrates, the ILC had a number of rather 
brave and ambitious ideas on various means to protect community interests. Thus Special 
Rapporteurs proposed: to allow invocation of state responsibility by individuals as a default rule of 
general international law (Amador); to recognize a separate category of “international crimes” 
commission of which would make all other states injured (Ago); to incorporate the UN Charter 
rules on Security Council sanctions into the Articles on State Responsibility as means to respond to 
international crimes (Ago and Riphagen); to provide for special obligations of the Security Council 
and the General Assembly with regard to international crimes (Arangio-Ruiz); and to recognize 
determination of existence of an international crime as a matter of mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
(Arangio-Ruiz).  Besides these significant innovations, there have also been a number of lower key 
proposals, such as to provide for state’s duty to exercise diplomatic protection in cases when a 
serious breach of a peremptory norm has occurred. However, none of this was met with general 
approval of states.  The only considerable public law paradigm based notion that seemed palatable 
to states was invocation of responsibility by non-injured states (presently Article 48).  
Thus ILC’s achievements in protection of community interests in law of state responsibility 
in retrospect seem less that satisfying. However, it is pertinent to note the story of protection of 
community interests has not come to a definitive conclusion. For the time being, it seems that states 
are not willing to press ahead with adoption of a treaty on state responsibility and thus to reopen 
discussion on many of contentious topics concluded with much difficulty. The General Assembly 
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has considered what to do with the Articles on State Responsibility in 2004684, 2007685, 2010686 and 
in 2013687, every time opting to postpone a definite decision. In 2013 the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly created a Working Group in order to examine feasibility of a convention or other 
appropriate action. After noting three possible options: 1) to negotiate a convention;  2) to adopt the 
ILC Articles by the General Assembly in the form of a declaration or resolution; or 3) to do 
nothing, the Working Group recommended that the General Assembly yet again postpone a 
decision and return to the question in 2016.688  
Nevertheless, as the relentless flow of international life continues to unfold this 
unwillingness of states eventually may change. If and when that happens and states return to 
contemplation of means to protect community interests, the ILC’s rejected proposals in all 
likelihood will serve as a most useful starting point. Without a meaningful transformation of the law 
of state responsibility, that would actualize mechanisms for enforcement of international law in 
accordance with the public law paradigm (conceiving a legal relationship between a state and the 
international community as a whole), international law “is doomed to be what it has been – 
marginal, residual and intermittent”689.  
 
 
                                                 
684 UN General Assembly Resolution 59/35, 16 December 2004. 
685 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/61, 6 December 2007. 
686 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/19, 6 December 2010. 
687 UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 15 November 2013. 
688 Draft resolution A/C.6/68/L.19, 15 November 2013. 
689 P. Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001, p. 104. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. The concept of the international community is not defined in positive law. Its uses in political, 
legislative, judicial and scholarly discourses are varied and vague. As the concept is intricately 
related to power and legitimacy, it is inevitably susceptible to abuse. Likewise, it is more 
appropriate to discuss the international community in terms of multiple communities existing within 
the international system, e.g., a community of international peace and security, a community of 
international trade or a regional community of human rights. A global international community 
encompassing all areas of inter-state activity is rather only a rhetorical community - an aspiration 
that may nonetheless facilitate evolution of a genuine all-encompassing international community. 
The use of the concept is nevertheless to be encouraged on all levels of discourse including judicial 
and legislative, as it facilitates recognition of shared interests, which in turn is a precondition for 
agreement on mechanisms for protection of those interests.  
 
2. Although existence of public interest norms in general international law is widely recognized by 
states, international organizations and even by international courts, so far these norms have had only 
a very limited impact on enforcement of international law. When faced with collision between 
sovereignty and state consent based rules (such as rules on immunities) and norms aimed at 
protecting community interests, international courts and the ICJ particularly, tend to give preference 
to the time tested values of the bilateralist international law, even if the protection of these values 
comes at a cost of ignoring community interests. Thus developments in general international law 
are mainly normative in nature i.e., the introduction of public interest norms and recognition of 
community interests in multilateral treaties are not accompanied by novel enforcement mechanisms. 
Thus there is a stark contrast between multitude of obligations which pursue communitarian 
objectives and virtual absence of communitarian mechanisms of enforcement. As long as 
enforcement mechanisms designed for protection of community interests have not been developed 
and become an accepted norm, the results that communitarian norms are able to deliver are bound 
to remain very limited. 
 
3. Certain specialised fields, such as the EU law and to lesser extent also the ECHR system, 
illustrate that with presence of political will a variety of legal mechanisms may be successfully 
employed to enforce communitarian interests. These regional systems demonstrate that an 
indispensable step in actualizing protection of community interests is to widen the possibilities of 
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judicial enforcement. Both the EU and the ECHR systems provide for mandatory jurisdiction of the 
respective courts and for inter-state actio popularis for enforcement of communitarian norms. In 
addition to that the EU law provides for institutionalized infringement proceedings and invocation 
of state responsibility not only by other states but also by individuals in national courts. These 
measures are accompanied by recognition of individuals as subjects of the legal system and by 
acknowledgement of the direct effect of the EU law, which substantively increases possibilities of 
enforcement through national judiciaries. Although analogies with specialised fields and regional 
systems due to significant differences in their constitutive principles must be treated with caution, 
they do provide realistic blueprints for reconstruction of responsibility mechanisms of general 
international law. 
 
4. The theory of the law of state responsibility historically has been based on bilateralism and 
subjective rights i.e., on the private law paradigm where the right to invoke responsibility belongs 
exclusively to the injured state. Such doctrinal foundations of the state responsibility law owe much 
to Roman private law which for centuries has served as a fertile ground for cultivating analogies by 
legal scholars of all creeds, including international law scholars. Existence of a breach of subjective 
rights as the only ground for invocation of state responsibility was further endorsed by the 19th 
century positivism, which was acutely averse to multilateralist notions of any kind and in particular 
against claims for protection of communitarian interests. However, notable international lawyers 
from Grotius to Lauterpacht have been pointing out considerable shortcomings of the strict 
bilateralism. In particular after the First World War a momentum was gathering for a rethink of the 
bilateralist conception of state responsibility rules i.e., that only the injured state is entitled to claim 
responsibility. After the Second World War the political climate was ripe for the public law inspired 
multilateralist notions to enter the mainstream of international legal thought.  
 
5. During the post-war years the ILC, which was dominated by like-minded internationalists such as 
Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice and Waldock, under the mandate of “progressive development and 
codification” embarked on a project of discretely introducing public law elements into general 
international law. If international law is to be regarded as the “gentle civilizer of nations”, then the 
ILC saw itself as the gentle civilizer of that international law. Two key areas of this project were 
areas most fundamental to general international law – the law of treaties and the law of state 
responsibility. In both of these the ILC aspired to introduce the public law paradigm based 
concepts, most notably - the concept of peremptory norms - which was essential for recognition that 
a minimalistic form of public order functions also in the community of states. In the law of treaties 
recognition of peremptory norms meant that states are no longer free to agree on whatever they 
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please, if such an agreement is contrary to the most fundamental norms recognized by the whole 
community of states. In the law of state responsibility violation of these fundamental norms was to 
result in criminal responsibility of states – a notion thoroughly inspired by the public law paradigm. 
The ILC was somewhat successful with the law of treaties, as provisions on peremptory norms 
found their way into the VCLT. However, it was less so with international crimes of states, as by 
late 1990ties states seemed to have lost appetite for notable innovations in general international law. 
 
6. The ILC throughout its work on state responsibility attempted to accommodate a theory that 
international law distinguishes two general categories of obligations – international crimes and 
delicts - and that each category required a separate regime of responsibility. However, from mid 
1990ties to appease opposition to the concept of international crimes, the ILC sought to substitute 
“international crimes” with the concept of “serious breaches of peremptory norms”. Even more 
important than change in terminology, the ILC continuously reduced the consequences attached to 
“serious breaches”. Thus the ILC gave up the idea that all states would be regarded as injured if a 
serious breach of a peremptory norm is committed. Likewise, the ILC relinquished the notions that 
consequences of serious breaches may include a punitive element, that all states have a right to 
apply countermeasures and claim restitution even if it resulted in a disproportionate burden on the 
responsible state or threatened economic stability, political independence or impaired dignity of the 
responsible state. 
 
7. The historical assessment demonstrates that in the second half of the 20th century when 
substantive international law reoriented towards community interests, the trend was not 
accompanied by a similar reorientation in responsibility rules. The ILC, despite an obvious 
intention to provide responsibility mechanisms to protect community interests, was unable to depart 
from the private law paradigm and bilateralist concepts. In other words, although the ILC aimed to 
introduce multilateralism into the law of state responsibility, it did so by using bilateralist private 
law constructs. In principle the legal relationship between a state in breach of its obligations and the 
international community in the Articles on State Responsibility is acknowledged by recognition of 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole. However, for purposes of invocation, 
these erga omnes obligations actually are split into series of individual relationships between the 
wrongdoer and another individual state. Most importantly, there is no invocation on behalf of the 
international community. Rather each concerned member of the community is meant to act as a 
private attorney general. This disparity between substantive law and responsibility mechanisms 
contributes to non-enforcement of international rules with communitarian objectives. 
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8. However, in the preset international community the possibility of centralized enforcement on 
behalf of the community in all likelihood is not a prospect of immediate future. Therefore the ILC 
rightly focused on mechanisms of decentralized enforcement. Thus the ILC was able to make 
limited, but nonetheless important advances in reorienting the law of state responsibility from 
bilateralism towards communitarianism. These advances include: recognition of the notion of 
“objective responsibility” i.e., omission of injury as a precondition for responsibility; invocation of 
responsibility by non-injured states and specific consequences applicable to serious breaches of 
peremptory norms. These accomplishments may be viewed critically, as they are half-hearted, 
slimed and cropped survivors of the ILC’s initial designs for introduction of the public law 
paradigm. However, all of these notions, despite criticisms that may be directed towards them, 
widen possibilities to bring claims for protection of community interests and thus reinforce 
multilateralism and the public law paradigm.  
 
9. Countermeasures of general interest, in spite of risk of political abuse, escalation of conflict and 
doctrinal primitiveness (signalling an absence of public order based on institutionalized 
mechanisms), in practice may be the only viable means of enforcement of communitarian norms. 
As the countermeasures of general interest are likely to remain an indispensable part of enforcement 
of international law, the position taken by the ILC of neither allowing nor prohibiting them is not 
helpful. A better approach would be to recognize their lawfulness, but to provide stringent criteria 
for their use. Elaboration of such criteria would have a restrictive effect on the use of 
countermeasures of general interest. These criteria must apply to both substantive and procedural 
elements of countermeasures. Among substantive requirements - countermeasures of general 
interest ought to be limited to breaches of peremptory norms. Likewise they must be subject to 
conditions currently applicable to countermeasures by injured states under Articles 49-51 and 53 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility. Among procedural elements, a helpful and stabilizing 
requirement would be that in all cases when there is an injured state, countermeasures of general 
interest may be taken only at the request of the injured state. In any scenario, in order to limit 
possibilities of politically motivated abuse, it would be beneficial to prohibit entirely unilateral 
countermeasures of general interest by non-injured states. 
 
10. The development of the law of state responsibility has by no means come to a definite 
conclusion. Although presently most states show no particular interest in negotiating a convention 
on the basis of the Articles on State Responsibility, the 2001 Articles merely present a station on a 
larger evolutionary journey of international law. With ever growing global interdependence the 
direction of that journey inevitably must be towards some form of public order and protection of 
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communitarian interests. However the historical review of the present study reveals that if anything 
the evolution of the law of state responsibility is painstakingly slow. Thus recognition of a right of 
non-injured states to invoke responsibility for breaches of obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole  - which is the key hallmark of communitarianism in the 2001 Articles – 
took the ILC half a century to arrive at, from early 1950 when the ILC first conceived obligations 
erga omnes. It was only in 2012 when in Belgium v Senegal the first genuinely erga omnes (partes) 
claim was successfully adjudicated before the ICJ. In absence of a radical overhaul of the 
international system, the next station in the law’s development is likely to be a continued expansion 
of decentralized enforcement mechanisms. Among these the most necessary would be recognition 
and elaboration of countermeasures of general interest and strengthening of consequences 
applicable to breaches of peremptory norms (e.g., to regard all states as injured when a peremptory 
norm has been breached).  
 
 
11. Finally, the historical review of the ILC’s work on state responsibility demonstrates that the 
change of heart at the ILC, which brought considerable concessions to the detriment of the public 
law paradigm, roughly coincided with the end of the Cold War.  Those momentous events of late 
1980ties and early 1990ties ended the bipolar world order and brought an unprecedented hegemony 
of the US. With that hegemony the US attitude towards important international law projects (from 
International Criminal Court to Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change) has been nothing short of 
appalling. The ILC’s work on state responsibility was no exception - the US was one of the 
principal opponents to the notion of “state crimes”. However, as the US hegemony becomes 
increasingly tested and the post-cold war status quo of 1990ties begins to crumble, states, including 
the US, may reassess their views on responsibility rules in accordance with their current and 
projected interests. States that would be losing in the geopolitical game may seek to compensate 
geopolitical power by power of legal rules - they may well become interested in addressing 
aggression and similar breaches by providing novel communitarian mechanisms for responding to 
them. Likewise, as the balance of power shifts, increased uncertainties are likely to lead to new 
search for stability within the international community. It is possible that such a search once again 
may turn towards international law, which provides at least some measure of stability in the ever 
shifting reality of interstate relations. The ILC’s concept of state crimes or its latter version - serious 
breaches of peremptory norms - may still come to prominence with meaningful consequences 
attached to breaches of norms that protect fundamental values of the whole international 
community. 
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8. ANNOTATIONS 
 
ANOTĀCIJA 
PROMOCIJAS DARBAM 
„STARPTAUTISKĀS KOPIENAS INTEREŠU AIZSARDZĪBA 
 VALSTS ATBILDĪBAS TIESĪBĀS” 
 
Starptautiskās tiesībās pēdējo 70 gadu laikā ir ievērojami attīstījušās, paredzot regulējumu 
virknei tiesisko interešu, kuras ir vērstas nevis tikai uz atsevišķu valstu individuālo interešu 
aizsardzību, bet gan uz visas starptautiskās kopienas kopīgo interešu nodrošināšanu. Šīs, tā 
saucamās ‘kopienas intereses’, piemēram, starptautiskā miera un drošības nodrošināšana, globālās 
vides aizsardzība vai cilvēktiesības, ir plaši aizsargātas starptautisko tiesību materiāltiesiskajās 
normās. Tomēr valstu starptautiskās atbildības tiesībās ir ārkārtīgi maz mehānismu, kuri būtu 
paredzēti vai piemēroti šo interešu aizsardzībai. Ņemot vērā šādu atšķirību starp plašo 
materiāltiesisko regulējumu un nepilnīgajiem šī regulējuma aizsardzības mehānismiem, pētījums 
pievēršas jautājumam, vai straujo attīstību kopīgo interešu normatīvajā aizsardzībā ir pavadījusi 
līdzīga attīstība valsts atbildības tiesībās. Pētījumā tiek argumentēts, ka 20.gadsimta otrajā pusē 
notikušo starptautisko tiesību daļēju pārorientāciju uz kopienas interesēm materiāltiesiskajās 
normās, nepavadīja līdzīga pārorientācija valsts atbildības tiesībās, kuras vēl arvien pamatā ir 
balstītas uz divpusējām attiecībām starp valsti, kura veic starptautisko tiesību pārkāpumu un cietušo 
valsti. Starptautisko tiesību komisija, neskatoties uz nodomu piedāvāt kopienas interešu 
aizsardzības mehānismus, savos ieteikumos nespēja atteikties no privāttiesiskā attiecību modelī 
balstītiem tiesību institūtiem. Šāda nesaderība starp materiāltiesiskajām normām un atbildības 
mehānismiem veicina uz starptautiskās kopienas interešu aizsardzību vēsto normu pārkāpumus un 
neļauj valstīm pilnvērtīgi aizsargāt materiāltiesiskajās normās paredzētās starptautiskās kopienas 
intereses. 
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ANNOTATION 
TO THE DOCTORAL THESIS  
„PROTECTION OF INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
IN THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY” 
 
 
International law has notably evolved within the last 70 years providing for protection of a 
multitude of legal interests, which could be regarded as ‘community interests’ or interests that are 
shared by all states (such as international peace and security, protection of global environmental 
commons or universally accepted human rights). However, there are remarkably few legal 
mechanisms in international law that are designed to protect those interests.  In other words, there 
seems to be a sharp contrast between abundant substantive content of international rules providing 
for shared interests and very modest legal means to enforce those interests. Considering this 
disparity, the aim of this thesis is to establish whether the normative shift towards multilateralism 
and community interests in substantive international law has been accompanied by a similar shift 
towards communitarianism in the law of state responsibility. The central claim of this dissertation is 
that in the second half of the 20th century, when substantive international law partially reoriented 
towards community interests, the trend was not accompanied by a similar reorientation in 
responsibility rules, which have remained based on bilateralism and private law paradigm. The 
International Law Commission, despite an intention to provide responsibility mechanisms to protect 
community interests, was unable to depart from the private law paradigm and private law concepts. 
This disparity between substantive law and responsibility mechanisms contributes to non-
enforcement of international rules with communitarian objectives. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER DOKTORARBEIT 
„DER SCHUTZ VON GEMEINSCHAFTSINTERESSEN IM RECHT DER 
STAATENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT“ 
 
Das Völkerrecht hat sich insbesondere  in den vergangenen 70 Jahren fortentwickelt und 
umfasst auch den Schutz zahlreicher Bereiche, die man aufgrund des Interesses der Allgemeinheit 
auch als „Gemeinschaftsinteressen“ bezeichnen mag. Zu nennen sind hier bspw. die Bereiche des 
(internationalen) Schutzes des Friedens, der Sicherheit, der Umwelt und der natürlichen 
Lebensräume sowie auch die als universal geltenden Menschenrechte. Dessen ungeachtet fällt auf, 
dass das Völkerrecht nur wenige Rechtsinstrumente bereitstellt, die diese Interessen effektiv 
schützen. Es zeigt sich also ein starker Kontrast zwischen den umfassenden materiellen Regeln des 
Völkerrechts bzgl dieser Gemeinschaftsinteressen und den äußerst bescheidenen Möglichkeiten, 
diese Rechte durchzusetzen. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die vor diesem Hintergrund 
angesprochenen Aspekte dahingehend zu untersuchen, ob es parallel zur Entwicklung zum 
Multilateralismus und zu Gemeinschaftsinteressen auch eine Entwicklung im Rechts der 
Staatenverantwortung gibt.  Die zentrale Aussage der Arbeit ist, dass es in der zweiten Hälfte des 
20. Jahrhunderts, als sich eine Entwicklung hin zu Gemeinschaftsinteressen vollzog,  keine 
entsprechende Entwicklung im völkerrechtlichen Haftungsregime gab, welches im Gegenteil, noch 
immer auf Bilateralismus und einem „Privatrechtsansatz“ gründet. Obgleich die 
Völkerrechtskommission die Absicht hatte, einen entsprechenden Mechanismus für die 
Staatenverantwortlichkeit zu schaffen, konnte sie eine Abkehr von dem bilateralen Ansatz nicht 
bewirken. Die Arbeit kommt schließlich zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Gegensatz zwischen 
materiellem Recht und fehlender Staatenverantwortlichkeit zur mangelnden Durchsetzbarkeit der 
Gemeinschaftsinteressen im Völkerrecht beiträgt. 
 
 
 194 
 
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
BOOKS 
1. Aalto P. Public Liability in EU Law Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011. 
2. Allott P. The Health of Nations. Society and Law Beyond the State. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
3. Allott P. Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
4. Allott P. International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World. Hull: 
Hull University Press, 1989. 
5. Alvarez J. International Organizations as Law-Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
6. Amerasinghe C. Diplomatic Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
7. Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London: Verso, 1991. 
8. Anzilotti D. Cours de droit international, Premier volume. Paris: Sirey, 1929. 
9. Aristotle. Politics, A Treatise of Government. Reprint of 1912 edition, Auckland: Floating 
Press, 2009. 
10. Arnull A. Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC 
Treaty. Common Market Law Review Vol. 32.1 (1995). 
11. Aurelius M. Meditations. transl., by Hard R., Herfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997. 
12. Aust H. Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011. 
13. Badescu C. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and 
Human Rights. London: Routledge, 2010. 
14. Barnett M., Finnemore M. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
15. Bederman D. International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001. 
 195 
16. Beatson J. et al (eds) Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking Emigre Lawyers in Twentieth-
Century Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
17. Bluntschli J. Das moderne Volkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt. 
Nordlingen: Beck, 1872. 
18. Bogdandy A., Venzke I. Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers. 
Berlin: Springer 2012. 
19. Borkowski A. Textbook on Roman Law, 2nd edition. London: Blackstone Press Limited, 
1997. 
20. Brigs H. The International Law Commission. Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1965. 
21. Brownlie I. Principles of Public International Law, 7th edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
22. Brownlie I. Principles of International Law, 6th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
23. Brownlie I. Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998, 
24. Brownlie I. Principies of Public International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1973. 
25. Boyle A., Chinkin C. The Making of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
26. Bull H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 
1977. 
27. Buzan B. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
28. Byers M., Nolte G., (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International 
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
29. Capaldo G.Z., The Pillars of Global Law. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008. 
30. Cass D. Constitutionalization of the World Trade Oragnization. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
31. Cassese A. The Human Dimension of International Law. Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
32. Cassese A. International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
33. Cassese A. Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reaprisal. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
 196 
34. Censer J., Hunt L. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, Exploring the French Revolution. 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004. 
35. Crawford J. State Responsibility, The General Part. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
36. Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
37. Crawford J. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
38. Danilenko G. Lawmaking in the International Community. Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers, 
1993. 
39. Deigh J., Dolinko D., (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
40. Durant R., Fiorino D., O'Leary R. (eds.), Environmental Governance Reconsidered: 
Challenges, Choices and Opportunities, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
41. Eckersley R. The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004. 
42. Elagab O. The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988. 
43. Farrall J. United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007. 
44. Fassbender B., Peters A., (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
45. Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Judge Bruno Simma.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
46. Franck T. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
47. Friedmann W. The Changing Structure of International Law. London: Stevens, 1964. 
48. Grotius H. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925. 
49. Hannikainen L. Peremptory norms (jus cogens) in international law: Historical 
development, criteria, present status. Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1988. 
50. Hall W. A Treatise on International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884. 
 197 
51. Henkin L. How Nations Behave: law and foreign policy, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979. 
52. Herdegen M. Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 3rd ed. Munchen: Beck 2002. 
53. Heffter A. Le droit international public de I'Europe, 3rd ed., translaed by Bergson J., Berlin: 
Schroeder, 1857. 
54. Hegel F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991. 
55. Hernandez G. The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
56. Higgins R. The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. 
57. Hirschl R. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
58. Hobbes T. Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
59. Hoffmann J., Nollkaemper A., Swerissen I., (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: From 
Principle to Practice. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012. 
60. de Hoogh A. Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into 
the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States. Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
61. Holland T. Studies in International Law. Oxford: Henry Frowde, 1898. 
62. Jennings R., Watts A. Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace. Vol. 1. 9th edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992. 
63. Jessup P. A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction. New York: Macmillan, 1948. 
64. Jorgensen N. The Responsibility of States for International Crimes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
65. Kant I. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970. 
66. Kelsen H. Principles of International Law. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2003, 
(1959 reprint). 
67. Kelsen H. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems. 
London: Stevens & Sons, 1950. 
 198 
68. Klabbers J., Peters A., Ulfstein G. The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
69. Klabbers J., Wallendahl A., (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of International 
Organizations. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. 
70. Kolliopoulos A. La Commission d’indemnisation des Nations Unies et le droit de la 
responsability internationale. Paris: LGDJ, 2001. 
71. Koskenniemi M. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
72. Kovach H., Nelligan C., Burall S. The Global Accountability Report: Power without 
Accountability? London: One World Trust, 2003, 
73. Lauterpacht H. The Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
74. Lauterpacht H. The Development of International Law by the International Court. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
75. Lauterpacht H. Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th ed. London: Longmans, 1955.  
76. Lauterpacht H. Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, London: Longman 
Publishing, 1927. 
77. Leeming D. Creation Myths. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
78. Loughlin M., Walker N. (eds.,) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
79. Loughlin M.  Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and 
Politics. Portland: Hart, 2000. 
80. Macedo S, (ed), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts And the Prosecution of Serious 
Crimes under International Law. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. 
81. de Martens F. Traite de droit international, translated by Leo A. Paris: Marescqaine, 1883. 
82. McNair A. Law of Treaties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
83. McNair A. Treaties Producing Effects “Erga Omnes”. Milan: Scritti Tomaso Perassi, 1957. 
84. Meron T. Humanization of International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006. 
85. Morgenthau H. Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. New York: Knopf. 1978. 
86. Nollkaemper A. National Courts and the International Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
 199 
87. Orakhelashvili A. Peremptory Norms in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
88. Österdahl I. Threat to the Peace. The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 in 
the UN Charter. Upsala: Iustus, 1998. 
89. Pattinson J. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should 
Intervene? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
90. Phillipson C. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome. London: 
MacMillan, 1911. 
91. Proukaki E. The Problem of Enforcement of International Law. Countermeasures, the non-
injured state and the idea of International Community. New York: Routledge, 2010. 
92. Ragazzi M. The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
93. Reuter P. Introduction to the Law of Treaties. London: Kegan Paul, 1995. 
94. Reydams L. Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
95. Schmitt C. Politische Theologie : vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. München: 
Ducker&Humbolt, 1922. 
96. Sabahi B. Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration: Principles and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
97. Sands P. Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
98. Sands P., Klein P. Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, fifth edition. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001. 
99. Scelle G. Precis de Droit des Gens, Principles et Systematique, Vol 1. Paris: Sirey, 1932. 
100. Schachter O. International Law in Theory and Practice. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991. 
101. Schermers H., Blokker N. International Institutional Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.  
102. Schmitt C. Politische Theologie : vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. München: 
Ducker&Humbolt, 1922. 
103. Scott A., Bankowski Z. The European Union and its Order: The Legal Theory of European 
Integration. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. 
 200 
104. Shany Y. The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003. 
105. Shaw M. International Law, 4th edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
106. Simma B. (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, 3rd edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
107. Simma B. (ed), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, 2nd edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
108. Sinclair I. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edition. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984. 
109. Singer P. Corporate Worriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003. 
110. Slaughter A. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
111. Strayer J. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970. 
112. Suárez F. On Laws and God the Lawgiver (1612 Williams G.L., (trans.). Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1944. 
113. Tams C., Sloan J. (eds.), The Development of International Law by the International Court 
of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
114. Tams C. Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005. 
115. Thakur R. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
116. Thucydydes. The History of the Peloponnesian War (Smith W. transl.). London: Jones&Co, 
1831. 
117. Tönnies F. Community and Society. Devon: David & Charles, 2011. 
118. Tsagourias N., (ed.)., Transnational Constitutionalism, Internatioal and European 
Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
119. Tunkin G. Theory of International Law, n/a, 1962. 
120. Vattel E. The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature. London: n/a 1797. 
121. Vatell E. Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, Vol. 1, 1758. Washington: 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916. 
 201 
122. Verdross A. Die verfassung der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft. Wien: Springer, 1926. 
123. Vicuna O. Antarctic Mineral Exploitation. The Emerging Legal Framework. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
124. de Visscher C. Theory and Reality in Public International Law. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968. 
125. Weblay L., Samuels H. Public Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
126. Weiler J. et al (eds), International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft 
Article 19 on State Responsibility. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989. 
127. Weiler J., Wind M., (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003. 
128. Wellens K. Remedies against International Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
129. William A. Constitutions and Constitutionalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963. 
130. Wolfers A. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962. 
131. Young M., (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
132. Zimmern A. Spiritual Values in World Affairs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939. 
133. Ковалев, A.A., Черниченко С.В., (ред.) Международное право, 3-е изд. Москва: 
Проспект, 2008. 
134. Лукашук И. Mеждународное право, Общая часть. Москва: Волтерс Клувер, 2001. 
135. Левин Д,Б. Проблема ответственности в науке международного права. Известия 
Aкадемии Hаук CCCP. Ho.2, 1946. 
136. Моджорян Л.А. Ответственность в современном международном праве, Советский 
ежегодник международного права 1970, Москва: Hаука, 1972. 
 
 
 
 
 202 
ARTICLES 
1. Abi-Saab G. The uses of article 19. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10.2, 
1999. p. 339. 
2. Abi-Saab G. Whither the International Community? European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 9 (1998). p. 252.  
3. Ago R. First Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/217, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1969, p. 225. 
4. Ahlborn C. To Share or Not to Share? The Allocation of Responsibility between 
International Organizations and Their Member States. Amsterdam Law School Research 
Paper 2013-73 (2013), ACIL 2013-26, available at www.sharesproject.nl [viewed 
September 5, 2014]. 
5. Akande D. The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for 
Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations? International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 46(02), 1997. p.309. 
6. Alland D. Countermeasures of General Interest. European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 13, 2002, p. 1239. 
7. Allott P. The Idealist’s Dilemma: Re-Imagining International Society. Published on June 9, 
2014. Available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-idealists-dilemma-re-imagining-
international-society/ [viewed August 19, 2014]. 
8. Allott P. Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism. In: The Legitimacy 
of International Organizations. Coicaud J.M., Heiskanen V., (eds.), 2001. 
9. Allott P. Reconstituting Humanity – New International Law, European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 2, 1992, p. 219. 
10. Allott P. State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 29, 1988, p. 1. 
11. Amador G. Second Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1957, Vol. II, p. 104.  
12. Amador G. Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/96, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1956, Vol. II, p. 173. 
13. Arangio-Ruiz G. Special Rapporteur, Fifth Report on State Responsibility , A/CN.4/453 and 
Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1993, Vol. II, p. 1. 
14. Baker P. Codification of International Law. British Yearbook of International Law (1924), 
5, p. 38. 
 203 
15. Barnett M., Finnemore M. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations. International Organization, 1999, Vol. 53, No. 04 p. 699. 
16. Bell C. Reassessing Multiple Attribution: the International Law Commission and the 
Behrami and Saramati Decision, New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, Vol. 42, 2010, p. 501. 
17. Bernhardt R. Article 103. In: Simma B. (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A 
Commentary. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1295. 
18. Biermann F., Dingwerth K. Global Environmental Change and the Nation State. Global 
Environmental Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, p. 1. 
19. Bodansky D. Is there an International Environmental Constitution? Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16, 2009, p. 565. 
20. Bodansky D. The Legitimacy of Global Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law? American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 1999, p. 596. 
21. Bogdandy A. Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from 
Germany, 47 Harvard J Int’l L (2006 – 2007) p. 226. 
22. Bogdandy A. General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Reserch 
Field, German Law Journal, Vol. 9, 2008, p. 1909. 
23. Bogdandy A., Dann P., Goldmann M. Developing the Publicness of Public International 
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities. German Law Journal 
Vol. 9, 2008, p. 1375. 
24. Bogdandy A., Delavalle S. Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International 
Law. International Law and Justice Working Paper 2008/3 , 1. 
25. Bowett D. Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International Law Commission on 
State Responsibility. European Journal of International Law Vol. 9 1998 p. 163. 
26. Boyle A. Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of 
Fragmentation and Jurisdiction. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 
1, 1997, p. 37. 
27. Bowett D. Collective Self-defence Under the Charter of the United Nations. The British 
Year Book of International Law, 1955-56, London: 1957, p. 130. 
28. Birnie P. The Antarctic Regime and Third states. In: Wolfrum R., (ed) Antarctic Challenge 
II. Berlin: Duncker&Humbolt, 1986, p. 239. 
29. Byers M. Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules. 
Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 66, 1997. 
 204 
30. Cardwell J., Duncan F., Who Decides? The ECJ's Judgment on Jurisdiction in the MOX 
Plant. Journal of Environmental Law 19.1 (2007) p. 121. 
31. Caron D. The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between 
Form and Authority. American Journal of International Law, 2002, 86,  p. 862. 
32. Cassese A. The Diffusion of Revolutionary Ideas and the Evolution of International Law. In: 
Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008. p. 72. 
33. Cassese A. The Character of the Violated Obligation. In: The Law of International 
Responsibility, Crawford et al eds, p. 415. 
34. Cassese A. States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of International Community. In: 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law, Fassbender B., Peters A., eds. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
35. Cassese A. Exinjura ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimacy of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 10, 1998, p. 23. 
36. Claude I. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations. 
International Organization, Vol. 20. 1966, p. 367. 
37. Charney J. Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals. 271 Recueil 
des Cours (1998) 101, p. 130. 
38. Charney J. Universal International Law, American Journal of International Law, 1993, Vol. 
87, p. 529. 
39. Clapham A. Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the Individual to Corporations 
and Armed Opposition Groups. Journal of International Criminal Justice Vol. 6.5, 2008, p. 
899. 
40. Craig P. Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union. European Law Journal 
Vol. 7, 2001, p. 125. 
41. Crawford J. Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An appraisal of Article 
48 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In: 
Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Judge Bruno Simma. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 224. 
42. Crawford J.  Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law. Recueil des Cours, 
319, 2006, p. 325. 
43. Crawford J. Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole. Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, Vol. 8. Issue 2, p. 320. 
 205 
44. Dawidowicz M. Public Law Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of 
State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures and their Relationship to the UN Security 
Council. In: British Yearbook of International Law, 2006. p.333. 
45. Damrosch L. Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, Recueil de 
Cours, 269 (1997), p. 9. 
46. D'Amato A. Treaties as a Source of General Rules of International Law. Harvard 
International Law Journal Vol. 3, 1962, p. 1. 
47. Dugard J. Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights: the Draft Articles of the International 
Law Commission. Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 75, 2005, p. 80. 
48. Dunoff J. Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of 
International Law, European Journal of International Law Vol. 17,  2006, p. 647. 
49. Dupuy P.M. Back to the Future of a Multilateral Dimension of the Law of State 
Responsibility for Breaches of ‘Obligations Owed to International Community as a Whole’. 
European Journal Of International Law, Vol. 23 No. 4, 2012, p. 1061. 
50. Dupuy P.M. A General Stocktaking of the Connections between the Multilateral Dimension 
of Obligations and Codification of the Law of Responsibility. European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 13. No. 5, 2002, p.1053. 
51. Erasmus D. The Adages of Erasmus. In: Erasmus on His Times: A shortened version of the 
Adages of the Erasmus, Philip M., transl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967,  p. 
108. 
52. Esty D. Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law. Yale 
Law Journal, 2006, Vol. 115, p.1490. 
53. Fassbender B. The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1998, Vol. 36, p. 529. 
54. Fassbender B. Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law. In: Sovereignty in 
Transition. Walker N., (ed.) Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003, p. 115. 
55. Fukuyama F., Bloom A. The End of History? The National Interest, Vol. 16, 1989, p. 3. 
56. Gaja G. States Having as Interest in Compliance with the Obligation Breached. In: The Law 
of International Responsibility, Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. p. 957. 
57. Gaja G. ‘New’ Vienna Convention on Treaties Between States and International 
Organizations or Between International Organizations: A Critical Commentary. British 
Yearbook of International Law Vol. 58.1, 1988, p. 253. 
 206 
58. Garrett G. The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union. International 
Organization, Vol. 49, 1995, p. 171. 
59. Gary M., Roberts K., and Gray S. Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures 
by US, UK and Continental European Multinational Corporations. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 1995, p. 555. 
60. Giacinto C. Beyond the State: The Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural 
Administrative Law. European Public Law Vol. 9, 2003, p. 563. 
61. Gordon G. Innate Cosmopolitan Dialectics at the ICJ: Changing Perceptions of International 
Community, the Role of the Court, and the Legacy of Judge Álvarez. Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 27, 2014, p. 309. 
62. Govers A. The Two Powers. Foreign Policy. Vol. 132, 2002, p. 32. 
63. Gowlland-Debbas V. Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State 
Responsibility. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 43.01 (1994), p. 55. 
64. Gray C. From Unity to Polarization: International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq. 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13.1, 2002, p. 1. 
65. Guillaume G. The Future of International Judicial Institutions. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 44 No. 4, 1995, p. 848. 
66. de Guttry A. Some Recent Cases of Unilateral Countermeasures and the Problem of Their 
lawfulness in International Law. Irish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 7 (1986-1987), 
p. 169. 
67. Hafner G. Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law. Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, 2003, p. 849. 
68. Harper K. Does the United nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as a Court 
and Legislature? 27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 
27, 1994, p. 126. 
69. Hewison G. The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas 
Driftnet Fishing. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 25, No. 4, October, 1994. 
70. de Hoogh A. The Relationship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and 
International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective. Austrian Journal of Public 
International Law, Vol. 41, 1991, p. 183. 
71. Johnson D. World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law. In: Towards World 
Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community. Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005. 
 207 
72. Jennings R. The Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24 
British Yearbook of International Law (1947), p. 301. 
73. Jennings R. Universal International Law in a Multicultural World. In: Bos M., Brownlie I., 
(eds.), Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987, p. 40. 
74. Johnson D. The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, July, 1955, p. 461. 
75. Pierson P. The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. 
Comparative Political Studies Vol. 29.2, 1996, p. 123. 
76. Keith K. Bilateralism and Community in Treaty Law and Practice – of Warriors, Workers, 
and (Hook-)Worms. In: Fastenrath U., et al. (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 
p. 753. 
77. Kekic L. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy. The Economist, (2007). p. 
21. 
78. Kennedy D. A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems, fall, 1994, p. 329. 
79. Kingsbury B., Donaldson M. From Bilateralism to Publicness in International Law. In: 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
80. Kingsbury B. International Law as Inter-Public Law. In: Richardson H., Williams M. (eds), 
Nomos XLIX: Moral Universalism and Pluralism. New Yourk: New York University Press, 
2009. 
81. Kingsbury B., Krisch N., Stewart R. The Emergence of Global Administrative Law. Law 
and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 68, 2005 Nos. 3& 4. 
82. Klabbers J. Constitutionalism Lite. 1 International Organizations Law Review, 31, 2004. 
83. Klabbers J. The Scope of International Law: erga omnes obligations and the turn to 
morality. In: Tpamäki M. (ed.), Liber Amicorum Bengt Broms, Helsinki, 1999. 
84. Klabbers J. (I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and Emergance of Non-State 
Actors. In: Petman J., Klabbers J., (eds) Nordic Cosmopolitanism: Essays in International 
Law for Martti Koskenniemi. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003, p.351. 
85. Koskenniemi M. A History of International Law Histories. In: Fassbender B., Peters A., 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 943. 
 208 
86. Koskenniemi M. Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order? 
British Yearbook of International Law, 2002, Vol. 2, 1, p. 337. 
87. Koskenniemi M. Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about 
International Law and Globalization. Theoretical Inquiries in Law Vol. 8, 2007, p. 9. 
88. Koskenniemi M. The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics. 
Modern Law Review, Vol. 70, 2007, p. 1. 
89. Koskenniemi M. International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities. Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 2005, Vol. 23 No.1, p. 64. 
90. Koskenniemi M. Hersh Lauterpacht (1897-1960). In: Jurists Uprooted: German-Speaking 
Emigre Lawyers in Twentieth-Century Britain, Beatson J. et al (eds), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
91. Koskenniemi M., Päivi L. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties. 
Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2002, p. 553. 
92. Koskenniemi M. New Approaches to International. In: New Approaches to International. 
Kennedy D., Tennant C., (eds.), Harward International Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1994. 
p. 427. 
93. Larsen K., Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The ‘Ultimate Authority and 
Control’ Test. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 2008, p. 521. 
94. Lauterpacht H. Codification and Development of International Law. In: International Law, 
Collected Papers, 2.The Law of Peace, Elihu Laurepacht ed., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975. 
95. Lauterpacht H. Spinoza and International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 
(1927) 8, p. 89. 
96. Lauterpacht H. The Grotian Tradition of International Law. British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 23, 1946, p. 27. 
97. Lauterpacht H. Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the 
International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (1949).  
98. Lauterpacht H. Régles générales du droit de la paix, 62 Recueil des Cours, (1937-IV) p.99. 
99. Lavalle R. A Novel, If Awkward, Exercise in International Law-Making: Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (2004). Netherlands International Law Review, 2004, p. 416. 
100. Liang Y. The General Assembly and the Progressive Development and Codification 
of International Law. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, 1948, p. 66. 
 209 
101. Lowe V. Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses. European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 10.2, 1999, p. 405. 
102. McCaffrey S. Lex Lata or the Continuum of State Responsibility. In: Weiler J. et al. (eds.), 
International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the ILC’s Draft Article 19 on State 
Responsibility. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989, p. 244. 
103. Morgenthau H. Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 34, 1940, p .260. 
104. Mosler H. The International Society as a Legal Community. 140 Recueil des Cours (1974 
IV) 1, p. 11. 
105. Nollkaemper A., Nadeski N. Responsibility of international organizations ‘in connection 
with acts of states’, SHARES Research Paper 08 (2012), finalized April 2012, available: 
sharesproject.nl [viewed August 26, 2014]. 
106. Nollkaemper A., Jacobs D. Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Concept Paper, 
ACIL Research Paper No 2011-07 (SHARES Series), finalized 2 August 2011, available: 
sharesproject.nl [viewed August 26, 2014]. 
107. Nollkaemper A. Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International 
Responsibility. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 16, 2 (Summer 2009), p. 546. 
108. Papić T. As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights Behrami and Saramati 
Decision and General International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 58, 2009, p. 283. 
109. Paulus A. Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation. Nordic Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 74, 2005, p. 317. 
110. Peaslee A. The Sanction of International Law. American Journal of International Law, 
1916, Vol. 10, No.2, p. 335. 
111. Pellet A. Between Codification and Progressive Development of the Law: Some Reflections 
from the ILC. International law forum 6(1) Leiden, 2004, p. 16. 
112. Pellet A. Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes! European Journal of International 
Law, 1999, Vol. 10 No. 2, p. 430. 
113. Pellet A. Remarques sur une révolution inachevée - Le projet de la C.D.I. sur la 
responsabilité des États. Annuaire français de droit international 1996, p. 4. 
114. Peters A. The Merits of Global Constitutionalism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
Vol. 16, 2009, p. 398. 
 210 
115. Peters A. Membership in the Global Constitutional Community. In: Klabbers J., Peters A., 
Ulfstein G. The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 155. 
116. Peters A., Armingeon K., Introduction  - Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 16, 2009, p. 385. 
117. Peters A. Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty. European Journal of International Law 
20, no. 3 (2009), p. 513. 
118. Peters A. Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures. Leiden Journal of International Law, 2006, 19, p. 579. 
119. Petman J. Panglossian Views into the New World Order. 13 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law, 2002, p. 336. 
120. Proelss A. Treaties Providing for Obligations of Third States. In: Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Dörr O., Schmalenbach K., (eds.), Heidelberg: Springer, 
2012, p. 645. 
121. Reinalda B. Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present 
Day. New Yourk: Routledge, 2009. 
122. Reinisch A. The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as Procedural Tools to 
avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes. Law & Practice of Int’l Courts and 
Tribunals Vol. 3 (2004) 37, p. 48. 
123. Romano C., The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle. The 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 31, 1998, p. 709. 
124. Root E. The Outlook for International Law. American Journal of International Law,1916, 
Vol. 10, No.1, p.7. 
125. Rosenne S. State Responsibility and International Crimes: Further Reﬂections on Article 19 
of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics Vol. 30, Fall 1997-Winter 1998, p. 145. 
126. Rosenne S. The Role of the International Law Commission. 64 American Society of 
International Law Procedure 1970, p. 26. 
127. Rosenstock R. An International Criminal Responsibility of States? In: ILC, International 
Law on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century — Views from the International Law 
Commission. New York: United Nations, 1997, p. 265. 
128. Rostovtsev M. International Relations in the Ancient World. In: The History and Nature of 
International Relations, Walsh E. ed. New York: MacMillan, 1922. 
 211 
129. Rubenstein W. On what a Private Attorney General Is – and Why it Matters. Vanderbilt Law 
Review, Vol. 57, No. 6, November 2004, p. 2129. 
130. Ryngaert C., Buchanan H., Member State Responsibility for the Acts of International 
Organizations. Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 7, 2011. p. 131. 
131. Salcedo C. Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law. 
European Journal of International Law 8, 1997 p. 588 
132. Salerno F. The Relevance of Consent in the Conclusion of Treaties Establishing Objective 
Regimes. In: The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, Cannizzaro E., ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
133. Scobbie, I. The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of ‘Obligations under 
Peremptory norms of General international Law’. European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, p. 1201. 
134. Shany Y. The First MOX Plant Award: The Need to Harmonize Competing Environmental 
Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures. Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, 
4, 2004, p. 815 
135. Shapiro M. Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance. 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 8, 2001 p. 369. 
136. Simma B. Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practicioner. 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2009, p. 267. 
137. Simma B., Pulkowski D. Of planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in 
International Law. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17 No. 3, 2006, p. 508. 
138. Simma B. From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Academie de Droit International, (1994 VI). 
139. Simma B. Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or 
Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes? In: The Future of 
International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios – New Law? (Delbruck ed.,), Kiel: 
Duncker&Humblot, 1993, p. 125. 
140. Simma B. The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty providing for an “Objective Regime”. Cornell 
International Law Journal, 1986, 19, p. 189. 
141. Slaughter A. Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy. Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, 2003, p. 1041. 
142. Slaughter A. A Global Community of Courts. Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 44, 
2003 p. 191. 
 212 
143. Slaughter A. The Accountability of Government Networks. Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, 2001, p. 347. 
144. Spinedi M. From One Codification to Another: Bilateralism and Multilateralism in the 
Genesis of the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility. European Journal of 
International Law, 2002, Vol. 13, No. 5, p. 1100. 
145. Stein E. Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, American 
Journal of International Law, 1981, Vol. 75, p. 1. 
146. Stern B. The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act. In: The Law of International 
Responsibility, Crawford J., Pellet A., Olleson S. (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. p. 193. 
147. Stern B. A Plea for “Reconstruction” of International Responsibility Based on the Notion of 
Legal Injury. In: Ragazzi M. (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of 
Oscar Schachter. Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005. 
148. Szasz P. The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96, American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 96, 2002, p. 902. 
149. Szasz P. Restructuring the International Organizational Framework. In: Weiss E. (ed) 
Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions. Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 1992, p. 360. 
150. Talmon S. The Security Council as World Legislature. American Journal of International 
Law, January 2005, p. 175. 
151. Tams C. Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible 
State? European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2002, p. 1161. 
152. Tomuschat C. Reconceptualizing the Debate on Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes – 
Concluding Observations. In: Tomuschat C., Thouvenin J., (eds.), The Fundamental Rules 
of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens And Obligations Erga Omnes. Leiden: 
Nijhoff, 2006, p. 425. 
153. Tomuschat C. The International Law Commission – An Outdated Institution? German 
Yearbook of International Law, 2006, Vol. 49, p. 77. 
154. Tomuschat C. International Crimes by States: An Endangered Species? In: Wellens K., 
(ed.), InternationalLaw: Theory and Practice, Essays in Honour of Eric Suy. Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 253. 
155. Tomuschat C. International Law Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century. General Course on Public International Law’, 281 Recueil des Cours (1999) p. 81. 
 213 
156. Tunkin G. The Role of Resolutions of International Organizations in Creating Norms of 
International Law. In: Butler (ed), International Law and the International System, 
Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987. 
157. Verdross A. Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law. American Journal of 
International law, 1966, 60 p. 55. 
158. Vermeer-Künzli A. A Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Protection and State Responsibility 
Erga Omnes. International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 56, No. 03, 2007, p. 553. 
159. Verzijl J. International Law in Historical Perspective. Leiden: Sijthoff, p. 1973. 
160. Villalpando S. The legal dimension of the international community: how community 
interests are protected in international law. European Journal of International Law, 21.2, 
2010. p. 410. 
161. Weil P. Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 77, 1989, p. 416. 
162. Waldock H. Special Rapporteur, Second report on the law of treaties, A/CN.4/156 and 
Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1963, Vol. II, p. 36. 
163. Waldock H. Third Report on the Law of Treaties, (1964), UN Doc. A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-
3 in 1964 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol.  II, p. 185. 
164. Waldron J. Can there Be a Democratic Jurisprudence? Emory Law Journal, Vol. 58, 2009. 
p. 675. 
165. Walker N. The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, 2002, p. 317. 
166. Weiss E. Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century. American Journal of 
International Law Vol. 96 (2002), p. 798. 
167. White, R. Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment. Netherlands International Law 
Review, Vol. 28, 1981, p. 149. 
168. Young A. Deconstructing International Organization Immunity. Georgetown Journal of 
international Law, Vol. 44, 2012, p. 311. 
169. Левин Д.Б. Проблема ответственности в науке международного права. Известия 
Aкадемии Hаук CCCP. Ho.2, 1946. 
170. Моджорян Л.А. Ответственность в современном международном праве, Советский 
ежегодник международного права 1970, Москва: Hаука, 1972. 
 
 
 214 
TREATIES 
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.  
2. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
2007, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/47, of 9 May 2008. 
3. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 UNTS 447. 
4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
December 11, 1997, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
5. Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. 
April 9, 1992, 1507 UNTS 167. 
6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107. 
7. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
September 22, 1992, 2354 UNTS 67. 
8. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22, 1985, 1513 UNTS 
293. 
9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, December 10,1984, 1465 UNTS 85. 
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3. 
11. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, September 3, 1992, 1974 UNTS 45. 
12. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
London, December 29, 1972, 1046 UNTS 120. 
13. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
December 21, 1965, 660 UNTS 195. 
14. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Washington 1964, 575 UNTS 159. 
15. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 596 UNTS 261. 
16. Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71. 
17. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
November 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221. 
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, May 23, 1969,  1155 UNTS 331. 
 215 
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
20. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Washington 1964, 17 UST 1270. 
21. Treaty Establishing European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 UNTS 11. 
22. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 
1948, 78 UNTS 277. 
23. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), September 2 1947, 21 UNTS 
77. 
24. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, December 2, 1946, 161 UNTS 72. 
25. Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 UNTS 16. 
26. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, October 2, 1924, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40421a204.html [viewed  August 28, 2014]. 
27. Covenant of the League of Nations, April 29, 1919 UKTS 4. 
28. Treaties of Münster of January 30 and  October 24, 1648 available at: 
http://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-
geschichte/portal/Internet/finde/langDatensatz.php?urlID=741&url_tabelle=tab_quelle 
[viewed  August 28, 2014]. 
29. Treaty of Osnabrück October 24, 1648, available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-
dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=4540 [viewed  August 28, 2014]. 
 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
International Court of Justice,  
1. Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) Judgment of March 
31, 2014 available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&case=148&code=aj&p3=4 [viewed September 8, 
2014]. 
2. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening), Judgment, 3 
February 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99. 
3. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), 
Judgment, 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012. 
 216 
4. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), 
Judgment, 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p.177. 
5. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.168. 
6. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 
July 2004, Advisory Opinion, 43 ILM (2004) p.1053. 
7. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2004, p.12. 
8. Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p.161. 
9. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3. 
10. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.466. 
11. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguy v. United States 
of America), Order of 10 November 1998, I. C. J. Reports 1998, p.426. 
12. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p.115. 
13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 616. 
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1996, p.226. 
15. Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p.102. 
16. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
8 April 1993, Provisional Measures, Sep. Op. Lauterpacht, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 440. 
17. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554. 
18. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1980, p.3. 
19. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.16. 
20. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p.32. 
 217 
21. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.3. 
22. South West Africa, second phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p.47. 
23. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v Bulgaria), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of May 26th, I.C.J. Reports I959, p.127. 
24. International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.128. 
25. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, 
p.174. 
 
Permanent Court of International Justice 
1. S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey), P.C.I.J. Reports 1927 (ser. A) No. 10. 
2. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v U.K.) P.C.I.J. Reports 1924, Series A, No. 2, 
p.12. 
3. S.S. “Wimbledon”, , P.C.I.J. Reports 1923, Series A, No. 1, p.15. 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
1. El-Masri v Macedonia, 39630/09 judgment of 13 December 2012, para.206. Available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621 [viewed September 28, 
2014]. 
2. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 27021/08, July 7, 2011. 
3. Behrami v. France, 71412/01; Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 78166/01133, 
ILR, 2007, 1. 
4. Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom, 35763/97, 2001-XI ECHR 79, 111. 
5. Loizidou v Turkey, A/310 [1995] ECHR 10. 
6. Denmark v Greece 3321/67, Yearbook of the ECHR, Vol. 12, 1969-II, p. 1. 
7. Norway v Greece 3322/67, Yearbook of the ECHR, Vol. 12, 1969-II, p. 1. 
8. Sweden v Greece 3323/67, Yearbook of the ECHR, Vol. 12, 1969-II, p. 1. 
9. Netherlands v Greece 3344/67, Yearbook of the ECHR, Vol. 12, 1969-II, p. 1. 
 
 218 
European Court of Justice and the General Court 
1. T–85/09, Kadi v Commission, [2010] ECR II–5177. 
2. C-58/08 The Queen, on application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-04999. 
3. T-137/07 Portela v Commission [2008] ECR II-00329. 
4. C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council 
and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351. 
5. C-145/04 Spain v UK, [2006] ECR I-7917. 
6. C-459/03 Commission v Ireland, [2006] ECR I-4635. 
7. C-304/02 Commission v France, [2005] ECR I-6263. 
8. T-250/02 Autosalone Ispra v EAEC [2005] ECR II 5227. 
9. C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2000] ECR I-00069.  
10. C-388/95 Belgium v Spain [2000] ECR I-03123.  
11. T-113/96 Edouard Dubois v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-125. 
12. C-331/88 Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023. 
13. 148/78 France v UK [1979] ECR 2923. 
14. 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
15. 28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1968] ECR 143. 
16. 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64). 
17. 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] ECR 1. 
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
1. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, IACHR Series A, No. 16 (1999). 
2. Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Judgment, IACHR Series C, No. 7 (1989). 
 
 219 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94A-A, 1999, 38 ILM 1581 
(1999). 
 
International Tribunal for the Law of The Sea 
MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v United Kingdom), Order, Request for Provisional Measures, 
ITLOS Case No 10, 3rd December 2001, 41 ILM 405. 
 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
Vol. 22, p. 53. 
 
WTO dispute resolution mechanisms  
WTO Panel, US – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R decision of 
January 27, 2000, para.7.73. 
Appellate Body of the WTO, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), 13 February 1998,WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 123. 
 
Permanent Court of Arbitration 
MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v United Kingdom), 42 ILM 5 (2003), 1187. 
 
SECONDARY EU LEGISLATION 
1. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013 implementing 
Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of 
Belarus. Official Journal of the European Union,  30.10.2013, L 288/1.  
2. Council Regulation (EU) No 697/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 
36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. Official Journal of 
the European Union, 23.7.2013, L 198/28. 
3. Council Implementing Regulation, (EU) No 206/2013 of 11 March 2013 implementing 
Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed 
 220 
against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran. Official Journal 
of the European Union, 12.3.2013, L 68/9. 
4. Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of 
Zimbabwe. Official Journal of the European Union, 24.2.2004, L 55/1. 
5. Council Regulation No 1228/2009 of 15 December 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 
423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, Official Journal, 16.12.2009, L 
330/49. 
 
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
1. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, adopted at its sixty-third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/66/10, 
para. 87). Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two. 
2. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Sixtieth Session (2008), UN Doc A/63/10, Ch IX ‘Protection of Persons in the Event 
of Disasters’. 
3. International Law Commission, Draft articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission,  2008, Vol. II, Part Two. 
4. International Law Commission, Draft articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10). 
5. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from 
the diversiﬁcation and expansion of international law, Report of the International Law 
Commission on its 56th session, GAOR, 59th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/59/10 (2004). 
6. International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Volume II, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. 
7. International Law Commission, First Report of the Special Rapporteur Dugard, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 2000/II(1), p.220. 
8. International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James 
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc 2000, A/CN.4/507/Add.4. 
9. International Law Commission, First Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James 
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/490/Add.2. 
10. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Forty-Eighth Session, 1996, Supplement No.10, UN Doc. A/51/10. 
 221 
11. International Law Commission: Draft Articles adopted by the International Law 
Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session, 1996, Supplement No.10, UN Doc. A/51/10. 
12. International Law Commission: Fifth report on state responsibility by Arangio-Ruiz G., 
A/CN.4/453 and Add.1-3, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1993, Vol. II, 
p.1. 
13. International Law Commission, Fifth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, 
Special Rapporteur, Document A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 2, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, 
Vol. II (Part One). 
14. International Law Commission, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Vol 2, A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l 
ii, p.226. 
15. International Law Commission, Fitzmaurice G. Special Rapporteur, Third report on law of 
treaties, A/CN A/115, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, Vol. II, p.20. 
16. International Law Commission, Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the First 
Session, UN Doc. A/925, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1949, p.227.  
17. Rules of the International Court of Justice, April 14, 1978, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&p3=0 [viewed August 10, 2014]. 
18. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) On the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. 
19. UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) on measures against the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea in connection with its nuclear weapon tests. 
20. UN Security Council resolution 1894 (2009) on protection of civilians in armed conflict. 
21. UN Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on protection of civilians in armed conflict. 
22. UN Security Council Resolution 1371 (2001) on the situation in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. 
23. UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (1999) on sanctions against Taliban government of 
Afghanistan. 
24. UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) on sanctions against Sierra Leone. 
25. UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) on sanctions against Yugoslavia. 
26. UN Security Council Resolution 784 (1992) on sanctions against Libya. 
27. UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
 222 
28. UN Security Council Resolution 409 (1977) on Southern Rhodesia. 
29. UN Security Council Resolution 388 (1976) on Southern Rhodesia. 
30. UN Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) on Darfur. 
31. UN General Assembly Resolution on Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, March 27, 2014. UN 
Doc. A/68/L.39. 
32. UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts,  56/83, 15 November 2013. 
33. UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, 65/19, 6 December 2010 
34. UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, 62/61, 6 December 2007. 
35. UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, 59/35, 16 December 2004. 
36. UN General Assembly Resolution on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, 28 January 2002, A/RES/56/83. 
37. UN General Assembly Resolution 174(II) of November 21, 1947, U.N. Doc. A/519. 
38. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. June 13, 1992. UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
39. Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Summary Records, 21 
September-10 December 1948, p.440. 
40. OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises of November 8, 2000, 
DAFFE/IME(2000)20. 
41. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms of the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, UN Doc 
E/CN.4Sub.2/2003//12/Rev.2 (2003) of August 13, 2003. 
42. World Bank Operational Policy 4.12 ‘Involuntary Resettlement’, January 2001 available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/ [viewed July 23, 2014]. 
 
September 19, 2014 
_________________________/ Edmunds Broks 
